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I. INTRODUCTION
Is security too important to be left to the politico-military community?
Is economic welfare too important to be left to the business community? Is
there any doubt that a failure to consider the security implications of trade
measures or the trade implications of security measures will lead to failed
policies in each area? These broad questions are posed by the current
disconnect between the two arguably most important organizations in global
governance in international security and international trade: the United
Nations Organization and the World Trade Organization (WTO). To begin
to explore this emerging set of questions, this Article considers one subset of
the legal issues posed by the relation between trade and security-that is,
how to implement the security exception found in the law of the WTO. This
exception, which on its face gives any member of the WTO the right to
decide unilaterally whether its security interests may trump its trade
commitments,' potentially encroaches on the regime for the management of
global security issues. Accordingly, how the provision is interpreted tells us
a great deal about how the existing supranational institutional structure will
address conflicts between trade and security values. It should also yield
insights about whether the institutions mediating global governance are
moving along trajectories that will encourage the evolution of institutions of
supranational governance that are both effective and democratic-institutions
that, like those of legitimate municipal governance, facilitate the
accommodation of diverse values and interests under the banner of the larger
community's needs. To articulate an approach for assessing these questions,
this Article will critique the two main existing views on the relationship
between WTO and U.N. law, which are premised on misconceptions of the
WTO law as either a limited bargain among states or as a constitutional
authority that "doth bestride the narrow world like a Colossus."2 It offers,
instead, an intermediate view, calling for a comity between the WTO and
the United Nations in the interpretation of their own spheres of competence
when they intrude into areas more clearly within the expertise of the other.
It should be noted that the meaning of the WTO security exception, as
well as the larger questions it implicates, is no longer merely an abstract
question. Some months ago, the United States and the European Union (EU)
reached what appeared to be a settlement of the ongoing dispute over the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, better known as the Libertad
or Helms-Burton Act.3 The most notorious provision of Helms-Burton,
creating a private right of action in U.S. courts for Cuban-Americans whose
property had been expropriated by the Castro regime, was repeatedly
1. See infra note 16 (providing text of relevant provisions).
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, 11. 135-36, in THE UNABRIDGED
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 949, 951 (William G. Clark & William A. Wright eds., 1989).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091
(West Supp. 1997)).
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suspended by President Clinton in return for an EU commitment to increase
pressure on Cuba to move toward democratization.4 Yet the European Union
continued to object vociferously to the threat of future liability in U.S.
courts should the President discontinue suspension of the private right of
action, as well as against the codification of the preexisting embargo and the
denial of visas for travel to the United States for those "trafficking" in
confiscated properties.' In an April 4, 1997, Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), the United States and the European Union took steps to address
these issues in the context of settling broader U.S.-EU disagreements
concerning the legal regime for the protection of investments and the
lawfulness of extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction.6 But blocking and
clawback statutes enacted in Europe and elsewhere remained in effect.7
The MOU's most salient achievement, at least in terms of its
immediate effect, was to put a hold on the pending EC legal challenge to
Helms-Burton before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (WTO/DSB).8
Because the suspension of the case preempted the European Community's
first submission, its legal theory thus far is stated best in its Request for the
Establishment of a Panel of October 3, 1996, in which it asserted both that
Helms-Burton violated particular provisions of the 1994 General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). The European Community also asserted that, regardless of
whether it violated the GATT or GATS, Helms-Burton nullified or impaired
trade benefits to which it was entitled under the GATT and GATS, and the
Act impeded attainment of the Community's objectives. 9 But it was the U.S.
4. See United States: Statement by the President on Suspending Title III of the Helms-
Burton Act, 36 I.L.M. 216, 216-17 (1997) (reporting President Clinton's announcement of six-month
suspension on implementation of Title Ill of Helms-Burton); Transcript of a White House Press
Briefing by Sandy Berger and Peter Tarnoff, U.S. NEwswuiE, July 17, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. The President cited the European Union's December announcement of a
"Common Position" to push for reforms in Cuba as one of the reasons for the suspension. See United
States: Statement by the President on Suspending Title X11 of the Helms-Burton Act, supra, at 217;
Clinton Statement on Cuba, U.S. NEwswmn, July 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5714184
(extending previous suspensions of Libertad Act). With the expiration of this initial six-month
suspension, the precise status of the WTO standstill provisions of the understanding is now somewhat
murky.
5. See Lionel Barber, EU to Outlaw Helms-Burton Co-operation, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 31, 1996, at 6; EUMay Retaliate Over U.S. Cuba Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 1996, at A14; cf
Saying Boo to Helms-Burton, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 49 (discussing Canadian and general
international condemnation of Helms-Burton).
6. See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the
U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529
(1997) [hereinafter U.S.-EU MOU].
7. See Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the Amendments
Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 36 I.L.M. 111, 111-13 (1997); European Union: Council
Regulation (EC) No. 2271196, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of
Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, 36 I.L.M. 125, 128-29 (1997); Mexico: Act to Protect Trade
and Investment from Foreign Norms that Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133, 133 (1997);
Theodor Meron & Detlev F. Vagts, The Helms Burton Act: Exercising the Presidential Option, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 84 (1997); Cuban Legislature Approves Helms-Burton Countermeasure,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5429566.
8. U.S.-EU MOU, supra note 6, at 530.
9. See World Trade Organization, United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democracy Act:
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threat to invoke the relevant national security exceptions under these
agreements, in which the United States claimed it was entitled to determine
whether its "essential security interests" justified the enactment of Helms-
Burton, that seems to have prompted a settlement, for now at least, although
other U.S. sanctions comparable to Helms-Burton could well result in a
separate challenge at the WTO/DSB.' ° Indeed, the United States coercively
had threatened that it might not even "show up" at the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (WTO/DSB) to defend its case," potentially undermining
the WTO and recalling the strategy the United States had employed in the
merits phase of Nicaragua's case before the International Court of Justice ten
years earlier.
Helms-Burton raises serious and important questions under
international law, including the WTO,' 2 the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),"3 and customary international law.' 4 It is conceivable
that these issues ultimately need not be addressed by international dispute
resolution-if, for example, a U.S. court effectively nullifies Helms-Burton
by construing it, in accord with one view of its legislative history, so as not
to violate international law.'" Yet the central question posed by the
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, para. (f), WT1DS3812 (Oct.
8, 1996) [hereinafter EC Panel Request].
10. Cf. Sue Kendall, Increasing Pessimism over International Investment Accord, Agence
France Presse, Feb. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allnws File (reporting that U.S.
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sanctions against French oil company Total's U.S. operations were
undercutting efforts to conclude Multilateral Agreement on Investment).
11. Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel; Move Escalates
Fight with European Union over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al (quoting
unnamed senior administration official).
12. See EC Panel Request, supra note 9; see also Pawel K. Chudzicki, The European
Union's Response to the Libertad Act and the Iran-Libya Act: Extraterritoriality Without Boundaries?,
28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 505, 520-25 (1997) (discussing WTO implications of Helms-Burton); Jonathan
R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
343, 351-57 (1996) (discussing WTO issues of earlier version of Helms-Burton); Brian Welke, GA1T
and NAFTA v. the Helms-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated Multilateral Agreements?, 4
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 361 (1997) (analyzing whether Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA and
GAT1).
13. See Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Resolution AG/DOC 3375/96
"Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere", OEA/ser. G/CP, doe. 2803/96, para. 6 (Aug.
27, 1996), available in 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996); W. Fletcher Fairey, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect
ofInternational Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1289, 1322-24 (1997).
14. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996) (discussing legality of extraterritorial application of U.S. law); EU/U.S.:
EU Member States Approve Deal to End Cuba Row, EUR. REP., Apr. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8516582 (reporting Canada's intent to pursue NAFTA Panel if U.S.-EU talks on Cuba fail); Joel
Glass, Fresh U.S. Exclusions Set to Anger Canada, LLOYD'S LisT INT'L, Mar. 17, 1997, at 3,
available in 1997 WL 4461858 (reporting Canadian trade minister's earlier charge that Ottawa would
seek NAFTA Panel if United States used Helms-Burton to "curtail[J" travel of Canadian citizens in
United States); Larry Herman, U.S. Shows Bad Form in Ignoring WRTO's Helms-Burton Panel, FIN.
POsT, Mar. 4, 1997, at 27 (citing Canada's plans to seek Panel under NAFTA similar to WTO Panel
sought by European Union); Peter Morton, EU Gets Warning from U.S.: Formal Complaint to World
Trade Organization About Anti-Cuba Sanctions Could Spark Backlash in Congress, Trade Official
Says, FIN. PosT, Nov. 21, 1996, at 7 (reporting Canadian and Mexican demands for NAFTA Panel
on Helms-Burton).
15. See Fairey, supra note 13, at 1326 n.235 (arguing that Congress's intent not to violate
international law should supersede measures it enacted that are later determined to violate international
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legislation has become the appropriateness of, as well as the likely reaction
to, a U.S. claim that the WTO national security exceptions are applicable in
this case." The most important aspect of this larger question is whether, in
the parlance of the exceptions, they are indeed self-judging-that is, free
from second-guessing by the WTO/DSB once a state has decided to invoke
them. It is argued that the self-judging interpretation of the national security
interests exception advanced by the United States may well undercut the
legal character of the new WTO."7 At the same time, the European
Community's decision to invoke its GATT rights against U.S. trade
sanctions, where those U.S. measures were not motivated by the kind of
protectionist sentiments that the WTO was intended to discipline, 8 may
signal the encroachment of the WTO legal regime into areas that previously
have been governed by other international institutions. The application of the
exception in this case thus has already publicly posed fundamental questions
about the nature of the WTO legal order.
law, given legislative history revealing that key proponents, Representative Burton and Senator
Coverdell, thought that Helms-Burton would not violate international law).
16. Article XXI of GATT provides for three distinct security exceptions:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. XXI, IV GATT B.I.S.D. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter GATT] (GATT agreement as amended and modified prior to adoption of WTO). The
GATT 1947 is incorporated into the GATT 1994, which was adopted with the founding of the WTO.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1(a), Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter
GATT 1994].
Formulations nearly identical to GATT Article XXI are also found in GATS Article XIV bis,
see General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TExTS 325 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS], and
TRIPs Article 73, see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement on Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 365 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs].
17. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Asserts Foreign Policy Is Involved in Its Dispute with
the EU over Cuba, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at A2 (quoting Professor John Jackson's assertion
that U.S. action may cause other countries to abuse national security exception); John H. Jackson &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burton, the U.S., and the WTO, FLASH INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 21, 1997, at 3 (on file with author).
18. But see Louis F. Desloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1996, at Cl (suggesting that certain factions in the United States may well have had economic
interests in securing Helms-Burton's enactment).
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This Article argues that the U.S. and EC views of the national security
interests exceptions reflect competing conceptions of the WTO legal order.
Under the first, the WTO is viewed as merely an agreement between states
governing a limited issue area, the disciplining of protectionist policies,
under which other issue areas are reserved to sovereign state decisionmaking
or, alternatively, whatever other international institutions states have
separately granted competence for management of the issue. Under this
view, the United States might well argue that its Helms-Burton sanctions are
outside the jurisdiction of the WTO and instead within the jurisdiction of the
United Nations (and, particularly, the Security Council).
Under the alternative conception, the new WTO represents a legal
order in which states have conceded quasi-constitutional authority for
management, not only of domestic protectionism, but also of national
policies pursued for any non-trade-related reasons that affect trade interests.
Under this view, the WTO legal order itself supplies the basis for restraining
the exercise of national security policies that impinge on trade interests.
Thus, the European Community might argue, based on a careful reading of
GATT history, that the essential security interests exception may not now be
invoked by the United States.
This Article suggests yet a third mode of interpreting the essential
security interests exception that mediates between the two competing
conceptions. Drawing on choice of law principles, it argues that the WTO
legal order should look to the practices of the United Nations to ascertain the
circumstances under which a state could legitimately invoke the essential
security interests exception-in particular, to whether the Security Council
has ever found a similar situation to warrant international enforcement
action.
Before articulating this view and applying it to the U.S.-EC dispute,
Part II of this Article discusses the alternative conceptions of the WTO that
underlie the competing U.S. and EC legal positions. It does so by
explicating the debate between Judith Hippler Bello and John Jackson
concerning the WTO remedial system, in which Bello suggests a bargain
theory of the new WTO as a contract between sovereigns and Jackson argues
from the premises of a public law, perhaps even quasi-constitutional,
conception. Part H further explores the presuppositions inherent in Jackson's
analysis of the administrative law concept of deference as a possible tool for
describing the relationship between WTO dispute settlement and national
adjudication of antidumping claims. Part III then employs these competing
perspectives to develop arguments for and against self-judging
interpretations of the WTO national security exceptions and shows how each
approach fails to resolve adequately the tension between the
supranationalizing effect of WTO law and the enduring importance of
national sovereignty. Part IV considers the relationship between the WTO
legal order and other structures of governance in the international legal order
that are implicated by the two conceptions. It does so by reexamining the
Institutional Comity in National Security
question of whether and how, in light of the establishment of an
"Organization" for the management of world trade, WTO law can function
as a special legal regime, separate from the general principles and rules of
international law or the influence of other international institutions. Finally,
Part V advances a choice of law approach for interpreting the essential
security interests exception that addresses the weaknesses of the bargain and
constitutional conceptions. It then applies the choice of law approach to the
Helms-Burton dispute.
In brief, under the choice of law view, the United States plausibly
could defend its trade-related measure from GATT challenge if it could
articulate its rationale for acting in terms of the types of circumstances that
previously have given rise to decisions by the United Nations that a matter
affects international peace and security. In the particular case of Cuba, the
United States might argue that the use of force by Cuba against U.S.
nationals in international air space, together with the broader threat of mass
migration from Cuba, could provide an objective basis for the assertion in
good faith of the essential security interests exception. The European
Community, on the other hand, could argue that Cuba's use of force failed
to persuade the Security Council that international peace and security were
threatened by Cuba's action and that the General Assembly has consistently
condemned the American trade embargo.
The Article concludes that, although the choice of law approach would
not necessarily resolve particularly hard cases, such as that between the
United States and European Union over Cuba, it would provide an objective
basis for addressing disputes of this kind. It would also encourage principled
decisionmaking within each institution, thus benefiting the broader
community by publicizing the relationship between issue areas and the
tradeoffs and bargaining that occur at the supranational level, furthering the
rational allocation of decisionmaking competence and buttressing the
legitimacy of the structure of international institutions as a whole.
I1. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS: WTO AS BARGAIN OR CONSTITUTION
The bargain and constitution conceptions of WTO law articulated by
Bello and Jackson may well reflect their different experiences: Bello was,
until quite recently, a U.S. government official and trade law practitioner,
and Jackson is chiefly known as the foremost academic authority on GATT
and now WTO law, although he too is also a former government official.
Thus, it is not surprising that Bello would suggest a modest degree of
supranational intrusion, while Jackson would envision a more dramatic
concession of state sovereignty. Their differences also may reflect the
longstanding dichotomy in GATT scholarship between so-called trade
realists, who regarded the GATT as a structured negotiating forum, and so-
called trade legalists, who focused on the GATT's role in cabining national
1998]
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trade policies through international rules. 9 Nonetheless, their conceptions
are the first major efforts to grapple with the new WTO's impact on state
sovereignty. Their two conceptions reflect alternative views of the effect of
the formal establishment of a World Trade Organization, after decades of ad
hoc institutional existence for the GATT, on the degree to which states must
comply with the rulings of the new WTO/DSB. The reasons Bello and
Jackson advance for their different views reveal underlying conceptions of
the relation between the new WTO and state sovereignty, which may well be
more determinative than the institutional commitments and scholarly
traditions inspiring their formal legal analyses. To make sense of Bello's and
Jackson's impressive technical assessments of GATT and now WTO law,
however, one needs to understand the historical context for the relevant
provisions of GATT and WTO law, as well as the larger supranationalizing
project from which the new WTO arose.
A. Old GAYT Wine into a New WTO Bottle
The GATT sprang from the ashes of the failed International Trade
Organization (ITO), which the U.S. executive branch had advanced after the
Second World War as a counterpart to the Bretton Woods institutions that
would be responsible for international economic reconstruction and
development. Congressional resistance led the executive branch to withdraw
support for the project and, instead, to seek an agreement for the provisional
application of the core trade rules embodied in the ITO without formally
establishing an international institution. Yet, through time and need, the
parties to the Protocol of Provisional Application, operating on the basis of
consensus, created a de facto international institution. But by calling each
other "contracting parties" rather than "members" and referring to decisions
of the GATT as those of "the Contracting Parties" acting collectively, they
preserved the legal reality that no true organization existed.2"
Given this anomalous legal origin, the GATT functioned for most of its
history primarily as a forum for multilateral negotiations leading to agreed
tariff rates. The GATT reached settlements through a series of multilateral
negotiating "rounds" in which each state accepted trade benefits in the form
of lower tariff rates for its exports to all importers of a particular product in
return for its own concession of lower tariffs on other products. The
"balance of advantages" thus negotiated was predicated, however, on
19. See infra note 43 (contrasting Robert Hudec's trade realism with Jackson's trade
legalism).
20. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 293-301 (3d ed. 1995).
21. This is something of an oversimplification. Negotiations were conducted under agreed
procedures that tended to reflect the economic power of larger economies, such as the principal
supplier rule, under which the principal exporter of a product negotiated the terms of its importation.
See id. at 379; see also Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zarcher, The GA7T and the Regulation of
Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273, 303 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983) (describing effect of principal supplier rule in enhancing power of large
economies).
Institutional Comity in National Security
compliance with the rules of the GATT, which included the most favored
nation principle as the structuring principle for negotiation of tariff
concessions and rules prohibiting quantitative restrictions and requiring
national treatment as the principal bulwarks against dilution of the trade
opportunities achieved though the negotiated concessions. The negotiated
balance of advantages was also premised on the reasonable expectations of
trade opportunities that would flow from the agreed tariff rates, based on the
circumstances underlying the negotiation. Accordingly, the GATT remedial
system contemplated the possibility of a remedy for measures by states that,
although not in violation of any of the particular rules of the GATT legal
system, nonetheless would "nullify or impair benefits" to which another
contracting party was entitled."
Given this legal complexity, the GATT included specific provisions
governing the relationship between the "Contracting Parties" in a case of
nullification or impairment of "benefits accruing" under the GATT's dispute
resolution rules. Article XXIII called first, for negotiated "satisfactory
adjustment" of the balance of advantages; second, for recommendations or
rulings by GATT dispute settlement Panels, which ordinarily came to
include withdrawal of the challenged measure; and, finally, if all else failed,
for "[authorization for] a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such obligations or
concessions under [the] Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in
the circumstances."23 Indeed, the weight attached to the original GATT's
apparent remedial goal of withdrawal of the offending measure, rather than
damages, may explain jurisprudence under the GATT-related Tokyo Round
Government Procurement Agreement holding that "provision of
compensation had been resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the
measure was impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the
withdrawal of the measures which were inconsistent with the General
Agreement. 5124
Over time, an increasingly sophisticated dispute resolution system of
quasi-adjudicative "Panels" evolved to address so-called violation and non-
violation complaints by the Contracting Parties under the GATT itself and a
family of GATT-related agreements negotiated during a series of tariff
22. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 348-49. One important so-called non-violation case
that clarified the nullification or impairment of benefits concept involved the U.S. assertion that the
expansion of the European Community distorted U.S. export opportunities. See EEC Payments and
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991) (Report of the Panel). The negotiated tariffs had been
premised for the United States on competitive opportunities for the United States which were vitiated
by the reduction of tariffs in competing products between the former members of the European
Community and new members of the European Community pursuant to the otherwise GATT-legal
expansion of the EC. See id.
23. GATT art. XXIII, para. 2.
24. Norway Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim, para.
4.21, GATT Doc. GPR.DS2/R (Apr. 28, 1992) (Panel Report) adopted May 13, 1992 by the
Committee on Government Procurement; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 551-56
(discussing Tokyo Round Government Procurement Agreement).
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negotiating rounds. Increasingly, Contracting Parties resorted to this
evolving GATT dispute resolution system to pursue "legal" rather than
"political" resolution of their differences. But concern, particularly in the
United States, about the ability of the losing party to block consensus
required for the adoption by the Contracting Parties of a GATT ruling called
into question the effectiveness of the GATT system. Accordingly, the recent
Uruguay Round for tariff reductions was coupled with extraordinary
proposals for institutional reform which led ultimately to the establishment
of a World Trade Organization. 25
The new WTO supposedly enabled the new WTO members to create a
dispute resolution system with teeth. While the overall remedial structure of
the old GATT was retained in the new WTO,26 it was located in a new
institutional context. The key revision from the GATT practice requiring the
consensus of the Contracting Parties for the adoption of a Panel Report was
that now, in most cases, Panel rulings automatically would be adopted by the
WTO/DSB unless rejected by consensus of the members.27 In addition, the
governing bodies of the WTO now have the power to interpret
authoritatively the provisions of the WTO Agreement establishing the
Organization as well as the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) setting
forth specific rules governing trade. 2' This might provide the basis for
overruling an interpretation advanced by the WTO/DSB, although not the
particular ruling in which it was found. 29 The law-creating power of the
25. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 338-43.
26. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 3(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Ta
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 404
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU]; see also infra text accompanying notes 226-230
(discussing DSU rules on remedies).
27. See DSU, supra note 26, arts. 16, 17. For discussion of the new DSU as a move toward
legalism, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GA27T, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Miquel Montana I Mora, A GA7T with Teeth: Law Wins over
Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 128-41
(1993); and Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 396-406 (1995). For a critique of GATT legalism on democratic
grounds, see Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1016,
1029 (1985), in which the author states: "In my view the value of representative government
outweighs the value of free trade." Even after the end of the Cold War, Trimble's doubts about this
aspect of international institutions are widely shared. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future
Security Council, 18 WASH. Q. 5, 12 (1995) (expressing concern over democratic deficit at United
Nations); J.H.H. Veiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2412 (1991)
(identifying democracy deficit as constraint on consolidation of European Union).
28. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. IX(2), THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE
LEGAL TEXTS 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO AGREEMENT].
29. See, e.g., World Trade Organization: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations (statement of John Jackson, Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan)
(June 10, 1994), available in 1994 WL 14188767 [hereinafter VJ'O Hearings]. The power to interpret
is not unlimited, since it may not in theory "be used in a manner that would undermine the
amendment provisions in Article X." WTO AGREEMENT art. IX(2). Because the WTO Agreement
permits three-fourths of the membership of the WTO to exercise this power, however, it might be
exercised to correct "legislatively" an erroneous interpretation of the WTO/DSB that could be
corrected otherwise only by consensus. Under the DSU, the particular Panel ruling would bind the
parties, although its legal reasoning would have no generative power. See infra text accompanying
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WTO is further buttressed by the WTO Agreement's amendment provisions,
which contemplate the possibility of amendments that would in some
instances bind members without their consent."
On the other hand, important limits on the power of the new WTO
remain. The expanded amendment power is subject to exceptions
entrenching the most favored nation principle and the basic institutional rules
governing the creation of new WTO law." Moreover, subject to WTO
amendment or reinterpretation, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) adjudication remains limited by the exceptions stated in the MTAs,
such as the general exceptions supplied by article XX of the GATT for,
among other things, environmental, conservation, and anti-monopoly
concerns,32 as well as the security exception in article XXI of the GATT.
notes 139-150 for discussion of precedential effect of Panel decisions.
30. Article X(4) provides that amendments of "a nature that would not alter the rights and
obligations of the Members, shall take effect for all Members upon acceptance by two thirds of the
Members." WTO AGREEMENT art. X(4). Noting that "all amendments at least indirectly change the
rights and obligations of Members," Frieder Roessler, Director of the Legal Affairs Division of the
GATT Secretariat, stated that "[w]hat was meant was that amendments which do not change the
policy obligations of Members towards each other, such as amendments relating to the institutional
structure or the procedures of the WTO, could be made applicable to all." Frieder Roessler, The
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE URUGUAY ROUND REsuLTs: A
EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE 67, 75 (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1995). In addition,
even amendments that "alter the rights and obligations of the Members" may become binding upon
members on pain of expulsion if three-fourths of the members decide that the amendment is "of such a
nature that any Member which has not accepted it ... shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to
remain a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference." WTO AGREEMENT art. X(3). This
artfully phrased expulsion power, see Roessler, supra, at 74, thus expands the law-creating power of
the WTO. It suggests the possibility that new multilateral agreements in major issue areas can be
purchased by a WTO supermajority and imposed on dissenting members who cannot bear the price of
expulsion. But see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398, 454 (1997) (stating that new WTO practices "have been tightened so as
to better accommodate concerns with protecting national sovereignty and preventing imbalances in
rights and obligations").
One might say that, by accepting the WTO, members have consented ex ante to any
amendments consistent with these rules. However, the legitimacy of this formalistic notion of consent
is rather problematic. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 49
(1990) (describing process-legitimacy as function of various factors: determinacy, symbolic
validation, coherence, and adherence). Thus, whether we are prepared to find persuasive a
justification based on ex ante consent to particular rules or results will depend to a great extent on the
context in which it is employed. Compare LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY 95-108 (1994)
(critiquing theory of advance consent in problematic context of membership in United Nations
operating as consent to enforcement action authorized by U.N. Security Council against member
state), with Frederick Kirgis, Specialized Lav-Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER
109, 124 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (after describing World Intellectual
Property Organization rules, noting that entry into force for all parties upon supermajority's approval
'seems to be catching on for other multilateral regulatory treaties negotiated under the auspices of
U.N. specialized agencies, if the treaties deal with fairly narrowly defined subjects and do not call for
detailed annexes that need to be amended more easily"). How the WTO fits into this continuum of
legitimacy is a central concern of this essay. See infra Part IV (discussing whether WTO law is closed
regime).
31. See WTO AGREEMENT art. X(2).
32. Article XX of the GATT provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
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Exceptions protecting sovereignty concerns cannot, however, swallow
the WTO's new supranationalizing rules. Indeed, an entirely self-judging
security exception would pose the risk of recreating, at least in theory, the
power of the losing party to block adverse Panel rulings. Concededly, there
always would be some political cost to abuse of the security exception,
perhaps even a cost so great that the WTO membership would amend or
reinterpret the security exception to eliminate the risk of such abuse in the
future. But even the theoretical risk of the very defect of pre-WTO/DSB
GATT adjudication that led to the WTO compels one to focus carefully on
whether a truly fully self-judging security exception would deviate from the
WTO's overall purposes. Bello's and Jackson's analyses of the legal effect
of WTO/DSB rulings are crucial in facilitating this project, for they lay the
groundwork for Part III's assessment of the WTO/DSB's possible responses
to an assertion of the security exception.
B. WTO as Bargain
Bello has argued recently that "WTO rules are simply not 'binding' in
the traditional sense."s" Rather,
a government could renege on its negotiated commitment not to exceed a specified
tariff on an item, provided it restored the overall balance of GATT concessions through
compensatory reductions in tariffs on other items. That is, a government could change
its mind about and raise a particular tariff, provided it offset such 'nullification and
impairment' of the delicate GATT balance through compensatory tariff reductions.5
Therefore, "any WTO member may exercise its sovereignty and take action
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, provided only that it compensates
adversely affected trading partners or suffers offsetting retaliation. "36 Thus,
on the surface at least, by channeling the WTO remedial system toward
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating
to ... the enforcement of [state] monopolies . ; [and]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.
GATT art. XX.
33. See supra note 16.
34. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (1996). For an earlier statement of Bello's view, see Judith H. Bello &
Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute Resolution in the New World
Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095, 1103 (1994), which notes that
"[e]ven if the United States as a defendant loses some WTO dispute settlement cases, it is not required
to change its law or practice to come into conformity with a WTO dispute settlement verdict."
35. Bello, supra note 34, at 417.
36. Id.
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substitutional relief rather than specific performance, the bargain conception
treats the WTO as a rather limited constraint on national sovereignty.
Bello's focus on "the fundamental nature of the negotiated bargain
among sovereign member states " " may well reflect a deeper view of the
function of remedial law in the trade area. Modem American contract
doctrine on remedies finds its origins in Holmes's famous dictum that "[t]he
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it."38 Indeed, under contract law, thought
Holmes, a party remained "free from interference until the time for
fulfillment ha[d] gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he
chooses. "" The American preference for substitutional relief in contract was
fed by concern over the potential intrusion on private liberty and doubts
concerning the efficacy of judicial supervision of specific relief,4" as well as
by the presumption that most contract cases involve commercial values
readily measurable in reference to actual or hypothetical markets.4"
37. Id.
38. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897). Holmes
added:
If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to
pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in
the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they
can.
Id. Thus, Holmes's remedial theory of contract was of a piece with his underlying jurisprudential
approach of objectifying judicial decisionmaking and treating private lawmaking as the maximization
of social welfare. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 148-95 (1993). This view further manifested itself in Holmes's reticence to restrict legislative
power through value-laden constitutional rules. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics.").
39. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881).
Modem contract doctrine, indeed even English doctrine well-established in Holmes's time, cast doubt
on Holmes's major premise for his conclusion that a party was always free to breach, for many
contracts were understood to create relationships that established interests in the reliability of
performance in the future that could be undercut in the present. See, e.g., Hockster v. De La Tour,
118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853) (establishing doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation, albeit
giving rise only to damages). Compare U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1972) (giving right to demand adequate
assurance of due performance prior to time performance is due), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 251 (1981) (setting forth comparable rule). See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978) (focusing on role of contract law in maintaining relationships between
parties rather than imposing remedies affording substitutional relief for noncompliance).
40. But cf. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1952) (granting injunction that,
although not requiring singer to perform her original contract, enjoined her from performing contract
with third party for engagement making performance of her original obligation impossible).
41. The efficiency of breach from a global wealth-maximizing perspective thus follows,
since it is argued that the breaching party would not breach its obligations unless the gains from
breach exceeded the costs of breach, including the duty to pay substitutional relief. See Lewis A.
Korhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv.
683, 686-710 (1986); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-45 (5th ed.
1998). But see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (arguing
that substitutional relief rule in contract fails on efficiency grounds because it does not account for
third-party interests); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275-77,
284-87 (1979) (arguing, among other things, that damages are likely to be undercompensatory and
that defaulting parties are best positioned to estimate true costs of their breach, so that rule favoring
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These considerations appear to support a substitutional remedial rule
for the WTO as well, given the importance of state sovereignty and the
market-oriented character of WTO law. The WTO/DSB, argues Bello, has
no authority to impose remedies or coerce compliance.42 More important,
focusing on the reciprocal concessions negotiated by states, the bargain
conception treats the GATT rules against protectionist measures, such as the
ban on quantitative restrictions and the most favored nation principle, merely
as instruments for assuring the stability of the negotiated balance of
advantages. This in turn suggests that the balance of trading power reflected
in the WTO is its central defining feature, placing the bargain conception of
the new WTO on the realist side of the historic split in GATT theology
between those who treated the GATT as a negotiating forum in which the
existing balance of power is reflected and those who saw the GATT from a
rule-oriented perspective in which global welfare is advanced. 43
The supremacy of the balance of advantages in WTO law under the
bargain conception thus emphasizes the mercantilist dimension of the GATT,
for trade is seen simply as "state policy," in Clausewitz's immortal
expression, by "other means. " 44 This view of the GATT bargain as a
struggle for power among states echoes the Holmesian view that contracts
are amoral struggles for power between individuals and further reflects an
atomistic portrait of international law, one that draws largely from the
Hobbesian state of nature as a war of all against all.45 It thus supplies an
argument for a broad reading of the security interest exception.
In some ways, however, the bargain conception may be more intrusive
on state sovereignty than it first appears, even in cases involving the national
security exception. Bello claims that detractors of the new WTO "oppose the
light it sheds on the costs of economic protectionism and of subordinating
specific performance would encourage negotiation of truly compensatory settlements).
42. "When a panel established under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding issues a
ruling adverse to a member, there is no prospect of incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm
inflicted or police enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no
truncheons or tear gas." Bello, supra note 34, at 417.
43. Compare ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (1990), and Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible":. Some Reflections on the
Nature of Litigation Betveen Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1987) (advancing power-oriented
view), with JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990) (espousing rule-oriented
approach); see also Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 851, 873-82 (1996) (discussing place of "institutionalism"
within realist/liberal debate).
44. KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR at xxix (O.J. Matthjis Jolles trans., 1943); see also
ALBERT 0. HIRSHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 34-40 (expanded
ed. 1980) (focusing on Nazi grand strategy to demonstrate that economic dependency yields political
power).
45. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Pt. 1, ch. XIII (C.B. Macpherson ed.. Penguin Books
1968) (1651); cf. Theodore H. Moran, Grand Strategy: The Pursuit of Power and the Pursuit of
Plenty, 50 INT'L ORG. 175, 192-93 (1996) (pursuing analogy to Hobbes and Locke, and their
respectively competitive and cooperative views of domestic state of nature, to articulate national
leaders' assumptions about international state of nature in formulation of international trade policy).
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trade objectives and obligations to nontrade objectives."46 She goes on to
suggest that
the United States may impose primary and even secondary embargoes of imports for
environmental or other nontrade purposes-but not necessarily for free. If a member's
measure is inconsistent with the WTO, a specific, identifiable price will be paid ....
Some special interest groups would prefer to keep such costs hidden, since their
publication is likely to reduce political support for using trade tactics for nontrade
objectives.'
The breadth of this formulation, together with Bello's statement that "[t]he
only sacred WTO imperative is to maintain [the balance of negotiated
concessions] so as to maintain political support for the WTO Agreement by
members,"48 suggests that even measures nullifying and impairing benefits
accrued under the GATT that are adopted for such nontrade purposes as
national security might confer upon affected states a right to substitutional
relief.49
Subject to the potential caveat that even nonprotectionist national
security measures that undermined the benefit of the GATT bargain would
entail a price, however, the bargain conception treats the WTO as a modest
institution. In fact, the WTO would fall squarely within a traditional
international model in which states retain their full sovereignty and
separateness, the so-called billiard ball model, under which self-help through
countermeasures is the principal means of enforcement of international
obligations."0 Yet, such a narrow conception of the WTO would likely
undermine Bello's goal of preserving the domestic political basis for support
for the WTO. " It has been argued that a trade regime that is fundamentally
indifferent to the social values in which trading communities are rooted is
doomed to undermine its own political support.5" Perhaps Bello recognized
as much, in conceding-oddly, when viewed from the traditional conception
of international law implicit in her argument-that the new WTO is
"essentially a confederation of sovereign national governments," albeit one
46. Bello, supra note 34, at 418.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 417.
49. One might argue that equating the balance of advantages negotiated under the GATT
with national security perversely supports a right to compensation even when the essential security
exception is invoked, for the advantages a state gains by invoking the exception should be balanced by
equivalent national security losses in order to restore the balance to reflect the power relationships the
negotiated reciprocal concessions embodied. See infra text accompanying note 89.
50. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES 39-40 (1984).
51. See Bello, supra note 34, at 418.
52. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 658, 660 (1996).
Nichols argues that the WTO,
as currently envisioned, fails to take into account the fundamental nature of societal
values, and creates little or no space in which such laws can exist. This intemperance
may diminish the already fragile support for the international trade regime, which in
turn may hinder the ability of member countries to support the World Trade
Organization.
1998]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 23: 301
that relies on "voluntary compliance" for enforcement.53 A "confederation"
suggests a somewhat greater transfer of sovereignty than Bello seems
otherwise prepared to accept. In endorsing most of the passage in which this
statement is found, Professor Jackson seems to indicate his agreement with
this broader view of WTO law. 4
C. WITO as Constitution
The constitutionalist premises of Jackson's argument are fully revealed
only through a careful and extended assessment not only of his critique of
Bello's argument that WTO/DSB rulings are not binding but also of his
recent analysis of the deference the WTO/DSB might give to a WTO
member's initial effort in applying WTO law governing antidumping
determinations. As this Article will argue, Jackson's expansive view of
WTO law cannot be explained adequately through traditional international
law categories concerning the relation between treaty and customary law or
the language of the longstanding debate between monists and dualists.
Rather, Jackson employs new categories for evaluating WTO law that depart
from traditional conceptions. Although this new constitutional approach
captures an important dimension of the WTO, as this Article will argue, it
overshoots the mark by isolating the WTO from other sources of
international law that could redress the deficit of substantive law that the
security exception would otherwise create.
Jackson's analysis of the effect of WTO remedial law reveals his view
of the uniqueness and supremacy of WTO law generally. His assessment of
Bello's thesis distinguishes between two cases: on the one hand, complaints
of nullification or impairment based on violation of the GATT; and, on the
other, so-called non-violation complaints. Jackson notes that the DSU
specifically provides that "where a measure has been found to nullify or
impair benefits under, or impede the attainment of objectives, of the relevant
covered agreement without violation thereof, there is no obligation to
withdraw the measure. " " Jackson argues that this statement "strongly
implies that in violation cases there is an obligation to perform."56 In short, a
violation of GATT/WTO rules amounting to a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment under the DSU would have important remedial
consequences, depriving the breaching member of the option of paying
compensation rather than withdrawing the offending measure. A violation of
53. Bello, supra note 34, at 417.
54. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings
on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 60, 61 (1997). Jackson specifically takes issue
only with Bello's statement that "[1]ike the GATT rules that preceded them, the WTO rules are simply
not 'binding' in the traditional sense." Id. (quoting Bello, supra note 34, at 416).
55. Id. at 63 (quoting DSU art. 26(1)(b)).
56. Id. (emphasis omitted). One might quibble with Jackson's textual analysis, since the
quoted language excluding any obligation to withdraw in non-violation cases could still be consistent
with a Holmesian view of an alternative obligation to perform or pay damages in the violation context.
Jackson also identifies, however, a series of DSU provisions he believes make clear that the DSU
"establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recommendation." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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GATT/WTO rules in and of itself would then assume greater significance,
for it would serve not only the instrumental function of reducing the costs of
WTO litigation by simplifying nullification and impairment of benefits
findings but also reflect the WTO membership's willingness to adhere to
WTO rules. In brief, Jackson's partial rejection of Bello's Holmesian theory
of the WTO remedial law arguably supposes a deepened quasi-constitutional
commitment of states to WTO rules.
The constitutional character of this view should not be confused with
an argument for the incorporation of WTO law into domestic law. Indeed,
Jackson has made clear that the constitutional dimension of his argument
does not flow from the idea that WTO law has become part of the
constitutional order of U.S. law. Jackson has argued recently that many
domestic legal systems, such as that of the United States, do not give GATT
rules direct, statute-like effect. 7 The EC and U.S. reluctance to give the
GATT/WTO direct effect in their respective legal orders surely reflects the
competitive aspect of the balance of advantages bargained for under the
WTO/GATT, under which states cooperate to improve their common
position yet continue to engage in mercantilist struggles over the exact
distribution of the gains from cooperation." Indeed, the most vigorous
advocate of the constitutionalization of free trade principles has favored
direct effect for the GATT, arguing that the "new mercantilism" is a
"constitutional failure."59 Constitutionalization of WTO law in the sense of
57. See id. at 64; see also John H. Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign
Trade Law and Policy, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65, 74-75
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS]. The
European Community has thus far also treated GATT as a bargain between sovereigns, rather than as
a statute that has become part of the EC legal order. See Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Status of
GAYT in EC Law, Revisited-The Consequences of the Judgment on the Banana Import Regime for the
Enforcement of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 53, 68 (1995) (concluding
that failure to treat WTO/GATT as having direct effect in EC legal order reflects "the perception that
GATT is a matter for the policy-making institutions, and that the Court [of Justice] will only intervene
when a policy decision is made by the institutions in secondary legislation to the effect that some
weight be given to the enforcement of international obligations"). According to Castillo de ]a Torre,
however, the EC Commission's position that GATT is not to be given direct effect under EC law, in
part because of the U.S. failure to make GATT self-executing under U.S. law or enforceable by
private citizens in U.S. courts, is arguably inconsistent with EC jurisprudence that does not require
reciprocity. See id. at 67-68.
58. Compare Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) (arguing that states focus on
relative gains rather than absolute gains), with Duncan Snidal, International Cooperation Among
Relative Gains Maximizers, 35 INT'L STUD. Q. 387, 388 (1991) (conceding that relative gains
concerns impede cooperation only in situations involving small numbers of states).
59. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 57, at 3, 38-44 (arguing for judicial review of individual free
trade claims as check on mercantilist behavior by states). See generally ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
(1991) (examining international economic relations from constitutionalist standpoint, under which free
trade principles are seen as aspect of private liberty that state should not be free to undercut without
judicial review).
On the other hand, rent-seeking might be reduced and trade-related, as well as other, private
rights might be vindicated by establishing mechanisms through which third parties might be given a
hearing at the WTO. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
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giving private persons direct rights to judicial relief in domestic courts
would raise profound concerns about the democratic legitimacy of WTO
law.60 Given his dualist rejection of the direct effect of WTO law in U.S.
courts, it is thus difficult to argue that Jackson's objection to the bargain
conception of WTO remedies derives from a monist concern that WTO law
should be part of the U.S. constitutional order.
Neither should Jackson's objection to Bello's remedial theory be
explained as a disagreement about the nature of the traditional international
law remedies, although Bello and Jackson might well have expressed their
disagreement in these terms. In theory, international law might be relevant
by way of the use of customary and general principles of law to fill in the
gaps of WTO law,6 for the DSU plainly recognizes that the dispute
settlement system is to "preserve the rights and obligations of the Members
under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law." 62 Such "preservation" and "clarification" might
include elaboration of the remedial consequences of the breach of
substantive obligations, relying on the general international law of
remedies.63
Jackson thus might have argued that Bello's international law remedial
theory ignores the preference for specific performance implied in the
Permanent Court of International Justice's dictum in the Chorzow Factory
Disputes to Non-government Parties, 17 U. PA. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300-03 (1996); Glen T.
Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute
Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2275, 2291 (1997) (arguing that private right of action
might prevent United States from using its economic and political power to avoid resolution of Helms-
Burton dispute at DSB); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. INT'L ECON. L. 359, 367-68 (1996).
60. See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 209-10 (1993) (arguing that Madisonian values of pluralism and deliberative
democracy require dualist conception of law under which international legal rules that are not
produced through appropriate processes may be less legitimate than domestic legal rules and, thus,
calling into question canons of statutory construction that favor international law over domestic law).
But compare infra text accompanying notes 305-319 for an argument that pluralism and deliberative
democracy in international lawmaking are furthered by deference by one international institution to the
law of another international institution.
61. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, as a general
rule of interpretation, for reference to "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, art. 31, para. 3(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
62. DSU, supra note 26, art. 3(2).
63. A technical objection to this line of argument might be that remedial law as such may be
excluded from "the customary rules of interpretation of public international law," since the rules
concerning breach stated in the Vienna Convention do not clarify the remedial consequences of
breach. On the other hand, the interpretive question of whether a treaty regime incorporates "relevant
rules" of international remedial law or instead specifies a special remedial regime, is clearly a
question of interpretation; the DSU mandates that its interpretation be in accordance with customary
rules of public international law. Cf. NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REvISION OF TREATIES
IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY LAW 141-44 (1994) (treating question of whether new customary
law, other than new jus cogens norms, affects the meaning of earlier treaty as essentially question of
interpretation of whether the original treaty was intended to create lex specialis that would be free
from effects of new custom).
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case, which has been widely understood to suggest that restitutio in integrum
is the preferred remedy in international law.' Jackson did not cite Chorzow
Factory or even assert the proposition that some form of specific
performance is the preferred remedy in international law, however.6" Rather,
like Bello, he explicitly framed his analysis in terms of the remedial law of
the WTO itself, without reference to its relation to general international law
principles.6 In sum, Jackson's position, like Bello's, treats the WTO as a
separate legal regime which operates, in some sense, as a "confederation,"
except that, unlike Bello's bargain conception, his view entails an obligation
for specific performance at least in violation cases.
Given the weakness of other possible explanations, the probable best
explanation for Jackson's objection to the bargain conception is suggested by
the vision of the WTO as an autonomous supranational legal regime
presented in Jackson and Steven Croley's discussion of the standard of
review of national decisions in antidumping cases.6' Jackson and Croley
maintain, in an argument that on its surface seems to support state
sovereignty, that the WTO/DSB should accord a particular brand of
deference to national administrative agencies initially applying the GATT
Antidumping Code, following its injunction that: "Where [a] panel finds that
a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in
64. The PCIJ stated:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need
be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it-such are the principles which should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.
Chorzow Factory (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 47 (Sept. 13).
65. Christine Gray has shown, in any event, that the received view that specific performance
is the preferred international law remedy may well be incorrect. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1987) ("There is little, if anything, to support the primacy of
restitutio in integrum in international arbital practice."). Compare International Law Commission:
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 44, 37 I.L.M. 440, 445 (1998) (implying preference for
restitutio in integrum: "The injured State is entitled to... compensation for damage... if and to the
extent that the damage is not made good by restitution in kind."), with United States Comments on
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 I.L.M. 468, 479 (1998) (questioning primacy of restitutio in
integrum, except in small class of exceptional cases, such as restoration of cultural property; otherwise
'compensation appears to be the preferred and practical form of reparation in state practice and
international law").
66. Jackson specifically stated: "I do not here address another interesting legal question of
the WTO and the DSU; namely, whether the new text of the DSU imposes an obligation on states to
refrain from all international law remedies for redress of a complaint other than those provided in the
DSU." Jackson, supra note 54, at 64 n.12; see also infra text accompanying notes 223-231
(discussing whether WTO is "closed regime").
67. See Steven P.' Croley & John H. Jackson, rTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194-95 (1996). Analysis of
this set of rules is particularly revealing since the standard of review in this class of cases was among
the central issues holding up the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. See id. at 194.
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conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations. ,6
1
Jackson and Croley correctly observe that the provision seems to
conflict with general principles of treaty interpretation, which arguably
reject the possibility of there being more than one correct interpretation of a
legal text. The DSU explicitly provides that the DSB is to "clarify" WTO
agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law," 69 and the Antidumping Code itself provides that "the
panel should interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law."7" The interpretive rules in the Vienna Convention are usually regarded
as a codification of the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law, and these rules appear to suppose the 'existence of a single
best interpretation." General international law rules and principles, in
addition to the treaty's legislative history would, in theory at least, resolve
doubts as to which of many plausible interpretations is, at the end of the day,
the best and therefore the only one that is "permissible." 2 Noting the
discrepancy, Jackson and Croley characterize the deference rule in the
Antidumping Code as "the fruit[] of compromise," whose meaning is
somewhat indeterminate. '3
What is particularly suggestive, however, is the construct Jackson and
Croley explore as a possible resolution of this indeterminacy: namely, the
deference U.S. federal courts accord determinations of law by federal
administrative agencies under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources
Defense Council.'4 They defend recourse to U.S. administrative law as an
analogy on the grounds that "an apparently similar standard-of-review issue,
raising analogous questions, figures prominently in U.S. administrative law
(the same is probably true for other countries as well)."' Arguably, implicit
in their analogy is the "confederation" model Bello suggested, perhaps in a
68. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 17(6)(ii), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE
LEGAL TEXTS 168 (1994) [hereinafter Antidumping Code].
69. DSU, supra note 26, art. 3(2).
70. Antidumping Code, supra note 68, art. 17(6)(ii).
71. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 200-01. But see MARK VILLIGIER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 327-43 (1985) (arguing that Vienna Convention rules did not
reflect customary international law of treaty interpretation at time they were formulated and have not
been rigorously followed by international tribunals in interim). But even if Jackson and Croley err in
equating the Vienna Convention rules with the "customary rules of public international law"
incorporated by the WTO, Jackson and Croley may yet be right if the parties to the WTO intended
their reference to those customary rules to mean the Vienna Convention rules, thus supporting the
overall conclusion that customary rules of treaty interpretation eschew legal indeterminacy of the kind
suggested by DSU Article 17(6)'s theory of multiple "permissible" interpretations. See H.
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 127-36 (1966) (arguing
that non liquet, or gap in law, is forbidden in contentious cases as matter of international law).
72. Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 200-01.
73. Id. at 200.
74. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 202.
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slip of the pen, to which Jackson implicitly subscribed. Under this view,
national administrative agencies and their reviewing domestic courts operate
much as technical experts implementing policies adopted by a supranational
legislature.76
Jackson and Croley nonetheless reject the Chevron analogy as a basis
for explaining or guiding the mode of deference commanded by the
Antidumping Code, although they ultimately endorse deference for other
reasons. They reject the Chevron analogy because none of its rationales in
U.S. domestic law is translatable to the WTO context; unlike judicial
deference to U.S. administrative agencies, WTO dispute settlement Panel
deference to legal interpretation of national administrative bodies would not
further accuracy or uniformity, since national administrative agencies are no
more likely to understand WTO law than the WTO dispute settlement
Panels, and deference to national authorities might yield multiple national
interpretations. More important, Chevron deference is supported by the
democratic legitimacy argument, in that supervision of administrative
agencies by a politically accountable executive yields greater accountability
to the political community than does supervision by unelected judges. In the
WTO context, deference to national administrative agencies replaces
accountability to one nation's political community with supervision by the
international political community that, as a whole, adopted the WTO.77
Jackson and Croley's recognition that Chevron rationales for deference to
national administrative bodies would exacerbate the democracy deficit in the
WTO constitution seems to presuppose the importance of accountability to
the WTO polis as a whole. Thus, Jackson's pragmatic style of argumentation
may mask a deep idealism that presupposes a supranational constitutional
dimension to the WTO legal order.78
76. The precise role of national courts in the resolution of GATT antidumping disputes is
somewhat unclear. For an argument that the Uruguay Round Agreement should be interpreted to
accord with the general international law rules requiring exhaustion of local remedies, including in the
case of antidumping disputes resort to national judicial review of national administrative body
determinations, before a question may be taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see Pieter-Jan
Kuyper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the Community, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND RESULTS: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVE, supra note 30, at 87, 106-09.
77. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 208-11. For an earlier discussion making many
of the same points, see Andrew W. Stuart, "I Tell Ya I Don't Get No Respect!": The Policies
Underlying Standards of Review in U.S. Courts as a Basis for Deference to Municipal Determinations
in GATT Panel Appeals, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 749, 789-90 (1992). See also James R.
Cannon, Jr. & Karen L. Bland, GATT Panels Need Restraining Principles, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1167 (1993) (supporting deference); Timothy M. Reif, Coming of Age in Geneva: Guiding the
GA7T Dispute Settlement System on Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185 (1993) (same). But see David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's Role in an Era of Increasing
Conflict, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1145 (1993) (rejecting deference).
78. "An imaginary trade constitution, liberal trade ideas, national and international political
judgments, a decentralized regime of bargained reciprocity: Jackson presents all these as facts rather
than commitments." David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John
Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 671, 714
(1995).
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Indeed, the constitutional dimension of Jackson and Croley's argument
is underscored by their failure to pursue a possible version of Chevron
deference that might be consistent with traditional international law doctrine.
Thomas Merrill has suggested that Chevron deference in U.S. administrative
law should be reconceptualized as a rule of discretionary deference to
executive precedent, replacing its current dichotomized "mandatory
deference to administrative agencies or mandatory independent judgment"
mode of analysis, which rests on the legal fiction of whether a clear result is
mandated by traditional statutory interpretation techniques.79 Merrill's
approach would appear to fall squarely within the Vienna Convention,
particularly with reference to the Convention's inclusion of state practice as
a primary means of interpreting international agreements, with the difference
that the practice of individual states may be given greater weight than the
Vienna Convention approach would demand."0 Jackson and Croley's failure
to consider this version of Chevron deference fuels the inference that their
argument cannot be expressed in the language of classical international law's
doctrine of sources or conception of state sovereignty.
Moreover, given their constitutionalist project, it is ultimately
umsurprising that Jackson and Croley would explicitly extend the
Antidumping Code's deference concept to other sovereignty-protecting
provisions in WTO law, such as the exceptions found in article XX of the
GATT."' But they ostensibly would do so on a ground, national sovereignty,
that they themselves recognize as questionable because it admits no
limitation and, taken to its logical conclusion, would defeat the very object
and purpose of the new DSU. Thus, in an important rhetorical move, their
definition of sovereignty perversely reinforces the constitutionalist dimension
of their rhetoric by suggesting a federalist argument for deference. 2
79. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
1010-12 (1992). It has been similarly argued that U.S. courts should in particular defer to executive
branch interpretation of treaties, given the special executive branch role in the creation and
implementation of this particular kind of U.S. law. See, e.g., The Role of International Law in U.S.
Foreign Policy Making, 86 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 434, 440 (1992) (remarks by Alan Kreczko,
Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
80. The Vienna Convention gives effect to subsequent practice which "establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 1, para.
3(b).
81. As Jackson and Croley note, the WTO Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides
that the deference standard "shall be reviewed after a period of three years with a view to considering
the question of whether it is capable of general application." Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 198
(quoting Decision). They therefore suggest that the deference standard be extended to the remainder of
the GATT; for example, by revising the current understanding of the word "necessary" in the Article
XX exceptions of the GATT so as "to recognize that governments should be authorized to have some
choice among several government measures (not mandated to choose, e.g., the 'least restrictive'
measure), as long as the choice does not unduly detract from the basic broader policy goals of the
treaty." Id. at 211 n.71.
82. They suggest: "[I]f one is willing to recognize that nations-states ought still to retain
powers for effective governing of national (or local) democratic constituencies in a variety of contexts
and cultures-perhaps using theories of 'subsidiarity'-then a case can be made for at least some
international deference to national decisions . . . ." Id. at 211. The subsidiarity concept, which has
played a central role in legitimating the centralization of decisionmaking authority in the European
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Others also have suggested a federalist analogy, namely the U.S.
Dormant Commerce Clause, for assessing the relation between GATT law's
promotion of free trade as a public interest and its respect for private
nontrade interests. Under this view, GATT Article XX, as well as more
specialized exceptions under the GATT Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Restrictions and the GATT Standards Code, are understood as
rules serving federalist values.8 3 The GATT Standards Code, which is
relevant to GATT Article XX exceptions, suggests that among the local
values to be protected under this federalist conception is national security.'
It is not too much of a stretch to view article XXI's general exception
with respect to a state's essential security interests through the same lens.
Indeed, even the U.S. constitutional system does not completely transfer
responsibilities concerning states' interests in their own security to the
national government, given the constitutional guarantees concerning the
preservation of state militias and states' rights to engage in self-defense
without advance federal authorization.85 The precise contours of this
deferential mode of review of the exercise of the national security exception
would need elaboration, but one possible approach is suggested by the
interpretation Jackson and Croley would give to the term "necessary" under
their federalist reading of article XX of the GATT, under which a state
would no longer need to show that it has selected the "least trade-restrictive
means" available to satisfy the "necessity" criterion. 6 The GATT Article
XXI national security exception, because it is not so limited, could already
be interpreted in accordance with the constitutionalist, albeit federalist,
premises of Jackson and Croley's proposal. Deference under this approach
would not signal abdication of the WTO/DSB's responsibility under the
legalist paradigm.
Community, is regarded as an analogue to federalism in the U.S. domestic context. See, e.g., George
A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUm. L. Rv. 331, 357-58 (1994) (analogizing doctrine of preemption of Member State
law to American and German legal concepts). The analogy has its limits, given the fact that
subsidiarity in EC law appears to have a solely utilitarian dimension, see Koen Lenaerts, The
Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of
Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 846, 852-65 (1994), while federalism in the United States is
premised largely on classical liberal political philosophy. See generally SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A
NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993) (examining national theory of
American federalism as question of political philosophy). Jackson and Croley's use of the term
"subsidiarity" may well reflect their preference for a utilitarian, instrumentalist approach to
international governance.
83. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1418-31 (1994).
84. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.2, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 138 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Standards
Code] ("[Tlechnical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate
objective .... Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements.").
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (granting right to bear arms); see also id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
(granting right to engage in war when "actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay").
86. See supra note 81 (describing Jackson and Croley's extension of deference analysis to
GATT Article XX exceptions).
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In sum, Jackson's vision of the WTO as supranational constitution
implicitly treats the WTO as what some have called a self-contained
regime-that is, one in which a state is free to exercise only the remedial
rights specifically contained within the regime itself and may not resort to
rights under general international law.87 Thus, when the constitutional
approach is extended to the security exception, it implies a remedial law
deficit in addressing the problem posed by the substantive gap that would be
created by a self-judging security exception, for states would not be free to
respond outside the WTO by invoking the right to countermeasures under
general international law or to seek redress at other international
adjudicatory fora. As this Article will argue, the substantive gap can be
filled, although not by looking solely within the largely indeterminate four
corners of the WTO, but rather by looking to the law of the United
Nations.88
III. BARGAIN AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY EXCEPTION
The bargain and constitutional conceptions thus suggest competing
perspectives for interpreting the law of the WTO. In the context of
determining whether the national security exception can be invoked without
DSB review, moreover, they are likely to yield antithetical conclusions-one
emphasizing the Contracting Parties' sovereignty and freedom of action, and
the other seeking to give effect to the WTO members' decision to discipline
unilateralism through a strengthened DSU. The use of the bargain and
constitutional approaches to WTO law in this Part of the Article to address
the problem of interpreting the security exception reveals how the two
conceptions fail to yield adequate results in simultaneously preserving state
sovereignty and giving effect to the supranationalizing effects of the new
WTO. That analysis thus sets the stage for Part IV of this Article, which
explores a revision of the constitutional conception to accommodate the
sovereignty concerns underlying the bargain conception. This in turn lays
the foundation for Part V's proposal for institutional comity between the
WTO and United Nations as a means of better resolving tensions between
trade and security values of the member states, and increasing the capacity
of these two institutions to encourage the development of supranational
governance in ways that further democratic values.
In sum, Section ILI.A articulates the bargain conception's view of the
security exception and shows that its self-judging interpretation does not fit
with the larger structure of international law. Section III.B extends the
reasoning of the constitutional conception to the problem of the security
exception. While Subsection IlI.B. 1 shows that the security exception
probably would be best understood under the old GATT as entirely self-
87. See infra Section IV.A.
88. See infra Section IV.B.
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judging, Subsection III.B.2 argues that the exception now would probably
best be interpreted under the new law of the WTO so as to permit second-
guessing by the WTO/DSB of a state's decision to invoke its rights.
Subsection III.B.3 demonstrates, however, that the paucity of sources within
the body of WTO law makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the DSB to
supply principled criteria that would allow WTO members to know when
they risk finding themselves outside the security exception's safe harbor.
A. The Bargain Argument for a Self-Judging Exception
The bargain argument focuses on the specific language governing
national security concerns in the WTO's multilateral trade agreements,
particularly the GATT. 9 In the case of U.S. trade sanctions under Helms-
Burton, the United States appears to be relying on article XXI(b)(iii), which
provides: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests... taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations."'
The language, however, might take on a particular meaning depending
on the precise context in which it is used.9 This kind of language has been
used in the arms control context, for example, where states are concerned
that the law governing multilateral treaties might excessively limit their
rights to withdraw; for in multilateral treaties, material breach by one party
does not necessarily give another party the right to withdraw, and rebus sic
stantibus might also be inapplicable. Thus, to secure their vital interests in
arms control agreements, states have insisted on withdrawal rights framed in
self-judging language, limited perhaps only by the obligation of performance
in subjective good faith.' Nonetheless, in the arms control context a
subjective requirement of good faith in withdrawal may be sufficient to
avoid rendering those treaties a legal nullity, because the additional
requirement that the matter leading to withdrawal be referred to the Security
Council channels the situation to the only place where it could be resolved.93
89. See supra note 16.
90. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 11-15 (noting U.S. claim that its action is
not subject to WTO review).
91. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. 1 (mandating that "treat[ies] shall
be interpreted . . . in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context").
92. See Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Withdraival and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 749, 787-90 (1994) (discussing limits on withdrawal imposed by treaty law that withdrawal
clause was intended to circumvent). The obligation of good faith is a central part of international law,
see Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 26 (providing that treaties must be performed in good
faith), but its precise meaning is open to dispute, see J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1991) (noting that it is disputed whether breach of obligation of good faith is
"abuse of right" entailing legal consequences or rather breach of moral duty entailing only political
consequences).
93. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, art. X, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. 483, 493 [hereinafter NPT] (withdrawing state must give
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This treaty law failure rationale for a special right of withdrawal does
not appear to apply in the trade context, however, since the WTO affords
states a plenary right to withdraw.94 One might indeed rely on the right of
withdrawal from the WTO to frame the context for interpreting the security
exception, for the right itself may undercut the very notion that WTO law
should be understood as a supranational constitution.9" That said, the
practical impossibility of withdrawal from the WTO, given the importance
of the expectations of trade benefits it confers on each member, makes any
formal criteria for defining supranational organizations quite beside the point
in this case.
Another context for interpreting the WTO security exception is the
family of international trade agreements. The national security exception was
deemed sufficiently important to preserving national sovereignty that it was
included also in NAFTA,96 which like the WTO contains mostly binding
dispute resolution procedures.97 NAFTA, however, also contains a non-self-
judging security exception for disputes concerning trade in energy
"goods." 98 The recent U.S.-Canada dispute relating to strategic trade in
notice of its intention to withdraw to Security Council and include "statement of the extraordinary
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests").
94. See WTO AGREEMENT art. XV (requiring six months' notice); cf. NPT, supra note 93,
art. X(1) (requiring three months' notice).
95. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NiELs M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 61, at 42 (3d rev. ed. 1995) (positing that "fundamental characteristics" of supranational institution
include, among other things, absence of unilateral right of withdrawal). But see Laurence R. Heifer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273,
287-90 (1997) (defining supranational organizations in terms of their capacity to establish direct links
with subnational entities); Jose E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International Organizations
68 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (focusing, from lawyer's perspective, on
whether international organizations exercise "independence" from states).
96. NAFTA Article 2102 contains exceptions similar to GATT Article XXI, except that
NAFTA Article 2102(1)(b)(iii) replaces GATT Article XXI(b)(i)'s exception "relating to fissionable
materials" with an exception for actions "relating to the implementation of national policies or
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices." North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2102(1)(b)(iii), 32
I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Arguably, this exception includes not only export
control regimes mandated by treaties, such as the NPT, but also supplier guidelines not expressly
required by the NPT but consistent with its larger purposes. See, e.g., Communication Received from
Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology 5, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254, Annex A (Feb. 1978) (including restraints with respect to
technology transfer, notwithstanding absence of limits on technology transfer in NPT except possibly
in respect of nuclear weapon state's obligation not to assist another state in acquisition of nuclear
weapons). NAFTA also contains a narrow security exception covering only the energy sector. See
NAFTA, supra, art. 607; infra notes 98-99.
97. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experience, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 163, 166-68 (1997).
98. Article 2102 of NAFTA (providing general national security exception) is expressly
made subject to article 607. See NAFTA, supra note 96, art. 2102(1). Article 607 provides a national
security exception to the prohibition on restrictions of energy trade, an exception which holds as
between the United States and Canada-but not Mexico. See id. annex 607 (exempting Mexico from
article 607). Article 607 states that
no Party may adopt or maintain a measure restricting imports of an energy or basic
petrochemical good from, or exports of an energy or basic petrochemical good to,
another Party under Article XXI of the GATT or under Article 2102 (National
Security), except to the extent necessary to:
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uranium and uranium enrichment services, in which the United States agreed
to Canadian demands for modification of the NAFTA- and GATT-illegal
U.S. program for importing uranium derived from dismantled Russian
nuclear warheads, suggests that the non-self-judging energy sector exception
may have played a role in limiting U.S. freedom of action to pursue national
security-related policies.99
By contrast with NAFTA's non-self-judging national security
exception, a plausible case for a broad reading of the WTO national security
exceptions can be derived that is consistent with the bargain theory's
commitment to fulfill the intentions of the parties as expressed in their own
words. The fact that the NAFTA countries included a non-self-judging
exception in an agreement directly related to the GATT suggests that at least
Canada, Mexico, and the United States assumed that the usual self-judging
language in the general NAFTA exception, and perhaps the WTO/GATT as
well, would free a state from review of its conduct in a dispute resolution
proceeding. As between the NAFTA countries, this might be a persuasive
approach in interpreting the comparable provisions of the WTO, °° but
absent evidence that the WTO members specifically acquiesced in this
special understanding, it could hardly be deemed compelling evidence in a
dispute between a NAFTA country and a non-NAFTA member of the WTO,
such as the European Community.
Nonetheless, in terms of treaty purpose,1"' one possible justification for
a broad exception protecting national security might be the anti-free trade
argument that the strategic, or mercantilist, dimension of trade requires
sovereign freedom of action as much in the trade area as in the traditional
national security area of arms control."ea A related, but potentially pro-free
trade, justification might be derived from the insights of public choice
theory: namely, that national security exceptions are subject to pretextual use
(a) supply a military establishment of a Party or enable fulfillment of a critical
defense contract of a Party;
(b) respond to a situation of aimed conflict involving the Party taking the
measure;
(c) implement national policies or international agreements relating to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or
(d) respond to direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials for
defense purposes.
Id. art. 607. The article 607 formulation thus narrows the grounds for which the exception may be
invoked. See Anne Marie Godin, Canada's International Obligations to Provide Energy Under the
EIP, GATT, and NAFTA, 1 GREATER N. CENT. NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 98 (1996). But the chief
difference between articles 607 and 2102 is that the former does not employ the self-judging "it
considers" language found in the latter.
99. U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area continued, without apparent harm to U.S. national
security. See Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post Cold War Transformations in
National Security and Separation of Powers-Beating Nuclear Swords into Plowshares in an
Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 331, 400-08 (1997).
100. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. 4 (providing that "[a] special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended").
101. See id. art. 31, para. 1 (providing that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted.., in the light of
its object and purpose").
102. See Perez, supra note 99, at 365-67.
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for offensive strategic trade policies as well as unnecessary defensive
policies, in addition to protectionism,' 3 much as antidumping and
countervailing duties exceptions are susceptible to excessive protectionism.
Just as the new WTO accepts the risk of some protectionism through
deference to national administrative agencies,'" the WTO rationally would
tolerate a politically optimal level of abuse of the national security exception
that would facilitate ex ante negotiations for reciprocal tariff reduction.' 5
Thus, a broad reading of the national security exception might well support
the bargain conception's larger view of the WTO as a vehicle for negotiating
trade expansion as well as a particular balance of advantages.
Yet, despite the potential technical arguments in its favor, the bargain
theory's broad reading of the WTO security exception might well fail, even
within the terms of the traditional tools of treaty interpretation bargain
theory requires. Arguably, the self-judging interpretation conflicts with the
important rule that a treaty should be read in light of general principles of
law."06 In particular, international agreements should not be illusory;
although there is no strict doctrine of consideration in international law to
assure the avoidance of legal nullities, the notion of a quid pro quo has made
its way into international jurisprudence.'" A self-judging national security
exception in the trade area is not cured by the procedural protection of
notice to the Security Council that makes tolerable the entirely subjective
withdrawal clause in arms control treaties. The text of the national security
exception requires no explanatory statement, thus inviting the United States
in the Helms-Burton case to suggest that it did not need to appear before a
GATT Panel to state its grounds for asserting the exception.' 8 In such
circumstances, it would be impossible to determine whether the WTO
member truly was prepared to assert in good faith its legal rights under the
security exception.
103. National security tests have been perceived by most commentators as especially
susceptible to manipulation. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301, 319
(1990) (analyzing national security tests in context of discussing U.S. domestic "national security"
exception under which President is authorized not to impose sanctions under Section 301 of U.S.
Trade Act, and noting that "questionable appeals to 'national security' may expose the USTR (and the
Administration) to considerable political criticism for being weak on trade issues").
104. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at211.
105. Based on public choice theory, it has been argued that the GATT contemplated a
politically-optimal level of protectionism, meaning that the right to engage in a certain level of
protectionism during implementation of a trade agreement would give states the confidence necessary
to move to make trade concessions at the negotiation stage. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a
"Safeguarde".. A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U.
CHI. L. Rav. 255, 259 (1991); see also Perez, supra note 99, at 404 (extending argument to national
security).
106. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. 3(c) ("There shall be taken into
account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.").
107. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 2). In this case, the
ICJ employed a quid pro quo concept to determine whether an agreement granting the ICJ jurisdiction
was a nullity when rights obtained in return for the agreement to accept jurisdiction of the ICJ were
later separately acquired as matter of customary international law. See id.
108. See supra text accompanying note 14.
Institutional Comity in National Security
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has implicitly rejected giving
effect to a state's refusal to explain itself in such cases. In the Military and
Paramilitary Activities Case over a decade ago, the ICJ insisted on
examining its own competence regardless of whether a party appeared to
argue that jurisdiction was wanting." 9 The U.S. tendency to suggest that
national security escape clauses are in effect jurisdictional barriers was also
rebutted in the recent Oil Platforms Case.ll° Article XX(d) of the U.S.-Iran
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of 15 August
1955 provided that "the present Treaty shall not preclude the application of
measures ... necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
necessary to protect its essential security interests."11 The ICJ rejected the
argument made by the United States in its submission that this language was
a limit on the jurisdiction of the Court, concluding that "[a] violation of the
rights of one party under the Treaty by means of the use of force is as
unlawful as would be a violation by administrative decision or by any other
means." 1 2 The ICJ explicitly recalled its decision in Military and
Paramilitary Activities that such language was to be considered a defense on
the merits. 13 Yet, as Judge Schwebel pointed out, 14 the United States had
withdrawn this contention in oral argument, making the ICJ's holding
unnecessary except, particularly in light of the reference to the Military and
Paramilitary Activities Case, as a slap on the wrist to the United States.
Even though the national security exception addressed in Oil Plaforms does
not include the self-judging language found in the WTO/GATT exception,
the ICJ opinion evinces judicial reluctance to adopt an interpretation that
would allow a state invoking a national security exception to escape without
defending its use of the exception in a manner that a court of justice can
assess-such as through an objective test for good faith.
Finally, and most recently, in the Lockerbie Case, the ICJ rejected the
argument that a Security Council Resolution under chapter VII of the
Charter adopted after a state has submitted its application to the Court can
retroactively defeat the ICJ jurisdiction or render the application
inadmissible. 5 The possible import of this decision is that the substantive
109. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 38 (June 27)
(applying multilateral treaty reservation to U.S. acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, but with effect,
because jurisdiction was based on other grounds, only of "barring the applicability of the United
Nations Charter and Organization of American States Charter as multilateral treaty law").
110. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. (Dec. 12) (visited Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.comell.law.edulicj/icj5/obj-eng.htm>.
111. Id. para. 20.
112. Id. para. 21.
113. See id. para. 20 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. at 116, 136).
114. See id. at *4-7 (separate opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, dissenting), (visited Apr.
3, 1998) <http:/lwww.cornell.law.edu/icj/icj51schw.htm>.
115. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the' 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J. (Feb. 27) (visited Mar.
23, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/idocketilukjudgmentlilukjudgementcontent.htm>.
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legality of even a chapter VII resolution can well be reviewed by the Court
in the merits phase. At a minimum, the decision established that a
respondent asserting the peremptory effect of a Council resolution as a
defense must do so in the merits phase of World Court litigation, where the
fact and interpretation of the resolution will be in issue. n6
In sum, much as the doctrine of consideration facilitates the contract
bargaining process by inducing caution and deliberation, as well as
sometimes assuring that for each of the parties there is at least some benefit
from the bargain," 7 an objective approach to the interpretation of the WTO
national security exceptions might better facilitate negotiations for reciprocal
tariff reductions. Yet, objective standards could also serve as a tool in
pursuit of a more ambitious goal at the international level for the integration
of individuals participating in a common project as members of the same
community.' 18 Accordingly, as detailed in Subsections H.B. 1 and III.B.2 of
this Article, because it focuses on the development of the supranational
community, the constitutional conception might more faithfully follow the
spirit of important international jurisprudence calling for independent review
of a state's attempt to avoid its international legal obligations on national
security grounds. That said, as detailed in Subsection m.B.3, WTO law
itself fails to supply determinate law that could give this internationalist
spirit the flesh it needs to live in a world where state sovereignty has not yet
died.
B. The Constitutional Argument Against a Self-Judging Exception
The constitutional conception would interpret the national security
exception by focusing on the role the exception plays in the new, legalist
approach to dispute resolution embodied in the WTO." 9 Concededly, the
116. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1996) (describing and critiquing various schools of thought on permissibility of substantive ICJ
review of legality of Security Council resolutions).
117. See P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LAW Q. REv.
193, 195 (1986) (arguing that only fully executed exchanges warrant expectation measure of
damages); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-01 (1941)
(detailing evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions of contract law); Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967)
(suggesting "substantive" unconscionability as corrective for process-oriented bargain theory).
118. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 97-101 (1980) (applying, in context of domestic contract law, notion of
.common conscience" drawn from Durkheim). Among merchants, for example, the Uniform
Commercial Code adopts a definition of "good faith" that looks to objective standards. See U.C.C. §
2-103(1)(b) (1972) (requiring "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fir dealing in the trade").
119. See Lowenfeld, supra note 27, at 481-87 (describing procedure used by Dispute
Settlement Body); Montana I Mora, supra note 27, at 159 ("Post-Uruguay panel bodies will resemble
an international court after the proposed reforms."); Young, supra note 27, at 396-406 (discussing
legalist paradigm of GATT coming to fruition in WTO). Indeed, one author has already relied on a
quasi-constitutional analysis to argue that the transformation of the GATT into the WTO requires
reinterpretation of the security interests exception because the WTO is an "emergent" community of
principle and, therefore, a non-self-judging interpretation of article XXI(b) is no longer tenable. See
Rene E. Browne, Note, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent World: The GATTArticle
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WTO Uruguay Agreements adopted the same apparently self-judging
language as was employed in the original GATT, 20 which under the bargain
conception might arguably be properly interpreted as self-judging.
Nevertheless, the argument that the new GATT under the WTO has a
meaning different from the old GATT-despite their identical language-
seems more persuasive when one notes that, from an institutional standpoint,
the new GATT/WTO represents both the continuation of the GATT and a
departure from the informal status of previous GATT procedures. For
example, it includes features that institutionalize management of
international trade and new international legislation.12' To the extent that it is
a continuation of the GATT, the new GATT within the framework of the
WTO may continue the meaning of the old GATT by reenacting the old
GATT rules as interpreted by the GATT Contracting Parties. On the other
hand, to the extent that the WTO represents a new institutional structure, it
arguably changes the meaning of particular rules of the old GATT to
conform to views that reflect the common intentions of the Members of the
WTO as to the effect of old GATT rules in a new institutional framework.1
22
XX1 Defense after Helms-Burton, 86 GEo. L.J. 405, 417-20 (1997). Notably, even though
recognizing the perceived illegitimacy of the WTO's intruding on national security considerations, id.
at 413, the author's analysis is limited to WTO law and fails to grapple with the probable
indeterminacy of an interpretation based solely on WTO sources of law. Compare infra text
accompanying notes 174-214 (arguing that, assuming new WTO transforms security exception into
non-self-judging defense, indefinite meaning of exception would make it difficult for it to operate as
effective or legitimate law), with infra text accompanying notes 215-238 (arguing for resort to non-
WTO legal sources to resolve these shortcomings of constitutional perspective).
120. For a suggestion that this argument should be refuted, see Perez, supra note 99, at 408-
10.
121. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 301-04 (discussing fruition of FOGS, or Future
of the GATT System, in new Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) for international surveillance
of national policy, and creation of WTO as new international organization, but one which would
"promote a sense of legal and practice continuity with the GATT"). Professor Jackson has suggested
that the new institutional structure "offers more flexibility for future inclusion of new negotiated rules
or measures which can assist nations to face the constantly emerging problems of world economics."
Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
103d Cong. 114 (1994) (statement of John H. Jackson, Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, the
University of Michigan Law School).
122. The distinction drawn here is analogous to that, in customary law, between lex lata and
legeferenda in that the WTO might have simply codified a settled meaning or adopted, in a new law-
creating act, an emerging legal principle. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (3d ed. 1993) (describing de legeferenda as emerging law reflecting initial
state practices rather than repeated instances that make it law); id. at 492 (employing lex lata to mean
currently binding legal rules). An analogy to rules governing the development of customary
international law seems particularly appropriate since the dispute resolution process under the GATT
reflects as much improvisation by the Contracting Parties as the GATT itself. See JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 339.
Customary law is always relevant to the interpretation of a treaty. See Vienna Convention,
supra note 61, art. 31, para. 3 ("There shall be taken into account, together with the context ... (c)
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."). This includes
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1(b), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE 151 (1946)
[hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]. Custom, the ICJ has held, can bind a subset of the world community.
See, e.g., Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (premising its analysis on possibility
of existence of regional customary law rule concerning right of asylum binding only in geographical
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The national security exception is new in the WTO in the straightforward
sense that it is included in the new multilateral trade agreements, which
contain the old GATT national security exception." Moreover, from the
perspective of the WTO, these exceptions are also new in the sense of
having a fundamentally different meaning. Accordingly, a coherent
"constitutional" account of the national security exception needs to begin at
the beginning, just as much of American constitutional law begins with an
inquiry into the statutory and common law background of colonial and
English law.
1. The National Security Exception at the Founding
Under accepted principles of treaty interpretation, determining the
meaning of article XXI of the old GATT requires looking first to its text in
good faith and in light of its object, purpose, and context; then to subsequent
practice of the parties; and finally to its negotiating history.'24 Article XXI's
language is clearly self-judging, but under the Vienna Convention and
customary international law, decisions of the Contracting Parties and the
GATT Panels might qualify as "subsequent agreements" or "subsequent
practice" authoritatively interpreting the GATT's provisions."
But articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention allow resort to
nontextual sources of interpretation only where a provision's text is
ambiguous. The language of article XXI seems expressly to confer upon the
GATT contracting party the power to make an unreviewable unilateral
determination, since the provision applies to what "it considers" its
"essential security interests."126 One might argue, however, that this
conclusion conflicts with the central premise of treaty interpretation of
"good faith." 27 Nonetheless, the self-judging interpretation finds support in
region of Latin America). Custom cannot, however, fill in gaps that do not exist and thus rewrite a
treaty. But see Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GA7T: An Analysis of GAiT's Security
Exception, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 558, 618-20 (1991) (questioning GATT Panel reticence to apply
customary international law in GATT cases); Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations:
Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1557 (1991) (arguing that contemporary treaties
create obligations that change in evolving circumstances).
123. Although parts of Subsection III.B.i's analysis of the GATT security exception overlap
with Section Ill.A's explication of the bargain conception's interpretation of the WTO security
exception through the use of traditional tools of treaty interpretation, see supra text accompanying
notes 89-118, the analysis is restated here to establish separately the baseline for evaluating in
Subsection m.B.2 the transformation arguably effected by the adoption of the WTO.
124. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31 (providing for primary means of
interpretation such as text and subsequent practice); id. art. 32 (providing for secondary means of
interpretation such as negotiating history).
125. See id. art. 31, para. 3(a) (defining "subsequent agreement"); id. art. 31, para. 3(b)
(defining "subsequent practice").
126. GATT art. XXI.
127. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."); see also Perez, supra note 92, at 778-82
(discussing limited usefulness of this principle in arms control context, given, inter alia, salience of
classified information).
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negotiating history,1 8 subsequent agreements,' 29 and subsequent practice' 3°-
most notably, in the Contracting Parties' discussion in 1949 of the U.S.
claim that its security interests warranted imposition of sanctions against
Czechoslovakia in what was apparently the first attempt by a state to assert
the security exception. The summary of the discussion recorded the
following view: "[E]very country must have the last resort on questions
relating to its own security. On the other hand, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES should be cautious not to take any step which might have the
effect of undermining the General Agreement." 3' Authoritative legal
128. See James R. Wilch, GAYT and the Half-Lfe of Uranium Industry Protection, 10 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 150, 182 nn.199-200 (1989) (reporting GATT drafters' reliance on only "the spirit"
of exception as check against its abuse) (citations omitted).
129. See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23-24 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Decision]. The operative provisions state:
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI(a), contracting parties should be informed to
the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI..
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties affected by such
actions retain their full rights under the General Agreement.
3. The Council may be requested to give further consideration to this matter in due
course.
Id.
The language seems to confirm the self-judging character of article XXI: Operative paragraph
1 is only precatory; operative paragraph 2 reaffirms only whatever rights parties may have under the
GATT, without specifying what those rights, if any, might be; and operative paragraph 3 indicates the
possibility of further action by the GATT Council, thus confirming that there may be a need for
further action. But see Hahn, supra note 122, at 575 (reading these clauses to support non-self-judging
interpretation of article XXI); P.J. Kuyper, The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law:
Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System of International Law?, 1994 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 227 (criticizing 1982 Decision as suggesting that claim of nullification or impairment of
benefits might, as non-violation claim, survive assertion of exception or waiver as defense to prima
facie case of nullification or impairment of benefits based on violation).
130. See Request of the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XXIII,
June 8, 1949, available in 1949 GATTPD LEXIS 2, at *7 (statement of U.K. representative Mr.
Shackle) [hereinafter Czechoslovakia Request]. This statement has been relied on by authoritative
commentary on the GATT to manifest the self-judging character of article XXI. See JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 984.
There have been only a handful of other cases of unilateral economic sanctions relying
explicitly or implicitly on the GATT security exception. Commentators have discussed the following
cases, although some do not involve explicit invocations of article XXI: Peru's import ban against
Czechoslovakia in 1955; Ghana's ban on imports from Portugal in 1961 in relation to Portugal's
continuing colonization of Angola; the U.S. ban on trade with Cuba since 1962; import bans by
certain states of the German Federal Republic on Icelandic fish; Sweden's footwear import quota in
the mid-1970s, terminated prior to GATT review; and the EC sanctions against Argentina because of
the Falklands Islands invasion. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT
750-51 (1969); Donald N. Zillman, Energy Trade and the National Security Exception to the GATT,
12 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 117, 124-26 (1994); see also Hahn, supra note 122, at 572-73
(noting that German Federal Republic, without relying expressly on article XXI, went so far as to
argue that its import ban was justified as countermeasure for Iceland's prior extension of its exclusive
fisheries zone in violation of customary international law, and that GATT was inapplicable); Richard
Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement and the
Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
603, 619 nn.99-101 & nn.103-04 (1987) (noting Swedish claimed need to maintain domestic
"production capacity in vital industries"). But none of these cases seems to depart from the received
understanding of the Czechoslovak case.
131. Czechoslovakia Request, supra note 130, at *7 (statement of Czechoslovak
representative Mr. Augenthaler).
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commentary appears to have attached the greatest weight to the
Czechoslovak case.'
This is not to say that the Contracting Parties' discussion is not
amenable to a contrary interpretation. The U.K. statement in the discussion
of the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute may not be dispositive for at least two
reasons. First, only one sentence, by using the imperative word "must,"
even suggests that the exception is self-judging. Meanwhile, the second
quoted sentence may well undercut this suggestion. It refers to a need for
"caution" by the "CONTRACTING PARTIES," which refers to caution by
the GATT Contracting Parties acting in their collective capacity. Collective
action by the Contracting Parties in this context must refer to action on the
Czechoslovak complaint. It is not clear whether the CONTRACTING
PARTIES' acceptance of an improper, though lawful, exercise of the self-
judging right in article XXI or their rejection of the U.S. defense, perhaps
driving the United States out of the GATT, "would have" had a greater
effect in "undermining the General Agreement."
Second, treating the GATT debate as a formal opinion, the precise
language of the summary was at best merely dictum. The nub of
Czechoslovakia's complaint was that the United. States had invoked article
XXI in an overbroad way, "because the narrow reference in the text to war
materials had been construed by the United States Government to cover a
wide range of goods which could never be so regarded."3 The United
States, on the other hand, maintained that its reliance on article XXI was
narrow and tailored to deny Czechoslovakia only a limited class of items, so
that "there were no grounds for the accusation that the provisions of article
XXI were extended to cover everything; for the commodities thus controlled
constituted an extremely small proportion of the exports of the country."134
Thus, the summing-up statement by the Chairman-that "the United States
justified any discrimination which might have occurred in [sic] the basis of
Articles XX and XXI and particularly on the ground of security covered by
the latter"' 35-was arguably a conclusion about the merits of the U.S.
defense. Indeed, because the summation did not distinguish between article
XX, which is clearly a defense on the merits, and article XXI, which under
a self-judging interpretation is merely a procedural condition, it suggests that
both could be seen as defenses on the merits. Therefore, the earliest, and
thus most persuasive, example of subsequent practice may also be read not
to require a self-judging interpretation of article XXI.
In sum, it is possible to read GATT precedent to leave open the
possibility of a non-self-judging exception. Indeed, the view that the
Czechoslovak case establishes the exception as self-judging is not universally
132. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 984.
133. See Czechoslovakia Request, supra note 130, at *7 (Statement of Czechoslovak
representative Mr. Augenthaler).
134. Id. at *8 (statement of U.S. representative Mr. Evans).
135. Id. (statement of Chairman).
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held. 136 Moreover, even before the new WTO, some had even expressed
doubt whether, regardless of the best reading of the old GATT law, the
United States could as a practical matter avoid an adverse outcome were it
ever to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the GATT on this issue in the post-
Cold War 1990s.13' Nonetheless, most commentators continue to take the
view that the old GATT began only where national security interests, as
determined by the Contracting Parties, ended.
3 1
2. Revised State Practice Leading to the WTO
Even if GATT Article XXI was originally self-judging, the WTO's
adoption might have rendered the exception non-self-judging. As part of the
travaux preparatoires, broadly conceived, of the new WTO, Panel Reports
and related materials might support this interpretation. 39 An alternative
rationale could be drawn from an analogy to U.S. administrative law that
might well be consistent with the constitutional conception, given Jackson
and Croley's consideration of the administrative deference rationale.
40
Under the administrative law analogy, the "reenactment" of the GATT
national security exception by the members of the WTO, as well as its
extension to the other multilateral trade agreements, "without making any
material changes in wording," would permit a WTO dispute settlement
Panel to "presume that [WTO membership] intends to incorporate
authoritative ... interpretations of that language into the reenacted" national
security exceptions. 141 To develop these arguments, we need to consider the
legal significance of GATT Panel reports, both as subsequent practice and as
precedent.
136. For example, under at least one commentator's reading of even the GATT 1947
negotiating history, it was expected that invocations of article XXI would be "subject to review in
principle." Hahn, supra note 122, at 568; cf. Wilch, supra note 128.
137. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Economic Sanctions: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 88
MICH. L. Rav. 1930, 1943 (1990) (reviewing BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS (1988)). Lowenfeld, a former Deputy Legal Adviser, thought it "doubtful that the United
States would prevail in the GATT Council in the 1990s as it did at the height of the Cold War." Id.
138. See Clinton E. Cameron, Note, Developing a Standard for Politically-Related State
Economic Action, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 218, 246-47 (1991) (discussing national security with respect
to GATT 1947 and treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation); Richard D. Porotsky, Note,
Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and
Utility of the Thirty-Five Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 929
(1995) (discussing national security with respect to GATT 1947 and GATT 1994).
139. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. 4 (permitting "a special meaning"
to be "given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended"); id. art. 32 (permitting
'recourse ... to supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion" to "confirm the meaning resulting from the application" of the
primary means of interpretation "or to determine the meaning when the interpretation" is "ambiguous
or obscure ... or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable").
140. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
141. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 814 (2d ed. 1995) (citing Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1979)).
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Under old procedures, the GATT Contracting Parties could adopt
Panel Reports only by consensus. 42 An adopted Panel Report would
certainly be given, even if not stare decisis effect (given the formal absence
of such a doctrine in international adjudication), at least persuasive effect in
future GATT deliberations as authoritative evidence of the meaning of the
GATT." 3 But normal principles of treaty interpretation militate against
treating an unadopted GATT Panel Report as an authoritative interpretation
of the old GATT.'" That said, the particular circumstances of a report, even
if it were not adopted by the Contracting Parties, might give it legal
significance in the development of a new or emerging view about the
meaning of particular language of the GATT.'45 This indeed appears to be
142. The GATT text is not unambiguous on whether consensus is required. Compare GATT
art. XXV(4) ("Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast."), with id. art. XXV(1) ("Whenever
reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as the
CONTRACTING PARTIES."), and id. art. XXIII(2) ("The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to
the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate."). Subsequent GATT practice is clear, however. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at
342-43 (describing GATT practice for "decisions" to be made by consensus).
143. See JACKSON, supra note 43, at 68.
144. Article 31(3)(a) admits only a "subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions," and article 31(3)(b) admits only
subsequent practice that "establishes the agreement." See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, at 93-
94. However, only the adoption of a Panel Report by the Contracting Parties might be said to be an
.agreement between the parties," setting aside the further question whether the adoption constitutes an
agreement with the legal reasoning employed in the Panel Report "regarding the interpretation or
application" of the GATT. Moreover, an unadopted report cannot be said to "establish the agreement"
of all the Contracting Parties, particularly when the losing state blocked its adoption by the
Contracting Parties. As John Jackson has argued: "It would seem that such reports would not be
particularly influential in the GATT and would not even bind the parties to the particular dispute as to
that dispute itself. ... Furthermore, it seems clear that the unadopted report is in no way a 'decision'
of the Contracting Parties.. .. " JACKSON, supra note 43, at 68; see also John H. Jackson, 7The Legal
Meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report: Some Reflections, in TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE
SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 149, 160 (Niels Blokker & Sam Muller eds., 1994)
[hereinafter TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION] (noting also, albeit with some reservations, that
agreement of the Contracting Parties might be established "[i]f later panels follow prior panels, this
would add to the evidence of practice, and if there were no considered counter examples").
145. Jackson notes:
[An unadopted Panel Report] may have some influence because it is well reasoned and
the panelists have a high reputation. Thus, even such a panel report could conceivably
be part of the overall practice of GATT, which could be used at some future time in
interpreting the GATT. This would be particularly so when, after time elapsed, it
appeared that most or all Contracting Parties had accepted the implications of the panel
report. Yet, if even one Contracting Party involved in the panel proceeding remained
adamantly opposed to it, general principles of international law would suggest that that
party would not be bound, and furthermore such holding out would undermine the
practice.
JACKSON, supra note 43, at 68; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 102 cmt. d (1987) ("[I]n principle a state that indicates its dissent from a practice
while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures.").
But see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 88-89 (noting that "[s]tates have rarely claimed or granted
an exemption on the basis of the dissenting state principle (sometimes described as the principle of the
persistent objector)") (citations omitted). Jackson's approach, equating dissent to precedent with the
so-called "persistent objector" exception to customary international law, hints at civil law's efforts to
assimilate precedent as a kind of customary law in legal systems that ordinarily do not concede that
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the approach adopted by the WTO/DSB Appellate Body, which has refused
to treat even GATT Panel Reports adopted by the Contacting Parties as
"subsequent practice" under customary rules of treaty interpretation. It has,
however, regarded them as de facto precedent, since they "create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into
account where they are relevant to any dispute." 146
Indeed, while the Appellate Body's rhetoric has reaffirmed the bargain
conception, 147 in practice the Appellate Body and DSU Panels have
employed precedent as a tool for constitutional reasoning that seeks to
realize the larger purposes, rather than the specific intentions, of the WTO
membership. For example, in Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the
Appellate Body cited a series of GATT Panel Reports, particularly Brazilian
Internal Taxes, to establish that the national treatment obligations extended
both to products bound under article II of the GATT and to those products
that are not bound. 148 The Appellate Body intimated that these precedents-
even though, strictly speaking, they were not even subsequent practice-had
higher status in the interpretive hierarchy under WTO law than preparatory
materials. The principles stated in these precedents, the Appellate Body
asserted, were "confirmed by the negotiating history of Article II. , 149 Panel
judges can make any law. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES-TExT-
MATERIALS 620-22 (5th ed. 1988).
146. See World Trade Organization, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the
Appellate Body *9, WT/DS8/B/R, WTIDSI10IABIR, WT/DSll/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), available in
1996 WL 738800 [hereinafter Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report], overruling
World Trade Organization, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, para. 6.10,
WT/DS/8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DSll/R (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Japanese Alcoholic Beverages
Panel Report]. In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Body attached particular weight to the fact
that the new WTO conferred upon WTO political bodies power to adopt interpretations by a
supermajority, thus implying, the Appellate Body argued, that other methods of interpretation were
foreclosed. See Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra, at *8; cf. Jackson, supra
note 144, at 158 (noting that "there clearly is a 'de facto' precedential effect operating" under GATT
dispute settlement system).
The DSU's behavior in this respect does not distinguish it from the ICJ. For the views of a
former judge of the ICJ, see MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 165-71
(1996), which argues that, despite the absence of a formal doctrine of stare decisis in its Statute, the
ICJ nonetheless follows precedent.
147. The Appellate Body stated: "The WTO Agreement is a treaty-the international
equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of
their own respective national interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain." Japanese
Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 146, at *9.
148. See id. at *10, *20 n.38 (citing Brazilian Internal Taxes, June 30, 1949, II GATT
B.I.S.D. at 181, para. 4 (1952)).
149. Id. at *10. It should be noted, however, that in this particular case the negotiating
history of the GATT was especially unclear. One delegate justified the extension of the national
treatment principle to unscheduled items on the ground that the rule was designed to channel all
protectionist national policies toward permitted forms, such as tariffs or subsidies; another delegate
argued, by contrast, that the extension of the rule to unscheduled items could be defended as necessary
to avoid renegotiation of what would be included in the schedule. See id. at *20 n.39 (citing
EPCT/TAC/PV.10 at 3, 33). Thus, the negotiating history presented a conflict between the GATT as
a system of rules to discipline national protectionism versus the GATT as a forum for negotiation and
enforcement of a balance of advantages. Given this discrepancy, it is possible the Appellate Body
relied on negotiating history only to confirm principles established by precedent in order to avoid
having to resolve the divergent strands of the negotiating history.
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Reports have been equally receptive to the use of precedent to protect the
basic policies of the WTO.'50
Reading Panel Reports from this point of view facilitates taking
account of the dissatisfaction expressed by the parties to the GATT in the
final decade of the Cold War, when the use of economic sanctions by major
powers proliferated and the Contracting Parties expressed a desire that the
article XXI exception should be made more predictable.' The more
difficult question, however, is divining what particular interpretation of
article XXI recent GATT Panel Reports reflected. This is especially true for
the GATT cases involving U.S. economic sanctions at the end of the Cold
War, which laid the foundation for the constitutional approach's argument
for a non-self-judging national security exception.
In United States Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua,'52 the United States
declined to invoke article XXI or to block adoption of the Panel Report in
Nicaragua's claim that the United States had violated article XIII(2) by
cutting short Nicaragua's sugar import quota without consultations. The
United States chose not to invoke article XXI even though it would later
argue that Nicaragua's activities during roughly the same time frame, to
which the United States had responded with covert paramilitary operations
and which presumably motivated the U.S. action on Nicaragua's sugar
quota, had implicated U.S. national security interests.'53
By contrast, in United States Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,54
after U.S. paramilitary operations became public and Nicaragua brought an
application to the ICJ, the U.S. President took steps under U.S. law to
150. See World Trade Organization, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Report of the Panel, para. 7.15, WTlDS331R (Jan. 6, 1997)
(relying on Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report, supra note 146, to conclude that it
was not bound by precedent, but nonetheless distinguishing precedents cited by parties as interpreting
"different agreements in different contexts"); World Trade Organization, Canada-Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, paras. 5.7-.9, WT/DS31/R (Nov. 8, 1996) (relying on
precedent to reject Canadian argument for broadening scope of article XX(d) exception in way that
would have permitted Canada to protect its cultural integrity); World Trade Organization, United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Panel,
paras. 7.8-.10, WT/DS24/R (Oct. 17, 1996) (relying on "previous panel reports" to reject argument
for extension of deferential standard of review to dispute arising under Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, which, unlike GATT Antidumping Code, does not specifically provide for such standard);
World Trade Organization, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Report of the Panel,
para. 261, WT/DS22/R (Oct. 17, 1996) (distinguishing cited precedent as "made in different
circumstances under a different regime of obligations").
151. See 1982 Decision, supra note 129, at 24, para. 3.
152. See United States Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D,
(31st Supp.) at 67 (1985) (Report of the Panel).
153. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 116 (June 27)
(holding inapplicable the provision in U.S.-Nicaragua Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
Treaty which allowed United States to escape that Treaty's obligations if United States considered it in
its "essential security interests"; but noting that, unlike GATT exception which contained subjective
language, FCN Treaty contained objective formulation); cf. Whitt, supra note 130, at 630 (calling for
amendment of GATT to conform to FCN formulation).
154. See United States Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, para. 1.3, at *2-3, available in
1986 GATTPD LEXIS 1 (G.A.T.T. Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted Report of the Panel) [hereinafter
Nicaragua Trade Measures].
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define the situation in Nicaragua as a threat to U.S. security interests. 5 At
this point, the United States, reportedly with the support of Australia,
Canada, and the European Union, argued before the GATT that there was
"no basis for GATT Contracting Parties to question, approve, or disapprove
the judgment of each Contracting Party as to what is necessary to protect its
national security interests."' 56 Nonetheless, at U.S. insistence, the terms of
reference of the Panel convened to address Nicaragua's claims explicitly
precluded consideration of the motivation or validity of the U.S. assertion of
article XXI. '57
The import of these precedents is debatable. Because the United States
did not assert its article XXI rights before either Panel, it is possible that the
Nicaragua Trade Measures Panel's language questioning its right to do so
was at best dictum or even, as the United States argued, ultra vires.155 Yet,
because the Contracting Parties failed to adopt the Panel Report only
because Nicaragua objected to the Panel Report as insufficiently critical of
the United States, 59 it is hard to say that the Contracting Parties rejected this
dictum. Given such doubts, the Panel Report itself might be largely
irrelevant, so that the U.S. success in obtaining terms of reference that
precluded consideration of the validity of its assertion of the national
security exception would confirm, as one noted commentator has suggested,
the "common law" under the GATT that the exception was self-judging.16
155. The U.S. failure to assert article XXI in the GATT Panel, and subsequent adoption by
the Contracting Parties, may have been connected to the fact that the original U.S. measures
challenged by Nicaragua-the withdrawal of Nicaragua's sugar quota in violation of article XIII(2),
was not explicitly grounded by the U.S. on its "essential security interests." It was only later, in
1985, that President Reagan imposed economic sanctions against Nicaragua pursuant to domestic legal
authorities that required him to determine that Nicaragua posed a "threat" to U.S. "national security."
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 984-85 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629
(1985)); see also International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1994)
(granting certain authorities to President in case of "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has
its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States," if Presidet "declares a national emergency with respect to"
that threat). But see Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1162, 1210 n. 199 (arguing that United States "would have been
wise" to invoke article XXI in sugar quota case and explaining U.S. decision to do so in subsequent
case as reflecting its "possibly having learned from experience").
156. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 985 (quoting U.S. Ambassador Peter Murphy
and citing 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 23, at 765 (June 5, 1985)); 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
23, at 765 (June 5, 1985) (quoting Ambassador Murphy as saying further that "[the] GATT is not an
appropriate forum for debating political and security issues"). One might ask whether the European
Union's position in that case raises an estoppel against its challenging the United States's assertion of
the exception in the Helms-Burton case.
157. See Nicaragua Trade Measures, supra note 154, para. 1.3, at *2-3 (citing meeting of
Council on Mar. 12, 1986).
158. See id. para. 4.5 n.1, at *13 (noting U.S. objection to inclusion in report of comments
relating to article XXI on grounds that this was outside terms of reference).
159. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 986.
160. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 95,
147 & n.171 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudee eds., 1996) (citing Nicaragua case terms of
reference as evidence that "GATT has arrived at a common-law understanding that bars any GATT
review of the justification for [national security] measures").
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Nonetheless, the fact that the United States felt the need to insist on
specific terms of reference on this point and the power of the reasoning of
the Panel Report itself tell a different, and perhaps more compelling, story.
Even though its terms of reference precluded analysis of whether the United
States had violated the GATT in invoking article XXI, the Panel nonetheless
felt required to consider Nicaragua's argument that, even if article XXI
provided a defense or excuse for any violation of the GATT, the
jurisprudence of the GATT still gave Nicaragua a claim for so-called non-
violation nullification or impairment of benefits. According to the Panel, this
theory, if successful, might have entitled Nicaragua to a GATT
recommendation that the United States remove the embargo. '6' In responding
to this remedial theory, the United States explicitly argued that under its
article XXI rights, it was not required to, and therefore would not, comply
with a recommendation that it terminate its embargo against Nicaragua, a
recommendation that the United States considered ultra vires for the Panel as
well as for the GATT.'62
The Panel agreed with the U.S. conclusion but not with its reasoning.
Relying on GATT jurisprudence in non-violation cases, the Panel stated that
a recommendation would be appropriate only if it "'appears to afford the
best prospect of an adjustment of the matter satisfactory to both parties.' "163
Thus, in pointing to the United States's expressed unwillingness to revoke
the embargo to buttress its conclusion that "recommending the withdrawal of
the embargo would not seem to offer the best prospect of an adjustment of
the matter satisfactory to both parties,"'" the Panel accepted the U.S.
161. See Nicaragua Trade Measures, supra note 154, para. 4.8, at *17. The new DSU, as
Jackson makes clear in Misunderstandings, would have defeated the argument for mandatory
withdrawal of measures in non-violation cases. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 63.
162. The United States maintained that
earlier panels which had examined non-violation cases had recommended that the party
complained against consider ways and means to remove the nullifying or impairing
measure because they considered this recommendation to be appropriate in the
circumstances. In the present case, such a recommendation would not be appropriate
because the United States had made it clear from the outset that the embargo was
motivated by security considerations and that any change in it was wholly dependent on
such considerations. . . .The United States further said that normally the question of
nullification or impairment required an examination of the "reasonable expectations" of
the parties concerned. However, in such an examination the United States would argue
that it had no expectation that the security situation giving rise to the embargo would
arise, and the Panel would be drawn into a consideration of the political situation
motivating the United States to invoke Article XXI. Such consideration was properly
excluded by the terms of reference and to arbitrate such matters would be outside the
competence of the Panel and of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
Nicaragua Trade Measures, supra note 154, para. 4.9, at *18-19 (emphasis added); see also id. para.
4.15, at *26-27 ("[The United States] had cautioned from the outset that the GATT dispute settlement
procedures were ill-suited to help resolve cases involving the invocation of Article XXI.").
163. Id. para. 5.10, at *33-34 (quoting Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Apr. 3,
1950, 11 GATT B.I.S.D. at 188, 195 (1952)).
164. Id. para. 5.10, at *34. Similarly, in response to Nicaragua's request for a "decision to
authorize Nicaragua to suspend the application of obligations to the United States," the Panel held
that, given the U.S. position on the continuation of the embargo, such a decision-entailing review of
the "basic question of whether actions under Article XXI could nullify or impair GATT benefits of the
adversely affected contracting party"-would be equally moot. Id. para. 5.11, at *35.
Institutional Comity in National Security
assertion only as a factual predicate for the exercise of its remedial
discretion. By endorsing only this dimension of the U.S. argument, the
Panel implicitly refused to lend credence to the U.S. position that article
XXI was self-judging, a claim that had formed the basis for the United
States's theory of the case in respect of a remedy for non-violation
nullification and impairment. Indeed, when the Panel specifically called into
question the ability of the GATT to resolve disputes between Contracting
Parties, it cited only the terms of reference as a limit on its power to review
article XXI,65 implying perhaps that article XXI itself, contrary to the U.S.
argument, would not preclude such review.
One might, therefore, characterize the Panel Report's theory as a
manifestation of the limitations of the procedural framework of GATT
Article XXIII, which grew out of a non-judicial model of dispute resolution
as a negotiating forum for the satisfactory resolution of disputes.166 In this
connection, a purely procedural interpretation of article XXI-one in which
a state needs only to satisfy the procedural condition of invoking the security
exception-would have been consistent with the expressed intention of the
GATT drafters that the GATT dispute resolution mechanism "serve as the
limit on Article XXI." 167 But the new Dispute Settlement Understanding of
the WTO, which conceives the dispute settlement system as "a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system," entrenches a more adjudicative model as the framework for WTO
dispute resolution.'68 Because each nation could block consensus on adoption
of a Panel Report under the old GATT system, its concurrence on terms of
reference for a Panel was essential. With the new requirement for negative
165. The Panel asked the following rhetorical question:
If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the
contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that
this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked
excessively or for purposes other than those set out in the provision? If the
CONTRACTING PARTIES give a panel the task of examining a case involving an
Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine the justification of that
invocation, do they limit the adversely affected contracting party's right to have its
complaint investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2? Are the powers of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII:2 sufficient to provide redress to
contracting parties subjected to a two-way embargo?
Id. para. 5.17, at *41-42 (emphasis added).
166. See JACKSON, supra note 130, at 163-89 (tracing evolution of GATT dispute resolution
procedures from politics to law).
167. Michael Gaugh, GAIT Article XXI and U.S. Export Controls: The Invalidity of
Nonessential Non-Proliferation Controls, N.Y. INT'L L. REv., Summer 1995, at 51, 69; see also
wilch, supra note 128, at 182 n.200 (citing U.N. Doc. EIPCIT/A/SR 33, at 4-5 (1947)).
168. See DSU, supra note 26, art. 3(2). The new regime of presumptive adoption of Panel
and Appellate Body Reports absent consensus to the contrary is a manifestation of this new
adjudicative structure of the WTO/DSU. See id. art. 16.4 (providing for adoption of Panel Reports);
id. art. 17.14 (providing for adoption of appellate body reports); id. art. 22.6 (providing for
authorization of suspension of concessions or other obligations). Some commentators have even
questioned whether the WTO/DSU goes too far, risking the legitimacy of the dispute settlement
system by empowering Panels to render decisions binding on the parties in cases where compliance
might be wanting. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EvOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 364 (1993).
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consensus to block adoption, the new adjudicative system eliminates
blocking power with respect to terms of reference as well.' 6 9
Accordingly, the central premise for the Panel Report's reasoning in
Nicaragua Trade Measures no longer obtains: WTO dispute settlement
bodies, unlike GATT Panels, are no longer colleges of arbitrators applying
only the legal rules, and sometimes only problematical versions of the legal
rules, that the parties to the dispute agree for them to apply.' 7 It is thus fair
to translate the reasoning of the Panel Report concerning substantive issues
to the new procedural context created by the WTO/DSU. The Panel's
suggestion that only the terms of reference precluded it from reviewing the
validity and motivation for the U.S. invocation of article XXI thus reflects
an emerging view of a preferred interpretation of GATT Article XXI that is
more coherent with the new adjudicative structure of the WTO/DSU than the
earlier view that invocation of article XXI is not a matter fit for Panel
review. 7'
In sum, an interpretation based on the structural effects of the new
dispute resolution procedures for GATT remedial law should have
implications for a substantive clause, like article XXI, that previously was
viewed entirely as a procedural condition.172 No Panel Report has yet
169. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 342-43 (discussing move from positive consensus
for adoption of Panel Report to adoption absent negative consensus in cases of "violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements") (citing
DSU, supra note 26, art. 23.1). Similarly, the WTO/DSU automatically permits retaliation by way of
suspension of concessions to the losing party. See id. at 343-44; cf George W. Downs et al., Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 392 (1996) ("We
believe that the negotiating history of the WTO demonstrates that the more demanding levels of
cooperation achieved by the Uruguay Round would not have been possible without its having
reduced," through automatic authorization for retaliation, "the likelihood of self-interested
exploitation by member states.").
170. C. Hahn, supra note 122, at 620 (calling precisely for standardized terms of reference
that would allow Panels "to examine [article XXI], sua sponte, if necessary"). Presumably, Hahn's
recommendation would include a case between two WTO members in which one invoked article XXI
but both took the position that article XXI was self-judging. It should be noted that the GATT did
issue standardized terms of reference that did not on their face permit a state to exclude Panel review
of the legality of its invocation of article XXI. See Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement
Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 63 (1989) [hereinafter
Decision on Procedures] (providing, in paragraph F(b), that "Panels shall have [certain] terms unless
the parties to the dispute agree otherwise"). The effect of this improvement is limited, however, since
paragraph F(b) does not disturb each party's preexisting right to block consensus on the formation of a
Panel, thus affording each the opportunity to compel the other party to agree to revised terms of
reference, as is permitted by paragraph F(b).
171. The argument draws on the transformation of WTO dispute settlement to effect a
substantive change in article XXI. This legal argument should not be confused with the practical point
that, even if a Panel purported to review the invocation of article XXI, the DSU will now no longer
permit the losing state to block consensus. Cf. Gaugh, supra note 167, at 71 (drawing connection
between article XXI and new DSU but only in this latter, practical sense).
172. The failure of Nicaragua and Argentina to secure an interpretive note to article XXI in
the Uruguay Round negotiations specifically supplying content for an interpretation of article XXI
does not disturb this structural interpretation of the relation between article XXI and the WTO/DSU.
The absence of consensus on the precise meaning of article XXI is a better explanation for the failure
to agree on an interpretive note than the objections of only a few states that article XXI should remain
self-judging. But see THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1877-
78 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (discussing Nicaraguan proposal and giving credence to both
rationales: "Other delegations, however, asserted that any attempt to devise a test for the application
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addressed the issue, however.'73 But if Helms-Burton were to lead to a Panel
Report on the issue that adopted the constitutional perspective and reviewed
the legality of the invocation of the national security exception in accordance
with a standard of objective good faith, the Panel still would need to find an
adequate basis for determining when that standard was met.
Subsection III.B.3 will show that the WTO/DSB would likely fail in
that effort-if its legal analysis were limited, as the constitutional approach
requires, to arguments framed solely in terms of WTO law. In light of that
failure, Part V of this Article will attempt to synthesize the insights of the
bargain and constitutional conceptions and advance an alternative approach
for interpreting WTO law.
3. An Authoritative Interpretation Deficit in WTO Law
Unlike treaty interpretation, which permits resort to "any relevant rules
of international law," 74 constitutional interpretation presupposes that the
"constitution," however it is defined, 75 is the ultimate manifestation of the
will of the sovereign, however that term is defined.'76 Thus, the
of Article XXI was unrealistic in light of the sensitivity of the issues involved, and because ultimately
only the contracting party imposing the measure could be in a position to judge its national security
interest.") (citing Note on Meeting of 27-30 June 1988, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG7/8 (July
21, 1988), at 2). The conclusion that the new exceptions under the WTO are non-self-judging is
underscored by the fact that Nicaragua sought an "interpretive note," rather than a revision of article
XXI, thus suggesting that the only question technically before the CONTRACTING PARTIES was
whether to confirm the Nicaraguan understanding that article XXI was not self-judging. The decision
not to adopt an interpretive note is thus fully consistent with the conclusion that none was necessary in
light of the common understanding that, whatever article XXI actually meant, it would not be self-
judging.
173. Nor did any GATT Panel address the question again under the GAIT 1947 regime.
Nonetheless, in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, available in 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 7
(G.A.T.T. June 14, 1994) (Report of the Panel) [hereinafter Restrictions on Imports of Tuna], a case
that arose under pre-WTO dispute settlement procedures, Australia as an interested third party sought
to distinguish article XX exceptions from article XXI exceptions by arguing: "Article XX was more
restrictive. Article XX exceptions could not be invoked to justify any trade measure applied for the
purposes of adoption or enforcement of any policy or practice." Id. at para. 4.10, at *123. One
reading of Australia's distinction is that it believed article XXI does permit "any" trade measure, so
long as it is invoked "for the purpose" articulated in that provision. A GATT Panel's scrutiny of the
motive for invocation of article XXI then would be implicit.
174. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31, para. 3(c).
175. See Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and
the Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 353, 373-81 (1996)
(discussing, preliminary to defense of fundamental revision in meaning of U.N. Charter without
formal amendment, rationales for employing constitutional interpretation to describe U.N. law); see
also infra note 274 (relating H.L.A. Hart's suggestion for locating in multilateral treaties "rules of
recognition" in international law to this Article's argument for extension of comity by WTO for law
of United Nations).
176. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. Ir'L L. 866, 869 (1990) (arguing that international law now protects
"the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty"). If "constitutional" international
law protects the "people's sovereignty," then it must grapple with the question of whether a global
community exists sufficient to constitute a global "people." See id. For a recent debate on this point,
compare THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 11 (1995), noting
that there is "an emerging sense of global community," with Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization,
International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. Rv.
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constitutional conception of WTO law employed in Subsection III.B.2 to
construct the non-self-judging interpretation of the security exception relied
only on arguments drawn from WTO sources. The question this Section
considers is whether the substance of the security exception can be defined,
also using only WTO sources, in a way that supplies adequate standards for
WTO/DSB review.
Of course, this formulation of the issue begs the prior question of what
constitutes an "adequate" level of determinacy that would enable the
WTO/DSB effectively to review a state's assertion of the security exception.
At the extreme, one might argue that that practice under NAFTA suggests
that even a vague non-self-judging interpretation of the national security
exception might be useful in deterring abuse. For example, the possible
influence of the clearly non-self-judging NAFTA security exception for the
energy sector on U.S. policy on uranium imports from Russia suggests that
a non-self-judging exception could play a role in constraining state conduct
even if its applicability were doubtful.' 77 In that case, however, the agreed
non-self-judging character of the exception in the energy sector established a
clear baseline for establishing GATT and NAFTA violations.' 78
Other practice, however, suggests that, in some cases at least, there
might be means short of invalidating the assertion of the security exception
that provide adequate deterrence from abuse. In implementing GATT Article
XXI(a)'s separate injunction that the GATT not be construed "to require any
contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests,"' 79 the U.S. Department
of Commerce reconciled competing demands for access to sensitive
information in unfair trade practice cases against the national security
interest in avoiding disclosure by giving less weight than it otherwise would
to the evidence actually supplied in the proceeding by the state pleading the
exception.'80 But this technique for accommodating the competing interests
of disciplining protectionism and protecting essential national security
interests might not be available under GATT Article XXI(b)'s broader safe
harbor that the GATT "not be construed . .. to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action."'' Burdening the exercise of a WTO
member's rights under GATT Article XXI(b)-unlike merely drawing
1944, 1951 (1997) (book review), stating, in a review of Franck's book, that "there is no global
community of people (as opposed to an artificial, legally constructed community of states)."
177. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
178. See supra text accompanying note 98.
179. GATT art. XXI(a).
180. The Department of Commerce occupied a similar stance in the instance of Yugoslav
nitrocellulose dumping. In respect of Yugoslavia's invocation of article XXI(a)'s right not to "furnish
any information the disclosure of which" it considered "contrary to its essential security interests," the
Department of Commerce took the position that it would not be appropriate either to burden
Yugoslavia's exercise of its article XXI rights by drawing adverse inferences from its refusal to
furnish requested information or to eviscerate U.S. antidumping laws and undercut the GATT
Antidumping Code by using without question information supplied by Yugoslavia favorable to its
position in the dispute on the merits. See Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value;
Industrial Nitrocellulose from Yugoslavia, 55 Fed. Reg. 34,946, 34,947-48 (1990).
181. GATT art. XXI(b).
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adverse inferences from the failure, pursuant to article XXI(a), to supply
evidence in an single unfair trade practice case-may well come dangerously
close to "preventing" the exercise of those rights. In any event, even if
indirect approaches could in the short term provide some level of deterrence
for abuse of the security exception, it is doubtful that constructive ambiguity
in the legal standard could in the long term prevent an ostensibly non-self-
judging security exception from becoming a dead letter. The boy was able to
cry wolf only so many times. Thus, the integrity of the security interests
exception as a legal construct demands that it have at least some core
meaning, even if there is substantial vagueness at its perimeter."8 2
The logical place to look for a core meaning is in cases implicating the
traditional policies of the GATT from which the WTO arose. From this
standpoint, the threat posed by the security exception consists of
theoretically limitless possibilities for a state taking an especially broad view
of what constitutes its economic security and arguing that its "essential"
interests under article XXI are jeopardized, a danger that may have been
exacerbated during the period immediately prior to the creation of the
WTO.l"3 Perhaps overreacting to this risk, one commentator has argued that
the national security exception is inapplicable even to civil nuclear power
trade,"M notwithstanding the well-known risk that civil nuclear power can
translate into military potential. Another commentator has argued the
exception should be limited to cases where it is invoked to respond to an
unlawful act.85 Rather than ignore the concerns underlying the security
182. Determinability can never be exact, of course. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND
LAWYERS' REASONINGS 268-74 (1964), reprinted as Julius Stone, The Indeterminacy of Holdings, in
ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 164-66 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996) [hereinafter
ANTHOLOGY] (noting that precedents operate at various levels of generality). But the weight of law as
a constraint on behavior is not fatally undermined by this inescapable fact. See FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND N LIFE 181-86 (1991), reprinted as Frederick Schauer, Generalizations, in ANTHOLOGY, supra,
at 166 (arguing that "it is a mistake to assume that the decision-maker... is largely unconstrained in
determining what events are assimilable with what other events").
183. One commentator has suggested that the end of the Cold War has changed the meaning
of security to include economic factors. See Zillman, supra note 130, at 124-26. But he fears that the
"extension of 'essential security interests' beyond the purely military . . . could justify almost any
trade restriction under GATT Article XXI." Id. at 126.
184. For an argument that even the "fissionable materials" and "supplying a military
establishment" exceptions were unavailable for subsequently phased-out restrictions on U.S.
enrichment of foreign source uranium, on the theory that the exception does not apply to trade in
uranium used for civilian power plants if a separate supply is available, see Wilch, supra note 128, at
185-87 nn.223-30. See also Leonard E. Santos, The National Security Exception to Free Trade, 30
FED. BAR NEWS & J. 293 (1983). Interestingly, Wilch also seems to believe that the maintenance of a
domestic uranium industry is as weakly related to the "supply of a military establishment" as the
maintenance of the Swedish footwear industry was for Sweden's military establishment, given the
availability of alternative channels of supply. See Wilch, supra note 128, at 186; cf. THEODORE H.
MORAN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 93 (1993) (framing this insight as
corollary of antitrust principles). Moran also notes a cartoon lampooning the Swedish footwear
position. See id. at 47; cf. Whitt, supra note 130, at 619 (discussing Swedish footwear national
security argument).
185. See Hahn, supra note 122, at 617. This position has no textual foundation and seems to
suppose that the WTO remedial system should be subordinated to the general international law of
remedies. See id. at 610 (expressing dismay at Panel's statement in Nicaragua Trade Measures, supra
1998]
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exception, as these proposals seem to do, it would be better to interpret the
security exception so as to balance the competing goals of disciplining the
protectionist policies of members against preserving member states'
legitimate right to protect, as the text of article XXI demands, only their
"essential" security interests.
If so, then the paradigm case for discovering the core meaning of the
security exception is a state's employment of strategic trade policies-
particularly given the risk of abusive reliance on the exception for
protectionist purposes that are not at the heart of essential security
interests.' 86 In a strategic trade policy case, theoretical tools might be able to
frame an objective test for determining whether a state has legitimate
grounds for fearing that another state could secure a trade-related national
security advantage. It has been argued, for example, that a state's acquisition
of market share that would take an international market over a specified
level of concentration would be of strategic significance."'
In practice, however, market power tests based on market share are
difficult to implement. There almost certainly will be a shortage of reliable
information that would facilitate a consensus on various factual
determinations-such as determining price elasticities of demand,'88 relevant
geographic and product markets,' 9 and whether there are barriers to
entry' 90-that might permit reliable assessments of market power, perhaps
note 154, that it was "limited to examining the matter 'in the light of the relevant GATT
provisions'"). Moreover, Hahn seems to generalize too easily from West Germany's position in the
Icelandic Fisheries case. See id. at 572-73. Simply put, protection of essential state interests is not
merely a matter of remedial law but also of national survival, which may be threatened well before a
breach of international legal obligation occurs.
186. See JACKSON, supra note 130, at 751-52 (noting that security exception might be used
improperly to shelter domestic industry and that "international economics is so intimately related to
politics that it is impossible to insulate the two from each other").
187. Moran has suggested employing the numerical thresholds used in U.S. antitrust analysis,
such as the four-firm concentration ratio test used by U.S. courts under section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, the specific antimerger provision of U.S. competition law. See MORAN, supra note 184,
at 46. Under this test, "if the largest four firms (or four countries) control less than 50 percent of the
market, they lack the ability to collude effectively even if they wish to exploit or manipulate
recipients." Id. at 46. Moran argues that the rule's "use for national strategists lies in signaling a
credible threat of denial on the part of foreign firms (or their home governments)." Id. at 93 n.55; see
also The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) (supplying sophisticated numerical criteria for evaluating proposed
merger and nuanced "analytical process" for assessing context in which to evaluate numerical
criteria).
188. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. Rev. 937 app. at 983-86 (1981) (demonstrating that market power is greater
where there are no effective substitutes for good in question, i.e., where price elasticity of demand is
lower).
189. Market definition can also be understood in terms of elasticity of supply, such that an
attempt to exercise market power, i.e., lowering output to raise price, causes expanded supply either
through increased output by other current producers or market entry by potential competitors. See
POSNER, supra note 41, at 324-28.
190. Much rent-seeking behavior employed as part of a neomercantilist national security
strategy might be described as an attempt to create artificial barriers to entry. See Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 238-39 (1986) (discussing collusive method of "cartel ringmaster").
See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
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even in the clearly defined markets involved in the "fissionable materials"
national security exception in article XX(b)(i).' 9' Compounding the empirical
problems of applying any antitrust-based model to the WTO's national
security exception would be the absence of a clear criterion for determining
which "goods and materials," for purposes of article XX(b)(ii) at least,
plausibly could be traded "for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment,"" 9 although focusing on market power could provide a
principled tool for screening out many of the most egregious security
exception abuse cases. 93 Even if these definitional problems could be
overcome so as to clarify the meaning of the article XXI(b)(i) and (ii)
national security exceptions covering trade in fissionable materials and
traffic in arms or goods for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment, 94 it is doubtful that antitrust methodology could be employed
in economic sanctions cases, such as Helms-Burton, implicating article
XXI(b)(iii)'s separate safe harbor for "any" action "taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations. ""'
More importantly, even if antitrust reasoning could supply the
foundation for interpreting the security exception,' 96 nothing in the Uruguay
L.J. 284, 315-21 (1977) (discussing alternative predatory pricing strategies).
191. GATT art. XXI(b)(i).
192. Id. art. XX(b)(ii).
193. Moran has argued that the virtue of the focus on concentration of production is that,
given the absence of concentration in most product markets, the market concentration test would, in
most cases, defeat national security arguments for subsidies for the production of such peripherally-
related goods, such as fabrics employed to clothe soldiers. See MORAN, supra note 184, at 46-49.
194. See GATT art. XXI(b)(i) and (ii). One recent example of use of regulatory policy
arguably for strategic reasons is the European Union's attempt to block the merger of Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas. See Steven Pearlstein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Gets Tough to Ensure Boeing,
McDonnell Merger, WASH. POST, July 17, 1997, at Cl (reporting that Acting U.S. Attorney General
for Antitrust said that "vital" U.S. interests were at stake in merger). It is unclear whether the
European Union blocked the merger solely on competition policy grounds or for fear that the
protection of the European Union champion, Airbus, was necessary for Europe's maintenance of the
capability to have an independent military aircraft infrastructure. Nonetheless, in suggesting that it
might bring the case to the WTO, see id., the United States may have opened the door to a possible
assertion of the national security exception by the European Union, much as the United States has
threatened to invoke the exception in the Helms-Burton case. In any event, the possibility of WTO
dispute resolution may have sparked a settlement, with Boeing agreeing to give up the exclusive
dealing arrangements that most troubled the European Union. See Steven Pearlstein, Europeans
Relent, Back Boeing Merger, WASH. POST, July 24, 1997, at El.
Both Helms-Burton, which concerns extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the Boeing-
McDonnell merger, which implicates antitrust principles, lie outside the normal confines of WTO law.
It was therefore unsurprising that the disputes have encouraged the business community to call for
transatlantic policy harmonization. See id. In this sense, both disputes reflect the incompleteness of the
WTO legal order and therefore the need to supplement the WTO through further negotiations, see
infra text accompanying notes 343-348 (discussing U.S.-EU investment negotiations resulting from
Helms-Burton), or through the institutional comity approach suggested in this Article, which expands
the WTO legal order through interpretation. See id.
195. GATT art. XXI(b)(iii).
196. Ultimately, the suggested feasibility of harmonization of antitrust enforcement policy
could well founder on the rocks of the need, entailed by harmonization, for consensus about the nature
of markets' social context. Before antitrust reasoning could be employed as the conceptual bedrock for
a meaningful security exception, antitrust policy itself would need to be harmonized-a task that will
be fraught with difficulties. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997) (analyzing intersections between trade and competition policy and
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Round explicitly authorizes interpreting the article XXI exception to
incorporate an antitrust dimension.'97 In fact, GATT Article XX(d)'s
separate safe harbor for certain state monopolistic practices' 8 seems to
militate against reconstructing article XXI(b) in terms of market power
rationales. Rather, the evident intent of the Uruguay Round is to remedy the
constitutional defects of GATT by creating a WTO/DSB empowered to
resolve disputes through adoption of Panel Reports without positive
consensus and conferring various quasi-lawmaking powers on the WTO
organs.'
99
Perhaps, however, one could find in the WTO's authority to "make"
law a future basis for giving meaning to the security exception. The WTO
would then reserve for itself authority to resolve national security-related
claims other than those controlled explicitly by the Supremacy Clause of the
U.N. Charter."' GATT Article XX(c) confirms this obligation by ensuring,
as if there might be some doubt, that the GATT would be not be interpreted
"to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security."2 ' Indeed, under the constitutional
conception of WTO law, the explicit confirmation of the supremacy of
certain U.N. law may indicate that the WTO is free to disregard U.N. law,
practice, and policy except where GATT Article XXI(c) specifically dictates
a different result. Thus, the WTO would be free through its own
authoritative interpretation of its own law-perhaps through reasoned case
law,"ta perhaps through formal interpretations of each of the national
developing agenda for policy harmonization, including new WTO Plurilateral Agreement).
197. At least the text of the new WTO and its related agreements reveals no change. See
Porotsky, supra note 138, at 929 n.136 (noting that "it appears that GATT 1994 made no significant
changes with respect to economic coercion") (citing GATT SECRETARIAT, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994) (compiling GATT 1994 documents)),
198. GATT art. XX(d).
199. See WTO AGREEMENT art. VIII (providing for international legal personality and
functional capacity for WTO); id. art. IX (providing for decisionmaking powers, including adoption
of formal interpretations and waivers); id. art. X (providing for possibility of amendments that may
take effect for all parties even without assent of all parties). That said, the constitutional characteristics
of the new WTO, particularly in respect of the protection of individual rights, may be limited. See
generally Mary F. Dominick, Book Review, 88 AM. J. INT'. L. 862 (1994) (reviewing NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
eds., 1993)).
200. Of course, the supremacy of the U.N. Charter resolves any question of direct conflict
with the Security Council's exercise of its powers. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 ("In the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.").
201. See supra note 16.
202. Ordinarily, the doctrine of stare decisis technically has no place in international
adjudication. See, e.g., Statute of the ICJ, supra note 122, art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."). Nonetheless, judicial
decisions may be referred to as "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Id. art.
38(1)(d). Nothing in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding appears to overturn this balance.
Indeed, GATT practice, which the Understanding to a large degree codified, suggested substantial
reliance by the Contracting Parties on the pronouncements of Panels as authoritative interpretations of
the GATT. See JACKSON, supra note 43, at 67-68; see also supra notes 119-125 and accompanying
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security exceptions in the MTAs under the WTO Agreement° 3-to supply
meaningful principles of restraint for invoking these exceptions in the future.
In making quasi-constitutional common law through the process of
interpreting the specific provisions of the MTAs, the WTO might draw on
structural principles defining its relation to sovereign states, principles much
like the federalism that informs U.S. constitutional analysis. Even if the
WTO law of the security exception might not be clear enough, at least
initially, over time the WTO could supply specific interpretations in concrete
cases that could fill the gap. One possible analogy for this approach might be
the U.S. Supreme Court's daring and ingenuity in fleshing out the meaning
of the so-called "constitutional" Sherman Antitrust Act, whose broad
language and vague legislative history required considerable judicial
creativity.' Deference to national judgments could still be part of this
methodology, as federalist deference to state judgments was in the U.S.
antitrust context.
25
Arguably, the WTO may already have located a structural principle
that could advance this interpretive agenda. Because the presumption against
extraterritorialism performs sovereignty-protective functions similar to those
served by a variety of similar federalist-based deference concepts,0 6 it might
well serve to control the exercise of the exceptions in articles XX and XXI
of the GATT that protect state sovereignty. Thus, explication of article XXI
might be guided by United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, in which
a GATT Panel held illegal U.S. conservation measures imposed pursuant to
GATT Article XX exceptions, largely because they were applied
extraterritorially. 2°7 This reasoning may have been reaffirmed by the
text (discussing various theories of status of GATT precedent).
203. See WTO AGREEMENT art. IX(2) ("The Ministerial Conference and the General Council
shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements [such as article XXI of the GATT]."). Admittedly, the power would need to be
exercised carefully, as required by the WTO, such that it "not be used in a manner that would
undermine the amendment provisions in Article X [of the WTO]." Id.
204. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (announcing "rule of
reason" under which only some-the anticompetitive-restraints in trade were considered unlawful
notwithstanding statutory language proscription of "[e]very . . . restraint in trade"); see also
Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a charter of freedom, the
Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions.").
205. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (fashioning federalism-based exception
for Sherman Anti-Trust Act for state-authorized and -supervised monopolies); Barry E. Hawk &
Laraine L. Laudati, Antitrust Federalism in the United Sates and Decentralization of Competition Law
Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 18, 20-21 (1996)
(describing states' active roles in antitrust enforcement).
206. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812-21 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting in part) (describing rules of comity and principles of interpretation, requiring, where
possible, avoidance of conflict with international law and rebuttably presuming non-extraterritoriality,
as related concepts); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1909) (refusing to
apply Sherman Act extraterritorially, arguably on Act of State grounds).
207. See Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 173, para. 5.26, at *176. The Report
noted:
If however Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to take trade
measures so as to force other contracting parties to change their policies within their
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WTO/DSB Appellate Body in United States Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline.08 In that case, a Panel rejected the U.S. argument
that deviation from national treatment was required by the difficulty of
extraterritorial criminal enforcement of U.S. information-gathering
requirements relative to the enforcement of environmental requirements for
imported gasoline. The Panel justified its decision by asserting that "the
usual measures available in international trade for determination of origin
and tracking of goods (including documentary evidence and third party
verification)" were sufficient." 9  Accepting the U.S. claim that a
protectionist measure would be justified as an alternative to extraterritorial
enforcement might have, instead, buttressed the latter's legitimacy. This the
DSB refused to do.
On closer inspection, however, it is not certain that these cases could
serve as precedents for employing the presumption against extraterritoriality
to interpret the exceptions in article XX of the GATT. Arguably, the validity
of extraterritorial enforcement solely for environmental or conservation
reasons was never squarely before the GATT and WTO dispute settlement
bodies in these two cases. The measures at issue in United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna and in United States Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline may have had protectionist effects
that called into question the purity of U.S. motives.2"' Thus, when
protectionist concerns are not implicated at all, as is perhaps the case in the
Helms-Burton dispute,2 ' it is not clear that the WTO has as yet treated the
presumption against extraterritorialism as a structural principle that could
inform its interpretation of the security exception and still take account of
the core interest of states in protecting their national security-rather than
their protectionist-interests.
In sum, the constitutional conception seriously risks legal
indeterminacy when extended to the substantive meaning of the security
exception. The WTO's text, context, purpose, or travaux reveal no
own jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the balance of rights and
obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of access to markets,
would be seriously impaired.
Id. The Panel Report did, however, leave open the possibility that the GATT posed no general barrier
to extraterritorialism. See id. para 5.16, at *166 ("It could not therefore be said that the General
Agreement proscribed in an absolute manner measures that related to things or actions outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.").
208. See World Trade Organization, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WTIDS21R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter United States-
Standards for Gasoline Panel Report]; see also World Trade Organization, United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WTIDS21ABIR (Apr. 29,
1996) (adopted by DSB on May 20, 1996) (affirming Panel Report).
209. United States-Standards for Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 208, para. 6.26.
210. See id. para. 6.23 (noting U.S. failure to adopt 1994 executive branch proposal for
implementing reformulated gasoline requirements that would have been GATT-legal).
211. But cf. Desloge, supra note 18 (arguing that Helms-Burton benefits special interest
group of wealthy Cuban expatriates by allowing them to sue foreign corporations doing business in
Cuba and then to settle out-of-court for share of current profits from Cuban nationalized assets, thus
letting them functionally participate in Cuban economy and thwarting intent of Helms-Burton, and also
claiming that White House was aware of this special interest-benefiting feature).
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persuasive criteria for interpreting the security exception as WTO law. Even
the structural principles that would flow from conceiving the WTO as a
constitutional order may not supply the basis for legislating a more
determinate security exception as a species of WTO constitutional common
law. This failure will leave a gap in WTO law that in effect renders the
national security exceptions self-judging in an unmanageable number of
cases, endangering the WTO's capacity to deter abuse. Would this require
the WTO/DSB to throw up its hands212 and invoke a political question
doctrine for abstention, either because security issues are exclusively the
province of some other body or because they are inherently nonjusticiable?2"
Nominally, at least, existing ICJ precedent would counsel against this
solution.2"4 Where, then, could the WTO look to resolve such cases when
text, context, purpose, past GATT practice, negotiating history, and even
WTO structure supply insufficient material to yield practical results?
Part IV will explain why the WTO should look outside itself. This
analysis will qualify the constitutional conception by reformulating the
bargain conception's central insight: namely, that treating WTO law as a
self-contained regime would undercut its legitimacy. Treating the WTO in
this manner would ignore other purposes and policies, those that represent
the will of the states, groups, and individuals participating in global affairs;
the international community has established an equally, if not more,
important supranational institution for these purposes and policies-the
United Nations.
212. One might then take the view that GATT Panels would be required not to decide the
case as non liquet. See Julius Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International
Community, 1959 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 124, 130-38 (arguing that, unlike municipal law, international
law is not complete legal system for which every set of facts is capable of legal resolution). But see 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 12-13 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)
(arguing that every international law case can be decided under existing rules or principles).
213. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803) (advancing political
question rationale for judicial abstention; "the President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion"); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962) (describing doctrine as applicable to several cases, but relying principally on textual
commitment of discretion to coordinate political branch of government and absence of judicially-
manageable standards); cf. infra note 293 (making similar argument based on case of GATT
abstention on political question concerning China's admission to GATT that, in mid-1960s at least,
was understood to be more properly within province of Security Council).
214. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 431-32,
(rejecting U.S argument that only U.N. Security Council was competent to review matter involving
international peace and security); id. at 436-37 (rejecting U.S. argument that situation involving
ongoing armed conflict lacked attributes necessary for adjudication). But see Antonio F. Perez, The
Passive Wrtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399 (1997) (arguing that recent practice of ICJ does in fact establish its
willingness to use variety of devices that together operate in effect as political question doctrine for
international adjudication).
1998]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 23: 301
IV. WTO LAW: LINKAGES BETWEEN THE REMEDIAL, SUBSTANTIVE, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
Just as Jackson and Croley refute the Chevron analogy from the
constitutionalist perspective on grounds of democratic legitimacy," 5 the
federalist deference Jackson and Croley suggest might be deeply problematic
if it undercut a more democratic WTO. From the bargain perspective,
assigning the WTO/DSB competence over questions not strictly within trade
policy would be inconsistent with the limited bargain struck by states, as
well as with constitutional notions of limited government." ' Yet, although it
might be questionable to characterize the WTO as a supranational
legislature, the constitutional dimensions to the new WTO cannot now be
ignored. The WTO Agreement formally established new international
institutions and thereby cured the perceived illegitimacy of the de facto
institutions of the GATT that emerged, despite what Jackson describes as its
"flawed constitutional beginnings" in the stillborn International Trade
Organization.2"7
One might respond that under traditional conceptions of the law of
international organizations, constitutional status means simply international
juridical personality-in short, the capacity to act as a subject of law with
the power to enter into international legal relationships, accept obligations,
and assert rights.218 However, the functional justification, and therefore
functional limits, of international institutions are increasingly under attack on
the ground that the emerging reality of transnational community,1 9 together
with the growth of transnational bureaucracies exercising governmental
responsibilities, 2 belies "absolute" state sovereignty and signifies the
emergence of "sovereign" supranational institutions.22'
215. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 208-11.
216. Conservatives and liberals formed an unholy alliance to criticize the WTO as a threat to
democratic legitimacy by undermining U.S. sovereignty. One should compare the statement of
Senator Jesse Helms, who called the WTO the "U.N. of world trade, without the veto," WTO
Hearings, supra note 29, (statement of Senator Jesse Helms, Foreign Relation Committee), available
in 1994 WL 14188760, with the testimony of Ralph Nader, who argued that the WTO would lead to
"bottom-up democratic impulses replaced by pull-down mercantile dictates." Id. (statement of Ralph
Nader), available in 1994 WL 14188790.
217. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 29-39 (1989). For example, the
GATT never entered into a relationship agreement with the United Nations, in part because of its
dubious constitutional status. See Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in 1
UNrrED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER, supra note 30, at 503, 509 n.16.
218. See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (recognizing formally, in Advisory Opinion, international juridical capacity of
United Nations).
219. See FRANCK, supra note 176, at 12-13 (noting that "multiple linkages, making different
regimes interdependent, are evidence of community" and that "[slociety is starting to perceive itself as
a community of states and, simultaneously, as a community of persons").
220. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1-28 (1995).
221. See David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and
the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 377 (1996) ("The idiom of juridical
personality for institutions is no longer absolute either, yielding now to its conceptual twin of
Institutional Comity in National Security
Thus, for Jackson's federalist-or, in Bello's vocabulary,
confederalist-conception of the WTO, the balance struck between the
central organs of supranational government and state authorities under the
WTO cannot be analyzed without considering how the other organs of
supranational government affect WTO law. An account of WTO law that
does justice to the insights of both the bargain and constitutional
conceptions, yet redresses their shortcomings, needs to consider the
relationship between WTO law and the law of other similar international
organizations functioning in the quasi-constitutional capacity characterizing
the WTO. This inquiry would begin by addressing the question Jackson
identified, but explicitly eschewed answering, in his rebuttal of Bello's claim
that WTO obligations are not binding: Is the WTO a self-contained remedial
regime?222 An even more important question, which Part V will address, is:
What does the answer to this prior question imply for locating the substance
of the security exception when the internal sources of WTO law do not
supply an answer?
A. The WTO as a Closed System of Remedial Law
Bruno Simma, explicating the ICJ's decision in the Hostages Case,
analyzed the concept of a self-contained regime largely in terms of the
international law of remedies.223 Thus, Simma uses the concept to suggest
that only the remedies specified in the special regime may be invoked by an
injured party in consequence of breach.2" Pieter-Jan Kuyper's insightful
analysis of this question in terms of the GATT suggests that, even if
remedial law might in the abstract be distinguished from substantive law,
determining whether the WTO is a self-contained remedial system
necessarily entails exploring the relationship between WTO remedial and
substantive law, including the law governing the GATT exceptions.225
Kuyper argues that the self-contained character of the GATT/WTO
regime has been increased significantly by article 23 of the new DSU, which
"emphasizes that WTO Members shall seek redress for violations of
obligations under the WTO and its annexes only through the dispute
settlement system of the DSU and shall suspend concessions or other
obligations only in accordance with the rules of the DSU."226 Kuyper
suggests that the ability of states to block dispute settlement Panel Reports
community and community interest in international law.").
222. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 63 n.12.
223. See Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 1985 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 111-13;
see also United States Diplomats and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40 (May
24) (identifying diplomatic law as "self-contained r6gime").
224. Simma suggests narrowing the definition to "designate a certain category of subsystems,
namely those embracing, in principle, a full (exhaustive and definite) set of secondary rules"; that is,
"a subsystem which is intended to exclude more or less totally the application of general legal
consequences of wrongful acts, in particular the application of the countermeasures normally at the
disposal of an injured party." Simma, supra note 223, at 117.
225. See Kuyper, supra note 129, at 239-57.
226. Id. at 251-52.
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under the old GATT system meant that the "remedy of reprisal or exceptio
non-adimpleti contractus under general international law could be reasserted
and applied."227 The new, binding DSU makes resort to alternative remedies
unnecessary.
Arguably, this view of the WTO as a self-contained remedial system
shapes Kuyper's understanding of the effect of asserting a waiver or
exception as a defense to a nullification or impairment of benefits claim.
Because the right to a remedy under any legal system presupposes a breach
of a legal obligation, Kuyper rejects the notion of "non-violation"
nullification or impairment of benefits under the GATT; any nullification or
impairment of benefits not cured by an exception is itself an unexcused
breach of the GATT. While recognizing the existence of possibly contrary
authority,228 Kuyper then argues that it would be "totally improper" to find a
right to compensation for nullification or impairment of benefits resulting
from waivers or exceptions under the GATT, "where by definition there can
be no reasonable expectation of the continuation of the tariff concession. 
229
Kuyper's reasoning is compelling, however, only when the exception
or waiver gives sufficient notice of the range of instances in which it might
be invoked, so that its subsequent application does not undercut the
reasonable expectations of the parties. Kuyper's argument for the absence of
a right to a remedy when a party asserts the national security exception
would not obtain, therefore, if the exception were entirely unpredictable.
Thus, even if Kuyper is right that the WTO is now a closed system in
Simma's remedial sense, his focus on the reasonable expectations of the
parties suggests that a remedy should still be available in a nullification and
impairment case in which a state wrongfully asserted an exception, either
227. Id. at 251. Reprisal is a countermeasure in response to a breach of an international
obligation that would otherwise be unlawful; exceptio adimpled contractus is reciprocal
nonperformance in response to material breach of a treaty. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 122, at
570-72.
228. See Kuyper, supra note 129, at 249 n.69 (citing United States Restrictions on the
Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the
Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 228,
261 (1991)). Arguably, however, Kuyper might have treated this waiver precedent as inapposite to the
case of exceptions, for waivers might be distinguishable from exceptions. A waiver operates
potentially only as a relinquishment of part of the Contracting Parties' negotiated benefit, namely the
right to withdrawal of a measure that would otherwise violate the GATT; it thereby preserves for the
contracting party the remainder of its negotiated benefit, namely the right to compensation in the event
of nullification or impairment of benefits. An exception, by contrast, is part of the landscape for the
negotiation of the balance of advantages. If this analysis is correct, Kuyper is on even stronger
ground, in terms of GATT precedent at least, in arguing against the survival of a residual claim for
compensation for nullification or impairment of benefits when an exception operates as a defense to
the duty to withdraw a measure that violates the GATT and, by parity of reasoning, for a measure that
does not violate the GATT yet nonetheless nullifies or impairs benefits.
229. Id. at 249. Kuyper specifically criticizes the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES
decision (prompted by Argentine protests about sanctions during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict) that,
in the case of measures based on the national security exceptions, "affected parties retain all their
GATT rights (meaning all rights under Article XXIII, inclusive of non-violation)." Id. Kuyper
criticizes this on the grounds that it suggested that there might be a right to compensation for
nullification and impairment of benefits even if an exception or waiver were applicable. See id. (citing
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1982)).
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because the assertion of the exception would be ineffective or because the
wrongful assertion of the exception would itself constitute an independent
breach.23 In sum, Kuyper's thorough analysis of WTO remedial law
demonstrates that the essential inquiry-whether in a case of wrongful
assertion of an exception or of nullification or, alternatively, in a case of
non-violative nullification or impairment of benefits-should be the same,
namely, what is the substance of the national security exception?
The point that WTO remedial law implies particular assumptions about
the substantive law of the WTO does not necessarily, in my view, imply the
converse position that WTO substantive law is law only insofar as it implies
the right to a remedy.23' This Article brackets the jurisprudential foundations
of WTO law, exploring instead how to determine the meaning of WTO
substantive law in light of the best understanding of what states
accomplished in transforming the GATT into a fundamentally new institution
that not only protects the reasonable expectations of the parties but also
serves supranational public purposes.
B. International Public Law and the VITO
If Kuyper's central insight is that the new DSU so strengthens WTO
remedial law that it closes the door to international law remedies, his
correlative failure is not recognizing that international law remedies will
then no longer be available to redress deficiencies in substantive WTO law.
Neither the bargain nor constitutional law arguments, moreover, seem
overwhelmingly persuasive in filling the hole left in the fabric of WTO law
by the national security exception, largely because neither conception fits
securely within a settled community interpretation of WTO law. Both
failures flow from understanding the WTO as a self-contained regime-the
bargain theory simply sees the WTO as too small, and the constitutional
theory sees it as too large.232
230. Kuyper in effect concedes the relevance of the Contracting Parties' reasonable
expectations of when an exception might be invoked when he acknowledges that, even in the case of
an exception, a remedy might be available for misuse, and thus a breach, of the exception. See id. at
249. Indeed, Kuyper has identified cases that he would consider examples of lawful and unlawful
assertions of the national security exception. Compare Pieter Jan Kuyper, Trade Sanctions, Security
and Human Rights and Commercial Policy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY
AFTER 1992: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 387, 417 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993) (discussing lawfulness of
threatened EC sanctions against Yugoslavia during latter's civil war), with PIETER JAN KUYPER, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: THE NETHERLANDS AND RHODESIA 180 (1978)
(arguing that, while it would be "highly doubtful . . . [although] not altogether improbable" to
consider that Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence was "an emergency" in its
international relations for Netherlands, it would be "impossible, however, to argue that the 'essential
security interests' of the Netherlands and other West European contracting parties to the GATT were
affected by the situation in Rhodesia; therefore their action was illegal").
231. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21-29 (Wilfrid
E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (discussing law as enforceable command of
sovereign).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 34-88.
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Arguably, these failures flow from envisioning the relationship of
WTO law to the general international law of remedies as much like the
relationship between the "law of contract" and the "law of the contract."233
For the bargain conception, analogous to the common law of contract, the
will of the parties expressed in the law of the contract takes priority over the
social interest expressed in the law of contract. Under the constitutional
conception, the common interests the parties embodied in WTO law trump
any other private interests they might have, including not only interests
reflected in their other contractual international agreements, but also those
reflected in their agreements creating other international institutions.
The distinction between private and public interest, in some
perspectives, can be collapsed, since the public interest at the supranational
level might well be described as the sum of the "private" interests of states
as members of the community, whose own "public" interests with respect to
their constituents could be described as the sum of the private interests of
their constituents.234 But the distinction remains important from a
constitutional standpoint because it reflects a view about the neutrality of
dispute resolution in the settlement of private conflict: To the extent that the
WTO is a public institution, its dispute settlement system strives to induce
the parties to implement particular outcomes. Indeed, Kenneth Abbott has
argued forcefully that it is useful to consider GATT issues in terms of the
dichotomy between public interests and private interests, where "the term
'public' refers to the common interests of the nations forming the world
trading community, while 'private' refers to the particular interests of the
individual states, the contracting parties of GATT."235 Thus, suggests
Abbott, "the role of international institutions of justice is to apply
community policy, not merely to resolve private conflicts."236
233. This is not to suggest that the public/private law distinction is much more than a
heuristic device. Private law is now widely understood to reflect public policies structuring private
choices. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip R. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 884-88 (1991). It is even
questionable whether private preferences can ever be expressed in a fully neutral private law system
given the role of legal rules in structuring private preferences. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986) (setting out numerous
arguments for conclusion that legal system should reject use of private preferences as exogenous
variables).
234. See Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Law and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 1034 (1994) (treating private/public distinction as
"merely the beginning of a continuum of vertical levels of analysis"); Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory
of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470, 511 (1996-97) (treating states simply as
mediating institutions between supranational institutions and individuals).
235. Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 32 (1992) [hereinafter Abbott, GATTAs a Public Institution]. For a similar
argument, see Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-
Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 111, 113-14, drawing on Bruce Ackerman's
and Mirjan Damalka's dichotomy between the "active" state and the "reactive" state. See BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 23-37 (1984); MIRIAN R. DAMA8KA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 71-96 (1986).
236. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution, supra note 235, at 35. The distinction Abbott
develops thus owes as much to the Hart and Sacks legal process methodology as to Ackerman and
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Accordingly, if we recognize that the public purposes states have
expressed in establishing the WTO as an independent international
organization compete and cooperate with the public purposes embodied in
other institutions, then we must focus on the relationship between
substantive rules and institutional structure.237 Such a public law approach
might be more useful in interpreting and applying WTO law than either the
bargain or constitutional conceptions. Under this view, the WTO itself is a
legislative enactment of an organic statute. Its precise meaning would be
found not only by processes of vertical synthesis, in which superior WTO
law is read together with applicable municipal laws, but also by horizontal
synthesis of WTO law with the law of other coequal, legislative enactments
of supranational bodies.
A more fundamental justification for looking to the law of other
institutions to fill the gaps left in the national security exception might be
found in the WTO's substantive legitimacy. Taking account of the ethical
values of the supranational community requires some mechanism for
harmonizing or selecting among competing values expressed in the relevant
institutions; dispute resolution between institutions, as between states and
institutions, 38 cannot be permanently neutral as to competing conceptions of
the good. Accordingly, if the WTO remedial system is to do more than
merely reflect the bargain struck in the concessions negotiated under the
GATT, it must also do more than authorize self-help by means of retaliatory
suspension of concessions. In some cases, for example the U.S. embargo
against Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, the non-defaulting GATT party lacks an
effective retaliatory option. In that case, the U.S. veto also impaired the
effective functioning of the Security Council in addressing the situation,
Damaka, for the legal process approach was organized precisely around the distinction between the
role of law in facilitating private settlements and its functioning as a "series of institutionalized
processes for settling by authority of the group various types of questions of concern to the group."
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL
PROCESS, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at xi, lxxxiii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (citation omitted) (quoting Hart). It was the purposive quality of law, that is, to achieve
agreed social ends, that distinguished the legal process school and that ultimately betrayed it when
social ends no longer were agreed. See id. at exii-exxv. The policy-oriented jurisprudence of the Yale
School bears important resemblances to this model. See generally MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981) (collecting essays relating to "the global constitutive process of
authoritative decision to the more comprehensive processes of effective power and social
interaction"). The notion of "community policy" should not, therefore, be used without some
skepticism.
237. See Thomas Cottier, Constitutional Trade Regulation in National and International Law:
Structure-Substance Pairings in the EFTA Experience, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 57,
at 409, 418-23 (arguing that limited institutional law-creating capacity of European Free Trade
Association problematized its wholesale incorporation of EC law); see also Laurence H. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 301-03 (1975) (articulating structure-
substance pairing concept in domestic context).
238. See BRILMAYER, supra note 30, at 141-67 (arguing for substantive justification for
international use of force); Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 773-
74 (1989) (arguing that "supreme authority" of law as "standard of conduct" is based on moral
dimensions).
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leaving Nicaragua without an effective remedy at the United Nations as
well.239 But that does not mean, as the next Part of this Article will argue,
that there is no U.N. "law" relevant to the WTO national security exception
that could fill the gaps left by the action of either the WTO or United
Nations alone.
V. INSTITUTIONAL COMITY IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
If Kuyper was right to close the exit out of the WTO through which its
members could seek remedies under general international law, then the door
must be reopened to allow the law of coordinate institutions to cure the
substantive gaps in the WTO legal system. The price of this new WTO law,
however, is requiring the WTO, when the need arises, to subordinate its
policies and interests to those of coordinate institutions. This might be called
institutional comity.
Because U.S. experience with reconciling the competing interests of
multiple sovereignties has led to a flourishing of its judiciary's analysis of
interjurisdictional conflicts under the rubric of "choice of law" analysis, Part
V of this Article advances an institutional comity approach for interpreting
the WTO national security exceptions that is described in terms of modem
U.S. choice of law principles. Because international organizations are not
expressions of territorial sovereignty, choice of law principles that are
ordinarily based on competence over territory are inapposite." Rather, the
modern U.S. choice of law principles described as governmental interest
analysis might provide a plausible framework for implementing institutional
comity.
24I
Section V.A articulates the choice of law approach and considers
preliminary objections. Section V.B then justifies on comity grounds
deference by the WTO to the law of the United Nations. It considers in
detail the explicit relationship between U.N. and WTO law; it explores the
more subtle, indirect relationships between U.N. and WTO law; it
reevaluates the differences between the bargain, constitutional, and comity
approaches; and, lastly, identifies important limits on the appropriateness of
deference by the WTO to U.N. policy. Finally, Section V.C applies the
239. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1987) (evaluating future of Court in wake of Nicaragua debacle).
240. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 42, 55, 64, 81 cmt. d, 323,
325, 377-78, 384 (1934) (stating that dispute is governed by law of place where last event necessary
to create right occurred). For an elaboration of the territorial conception written by the Restatement's
Chief Reporter, see 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.2 (1935).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 242-247. Admittedly, as Professor Trimble has
suggested to me, even interests analysis is territorial in the sense that it allocates authority over
territory. In this sense, all choice of law theory that has emerged from conflicts between different
territorial sovereigns is grounded in values that must respect territorially-based concerns. Nonetheless,
employment of interests analysis as part of the conceptual apparatus for WTO interpretation
transcends, as this Article will argue, the territorial origin of choice of law analysis and can lay the
- foundation for accommodating non-territorially-based allocations of authority in a global political and
legal system in which states are no longer the only relevant actors.
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comity approach to the problem of Helms-Burton in a preliminary, and
necessarily inconclusive, assessment. Part VI of the Article concludes that
the institutional comity approach, notwithstanding its failure to give a
compelling solution in the Helms-Burton case, offers the best prospect for
giving meaning to the WTO security exception.
A. The Choice of Law Method and Preliminary Objections
The institutional comity approach elaborated in this Part draws on
modem American choice of law principles, which no longer automatically
apply the law of the jurisdiction in whose territory a right vested and instead
apply the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the
matter in question.242 The earliest versions of governmental interest analysis
would have established forum law as the default rule in the case of conflict
between policies of sovereigns having an interest in a matter.243 But modem
governmental interests analysis calls for a careful assessment of the interests
supporting a particular sovereign's potentially applicable law and, where
possible, identifying so-called "false" conflicts in which closer inspection
reveals that the interests underlying one jurisdiction's law in fact would not
be served by its application.2 Even in cases of true conflicts, some schools
of modem governmental interests conflicts doctrine would balance the
competing policies of interested jurisdictions, so that the forum would defer
wherever its interests are comparatively less impaired than are those of the
non-forum jurisdiction.245 Congruently, building on the traditional concept of
comity, explicit balancing of interests became a major theme in modem
analysis of transnational conflict of laws, implying much greater deference
to non-forum law.246 In international cases, this line of development
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing relevant factors);
see also WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-90 (1942)
(challenging vested rights theory); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933) (calling for choice of law method of analysis that avoids mechanical
rules); Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Second), 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 679 (1963) (reviewing and analyzing different policies regarding choice of law rules). But see
William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 143-44 (1998) (criticizing tendency to describe balancing of
governmental interests as "the choice of law method" to exclusion of other choice of law methods
such as vested rights or local law approaches).
243. See BRAINERD CuRRiu, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183 (1963) ("Normally, even in cases involving foreign
elements, the court should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in
the law of the forum.").
244. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
757 (1963) (softening his earlier preference for forum law by arguing that, even when forum initially
found true conflict, on reconsideration of question "a more moderate and restrained interpretation" of
forum law would result in forum's not applying its own law); Brainerd Currie, Married Women's
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 233-44 (1958).
245. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv.
1, 18 (1963) (advancing "comparative impairment" approach, under which, in case of conflicting
"external" objectives of forum state and another state, state whose "internal objective will be least
impaired" should defer).
246. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 616 (9th Cir.
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culminated in the complex rules of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, which turned to comity as the
mechanism for resolving conflicts of state interests in transnational disputes
concerning prescriptive, as well as adjudicative, jurisdiction.247 Thus, if
interests analysis can be used to resolve conflicts of laws problems through
balancing public policy interests expressed in municipal statutes, it might
also resolve conflicts between the policies expressed in the "statutes"
establishing international institutions.
Before considering how the institutional comity approach might be
applied to the WTO national security exceptions, however, it would be
useful to consider preliminary objections to the assumptions upon which the
method is founded: namely, that governmental interests choice of law
reasoning is not applicable to conflicts of public law; and that, even if it
were, it fails the test of democratic legitimacy. First, choice of law
approaches to public law conflicts have not gone uncriticized. Relying on the
traditional distinction between private law, the historic domain of conflicts
theory, and public law, some experts have questioned whether choice of law
principles are applicable to the public law context.248 Yet it would seem that
modem governmental interests analysis's focus on the relatively slight public
interest in disputes governed by private law, such as contract and tort, would
be even more appropriate in the case of conflicts between jurisdictions over
relatively more important public interests expressed in statutory regimes.249
Indeed, comity in choice of public law is functionally equivalent to less
explicit, but less controversial, interpretive techniques. Well-accepted,
traditional doctrines expressing restraint in the extraterritorial application of
1976) (adopting jurisdictional rule of reason in extraterritorial application of Sherman Antitrust Act).
247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(3) (1987) (applying neutral criteria by selecting law of state whose "interest is clearly greater").
Yet, territorialism survives in interests analysis under a version implemented through a conception of
territorial effects that remains dominant, if much disputed, in public law. Compare Russell J.
Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the
Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEx. L. Rv. 1799, 1817-18 (1992) (arguing that choice
of law methods, including effects test, are inappropriate in cases involving public law), with Joel P.
Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 998, 1030-56 (1993) (arguing that "a conflict of laws for public law is
needed" and proposing method built around effects test). Territorialism also has revived in the private
international law context, where the comity principle expressed in the Restatement (Third) has been
construed narrowly by the U.S. Supreme Court to require deference only when the law of the foreign
state compels particular conduct. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-801
(1993) (applying Sherman Act extraterritorially to U.K. conspiracy having effects in United States).
But see supra note 241 (alluding to territorial dimensions of interest arguments).
248. See Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Extraterritorial Effect of Antitrust Law, 179 RECUEIL DES
COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 9, 110 (1983); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39, 42; Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Private and Public International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280,
289 (1982).
249. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interactions, 163 R.C.A.D.I 321, 325-29 (1979
11) (proposing employment of governmental interests choice of law approach to analysis of conflicts of
"legislative" jurisdiction); Trachtman, supra note 247, at 1030-38 (1994).
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forum law-such as the presumption that statutes are not ordinarily intended
to apply extraterritoriallyso or to conflict with international law" 1-reflect
the underlying policy considerations buttressing the comity principle's
deference to the law of a foreign jurisdiction with a greater interest than the
forum in the matter under dispute.252 Thus, one could view institutional
comity from the standpoint of a rule of interpretation rather than as an
external limit on prescriptive jurisdiction. It might function as the equivalent
of an interpretive canon in international organizations' own assessments of
their powers, but with the advantage that results turn on explicit evaluation
of competing interests rather than conclusory application of canons of
statutory construction.
Drawing on similar arguments made in related contexts, the second,
arguably more telling, objection to supranational institutional comity might
be framed in terms of the democratic legitimacy of supranational
institutions."sI Similarly, some regard comity as a mediating principle
mitigating the conflict between state sovereignties, but at the price of
subordinating public values to private interests."4 Institutional comity also
might risk subordinating public values expressed in the new WTO's
commitment to trade legalism to the "private" state sovereign interest in
freedom of action under the national security exception.
Arguably, political conflict between the relevant international
organizations might be desirable because it would force the political
communities represented to negotiate a specific arrangement.255 Indeed, this
claim may be compelling in the domestic lawmaking context. There, subject
to the public choice prediction of deviations from politically representative
outcomes due to rent-seeking behavior by the better organized," 6 one might
250. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-59 (1991) (supporting
non-extraterritorial application of federal statutes unless Congress manifests clear intention to
contrary).
251. See generally Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.) (stating that congressional statutes are intended by Congress to accord with international law,
unless Congress manifests clear intention to contrary).
252. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also
suggested that the act of state doctrine, in which the forum defers to the law of the state in which the
act of state occurred rather than the law, including the international law, of the forum might also be
understood as a choice of law rule. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Co. Int'l,
493 U.S. 400, 403-08 (1990) (Scalia, J.). It should be noted that the presumption against non-
extraterritorial application and the act of state doctrine, understood as conflict of laws rules, draw
from the vested rights territorial theory that underlay the Bealian Restatement. See supra note 240 and
accompanying text. It is, therefore, not surprising that like vested rights theory, these interpretive
canons do little to explicate the underlying policy conflicts that should guide reasoned decisionmaking.
253. See generally Trimble, supra note 176 (questioning, in light of their obviously
increasing authority, democratic legitimacy of supranational institutions such as WTO).
254. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 61-63 (1991).
255. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEx. L. Rv. 1799, 1819
(1992) (arguing that application of lexfori induces negotiation of transnational legislative solutions by
forcing policymakers to confront conflicts between their and other jurisdictions' policies); see also
Dodge, supra note 242 (favoring judicial unilateralism rather than multilateralist attempts to balance
conflicting state policies to select one jurisdiction's law alone as applicable).
256. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
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assume vigorous political processes in which politically accountable
governments whose policies conflict should be able to negotiate agreements
that reflect the common interests of their constituents. But at the
supranational level it is doubtful that political conflict will lead, in the short
term, to representative outcomes, given the greater opportunities for rent-
seeking by private interest groups 7 and the current bias in the transnational
political process toward elite decisionmaking?. 5 There is no reason to think
choice of law brinkmanship will not lead to protracted institutional conflicts
or that resolution of such conflicts will not reflect elite bargaining rather
than accountability to the larger public.
Taking this concern to its logical conclusion, one might even argue that
the risk of elite management and private interest group rent-seeking is so
great in international institutions that purely reasoned decisionmaking by
judicial organs might be preferable to any sort of political process in which
the interests of states and their constituents are represented. Under this view,
institutional choice of law would treat the United Nations and WTO as
completely independent legal systems, for the most part, yet recognize that
their specific provisions might yield particular rules that should be followed
simply because they are a "better" law.259 Although the institutions would
not be organically connected, the policies of one organization might yet
influence the law of another on the theory that analogous legal reasoning
might be useful. Analogy as a legal construct draws from a common law
notion that courts find law through reasoned examination of precedents, and
their underlying rationales, as applied to similar or even new
circumstances.260 Yet an analogy's underlying justification is an argument
from reason that knows no democratic justification, except to the extent that
the legislator does not overturn precedents or enact laws reflecting
alternative policy rationales.
But fear of rent-seeking and elite government is not ultimately a
compelling argument against political, rather than legal, decisionmaking; for
it would amount to throwing out the proverbial baby with its bath water.
Rather, a democratic justification for importing into WTO law principles and
INTRODUCTION 68-69 (1991).
257. See Paul Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681, 699 (1997).
258. See Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning
Sovereignty in International Law, 14 Wis. J. INT'L L. 463, 475-76 (1996) (reviewing CHAYES &
CHAYEs, supra note 220).
259. See ROBERT ALLEN LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS 297 (4th ed. 1986)
(picking better law in light of "socioeconomic jurisprudential standards"); Arthur Taylor von Mehren,
Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary
Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REv. 347, 366-67 (1974) (proposing Solomonic outcomes
whereby plaintiff might receive half of her entitlement).
260. See M.J. Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Space Law, 51 INT'L ORo. 245, 269 (1997).
Peterson shows how analogical reasoning by international lawyers structured discussion by policy-
makers on establishing legal regimes for outer space law, and how analogies were "used to create
definitions of the issue and what it is at stake, establish regulatory rules for conduct, and even
establish the symbolic meanings that permit creation of the social and institutional facts needed for
successful management of an issue or cooperation on solving a problem." Id.
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policies derived from the practice of the United Nations would focus on the
role of principled decisionmaking in furthering deliberative democracy. It
would conceive of the WTO and United Nations as separate sovereignties,
not territorial sovereignties in the classic sense, but rather institutional
sovereignties encompassing competing epistemic communities."'
Admittedly, sociological analysis of this kind may be too imprecise for
international lawyers to fathom and operationalize,262 even if the insights it
suggests are sound. Professional international lawyers need to express the
relationship between international institutions in terms of familiar conceptual
categories, such as the role of comity in mediating private law disputes
involving the interests of different territorial sovereigns where both
sovereigns have an interest but where no controlling legal principle, such as
a treaty or rule of customary international law, gives priority to the claim of
one sovereign.263
Finally, the concept of comity may not only provide a language for
articulating the relationship between competing international institutions but
also could serve as a vehicle for reconfiguring the relationship between the
collective identities of the two institutions and the communities of interests
they represent. Political scientists studying international organizations
traditionally have fallen between two camps, which at the risk of
oversimplification for the purpose of exposition might be described as
follows: neorealists who, focusing on the interests of states, claim that the
behavior of international organizations is always explicable solely in terms
of the interests of the states that constitute them; and neoliberals or liberal
institutionalists who, observing the role international institutions play in the
system of states, argue that international institutions, once established, can
take on an independent existence and pursue activities that are not reducible
to the interests of the states that initially created them.2" The new
constructivist school, however, argues that "both identities and interests may
be reconstituted in the political process; [for] it is through the political
process that roles and policies are adopted and challenged." 265 Mediating
261. See Bederman, supra note 221, at 373-74 (treating international organizations as, in
language of political scientists, "epistemic communities"). See generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction:
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992) (setting forth
concept of epistemic communities).
262. For example, even the sociological approach's advocates, such as David Bederman,
recognize that for international lawyers, "[t]here is a sense of discomfort in looking to sociological,
group-dynamic theories to explain how international legal rules are made and enforced, particularly in
institutions." Bederman, supra note 221, at 374.
263. See Paul, supra note 254, at 5-8.
264. See Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the
Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT'L ORG. 555, 558-61 (1997) (describing neorealism and
neoliberalism as prelude to constructivist account). Compare John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise
of International Institutions, INT'L SECuRITY, Winter 1994/95, at 5 (presenting neorealist account),
with ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(1984) (presenting neoliberal or liberal institutionalist account). See generally Anthony Clark Arend,
38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107 (1998) (offering more nuanced exposition of neorealist, "rationalist"
institutionalist, and constructivist political science scholarship and their relation to international law).
265. Mlada Bukovansky, American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War
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between realist and liberal institutionalist political science, constructivism
thus "adds to our understanding by focusing on the constitutive aspects of
legitimizing discourse and analyzing how those aspects interact with the
more obvious, interested struggles for wealth and power. "266
Because institutional comity also articulates the relationship at the level
of supranational governance between liberal institutionalism's "legitimizing
discourse" and neo-realism's "struggles for wealth and power," it provides a
legal vocabulary for appropriating constructivism's insights. Drawing upon
constructivism as its foundation in political science, institutional comity
posits the mutability, through legitimizing discourse, of the collective
interests, values, and identities expressed in supranational institutions.
Indeed, constructivism's central insight-that political communities evolve in
the process of interacting through a process of legitimizing discourse with
other political communities-implies that in order to be persuasive,
rhetorical strategies must appeal in principle to the perspectives of both
relevant political communities. The act of speech thus transforms the
speaker, engaging her capacity to empathize with the "foreign" perspective.
Comity, as a legal construct, builds on this insight, employing rules of
reasonableness and principles of deference as its verbal formulas and
emotive qualities in its transformative and, in the end, harmonizing project.
Thus, engaging supranational institutional structures in the
management of conflicting policies through the medium of the principled
decisionmaking in their respective spheres of competence would have the
advantage of inducing decisionmakers in one institution to develop and
articulate their decisions in terms of their implications in other legal settings
as well. By making the tradeoffs more public, and thus educating the
broader public about the principles and policies at issue, one might increase
the prospects for the negotiation of globally agreed tradeoffs that are
representative of the global public interest, to the extent such an animal
exists.267 Transparency and reasoned deliberation play important roles in
perspectives as diverse as Madisonian federalism,268 public choice theory,269
of 1812, 51 INT'L ORG. 209, 211 (1997). Bukovansky employs a "constructivist" methodology to
resolve conflicts between neorealist and liberal institutionalist explanations for the development of the
U.S. commitment to neutrality principles. See also Reus-Smit, supra note 264, at 570-83 (relating
international dispute resolution to organizing principle of legitimacy in international society through
comparison of ancient and modem dispute resolution). See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is
What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992)
(developing constructivist approach fully for first time).
266. See Bukovansky, supra note 265, at 240.
267. See Trimble, supra note 176, at 1767-68.
268. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing factions and publicity of factional agendas; noting that "where there is a consciousness of
unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the
number whose concurrence is necessary").
269. Cf. Stephan, supra note 257, at 685-88 (arguing that both legal process and public
choice schools of statutory interpretation are troubled by defects in international lawmaking process);
Turley, supra note 60, at 239-59 (discussing, from public choice perspective, rent-seeking behavior in
international lawmaking).
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and socialism,27 from which theories of supranational politics could be
constructed. Some might object that deliberative politics of this kind
presuppose the existence of a global community as deeply formed as a
typical nation-state. Professor Trimble in fact argues that Professor Franck's
focus on the emergence of a single global community is fundamentally
misplaced, for then Franck "cannot take advantage of the commonalities of
the world's many subcommunities"'271-implicitly referring to
subcommunities of religion and ethnicity whose divisions today, if Professor
Huntington is correct (and Professor Trimble finds him persuasive),272 may
be permanent features of international society. This Article hopes to begin to
address Professor Trimble's objection to the concept of global community by
showing that comity between supranational institutions both respects the
expression through particular supranational organizations of
"commonalities" of the world's "subcommunities" of power and trade, then
discursively mediating their conflicting interests, values, and identities to
form shared interests, values, and identities that would qualify as a global
community.
Supranational institutional comity thus may provide a language for
expressing a possible set of relationships between the WTO and United
Nations and the subcommunities they represent, as well as a vehicle for
continuing evolution, in a democratic yet deliberative process, of the
relationship between the trade and security legal regimes. Section V.B turns
to the task of articulating these relationships.
B. Institutional Comity Between the WTO and United Nations in
International Security
Any WTO/DSB Panel attempting to implement institutional comity
would look for sources of legal evidence to define the WTO's relationship
with other international institutions. As Subsection V.B. 1 shows, WTO and
U.N. text and history, as well as the jurisprudence of the ICJ, supply a basis
for inferring the need for policy coordination between the WTO and United
Nations in the management of security issues. Subsection V.B.2, drawing on
illustrative related precedents, describes how institutional comity furthers the
mandate for policy coordination in interpreting the WTO security exception.
Subsection V.B.3 shows how institutional comity's interpretation of the
security exception is superior to those offered by the bargain and
constitutional conceptions. Finally, Subsection V.B.4 describes potential
limits, even in the area of national security, on employing institutional
comity to interpret the WTO.
270. See Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy, Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y, Spring 1989, at 25, 33 (emphasizing that choices must be made in "deliberative way," and not
.simply... conform to the preferences, convictions, and ideals of citizens") (emphasis omitted).
271. Trimble, supra note 176, at 1954.
272. See id. at 1954 n.13 and accompanying text (discussing SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (1996)).
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1. The Relationship Between the WTO and United Nations in
National Security
In implementing institutional comity, a WTO/DSB would nonetheless
mine the core provisions of the WTO to establish a boundary or framework
for deference to the law of another supranational institution. Article X of the
WTO Agreement identifies two sets of such provisions-one substantive, the
other institutional-that may not under any circumstances be amended except
by the consent of all the members of the WTO. The substantive rules that
may not be amended are the most favored nation clauses of each of the
multilateral trade agreements, as well as the related tariff binding rule of the
GATT. The institutional rules that may not be amended are articles IX and
X of the WTO itself, which specify the decisionmaking, interpretive, and
amendment rules of the WTO.273 But neither of these "rules of
recognition"274 specifically identify the relationship, if any, between the
WTO and other international organizations. Nonetheless, the obvious
institutional relationship, suggested both by the basic subject matter of
article XXI-national security-and article XXI(c)'s specific textual
reference to the U.N. Security Council,27 is between the WTO and the
United Nations. Indeed, the WTO, which is in a sense the realization of the
initial dream to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) to fill the
institutional gap for trade left by the Bretton Woods Agreements after World
War UI, owes its very existence to the United Nations, whose Economic and
Social Council in its first meeting called for the establishment of an ITO.216
Therefore, one would think that completeness in elaborating a transnational
constitutional structure for addressing the security dimension of international
273. See WTO AGREEMENT art. X(2).
274. A rule of recognition, H.L.A. Hart postulated, "will specify some feature or features
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule
of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
94 (2d ed. 1994). Hart adds that an "ultimate rule" of recognition is a rule of recognition that
specifies lower-order rules. Id. at 105. WTO rules, namely the particular provisions that can only be
amended by unanimous consent, may well embody rules of recognition for the WTO legal order.
Consider, for example, the position of Kent Greenawalt, who evaluates whether the amendment
provisions of the U.S. Constitution could serve as an ultimate rule of recognition for U.S. law;
ultimately, he concludes that a full specification of the ultimate rule of recognition would require a far
more complicated account of the interaction of institutional and customary law created by the various
law-making actors in the U.S. legal system. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. Rv. 621 (1987). Setting aside the potential complexity of its statement,
Hart doubted whether even in theory there was a single ultimate rule of recognition in the international
legal order, although he left open the possibility that the international legal system could evolve in that
direction. But Hart supposed that, if there were an international law ultimate rule of recognition,
"[multilateral] treaties would in fact be legislative enactments and international law would have
distinct criteria of validity for its rules." HART, supra, at 236. Under this view, the WTO as such a
legislative enactment would then need to be synthesized with other, related legislative enactments,
arguably as proposed in this Article.
275. Cf. Perez, supra note 92, at 784-85 (discussing how requirement of notification prior to
withdrawal from NPT transfers management responsibility over situation that gave rise to state's
decision to withdraw to Security Council).
276. See JACKSON, supra note 217, at 32 & n.41 (citing E.S.C. Res. 13, U.N. ESCOR, U.N.
Doe. E/22/Rev. (1946)).
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economic law would require institutional linkages between the WTO and
U.N. legal orders.
Some linkages between the WTO and United Nations are stated in
specific textual commitments in the U.N. Charter and the WTO Agreement
and its annexes and are, therefore, straightforward and incontestable. The
U.N. Supremacy Clause, and the absence of a similar clause in the WTO,
ensures that in the case of a direct conflict, any state member of both the
United Nations and WTO would be compelled to observe its U.N.
obligations. 7 In particular, Security Council decisions, subject at a
minimum to the limitations stated in article 24,278 become binding on
members by operation of article 25 of the Charter and thereby benefit from
article 103's supremacy clause effect. Moreover, article 48 of the Charter
expressly provides that the Security Council's "decisions shall be carried out
by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in
the appropriate international agencies of which they are members."279
Presumably, even without correlative provisions in the WTO annexes, these
provisions would be sufficient to import the law of the United Nations into
the law of the WTO. But article XXI(c) of the GATT also specifically
provides that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed. . . to prevent
any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security,"'28° thereby confirming the relationships that would flow
directly from the Charter provisions themselves.' Whether the
277. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."). The legal
situation might be somewhat more complicated for customs territories authorized to become members
of the WTO pursuant to the explanatory notes to the WTO Agreement. See WTO AGREEMENT,
Explanatory Notes, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 18 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1152. Such customs territories would
ordinarily be part of states that are members of the United Nations and thus, under principles of treaty
interpretation reflected in article 27 of the Vienna Convention, the state would be bound. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 61, art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
Another complicating scenario would arise for states that are members of the WTO but not the
United Nations. In that context, articles 2(5) and 2(6) of the U.N. Charter, under which members are
obligated to "refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action" and the United Nations is obligated to "ensure that states which are
not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with [its] Principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(5), 2(6). One clearly
anomalous case is, of course, Switzerland, which is the home of the WTO bureaucracy yet is not a
member of the United Nations.
278. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24(2) (stating that "the Security Council shall act in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations"). See generally Perez, supra note 175
(assessing whether and how domestic jurisdiction principle stated in article 2(7) constrains Security
Council decisionmaking).
279. U.N. CHARTER art. 48(2).
280. GATT art. XXI(c).
281. See Richard H. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship Between United Nations Law and the
Law of Other International Organizations, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1604, 1611-17 (1984). Lauwaars
discusses the Dutch Government's refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa recommended by
General Assembly and notes the paucity of precedents under article XXI(c), but he nonetheless asserts
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recommendation of the Security Council and General Assembly are covered
by this provision has not, however, been authoritatively determined.282
Yet, there may also be more subtle linkages between the United
Nations and the WTO. Historically, the GATT's basic structure was
significantly affected by the U.N. legal order. In 1964, for example, the
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development proposed preferential tariffs
for developing countries, notwithstanding the GATT most favored nation
principle, which were ultimately implemented by the Contracting Parties
acting collectively through a "waiver" granted in 1971 for a ten-year period
and later by a "decision" in 1979.283 Because the "decision" was not
explicitly labeled a "waiver," its exact legal status within the GATT system
was regarded as unclear.284 The GATT, unlike other international
organizations, was not given specific authority to interpret its constitutive
instrument through a formal interpretive procedure.28 The decision was not,
moreover, adopted as a formal amendment to the GATT to address the
concerns of developing countries, as was Part V of the GATT in 1966.286
Thus, U.N.-derived policies in an area squarely within the United Nations's
competence287 stimulated lawmaking by the GATT that seemed problematic
when viewed solely through the GATT lens. Under a different lens, one that
considers both the direct and indirect relationships between the United
Nations and the WTO, the GATT's response to U.N. input becomes much
more comprehensible. By analogy, U.N. law and practice in areas other than
economic development should also have indirect implications for the law of
the WTO.
that "emergency in international relations" under article XXI(b)(iii) has been interpreted broadly. Id.;
cf. KUYPER, supra note 230, at 180 (noting that application of sanctions to Rhodesia was GATT-
illegal given lack of true threat to security).
282. See Lauwaars, supra note 281, at 1612.
283. See JACKSON, supra note 217, at 278-79 (citing Generalized System of Preferences,
GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1971) ('Waiver), and Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203
(1980) (Decision)).
284. See JACKSON, supra note 217, at 279 (nonetheless describing decision as "the enabling
clause" for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) implemented by Contracting Parties
notwithstanding their MFN obligation under GATT).
285. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. XXIX, 60 Stat. 1401
(1946), reprinted in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 321 (Stephen Zamora
& Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement] (providing for explicit power
to interpret). Indeed, one might well regard article IX(2) of the WTO Agreement's provision
authorizing formal interpretations of the WTO and its annexes as an effort to cure the gap in the
original GATT, subject to article IX(2)'s injunction against the use of the power to interpret. Under
this view, article IX(2) would allow circumvention of the more onerous requirements of the provisions
governing amendments in article X of the WTO Agreement, thereby avoiding interpretations that, like
the 1979 decision authorizing the GSP, operate as de facto amendments. But see Jackson, supra note
144, at 158-60 (arguing that GATT practice established that power to take joint action under article
XXV included power to issue "definitive interpretation as well as elaboration of the GATT").
286. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 1112-13.
287. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) ("[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving
problems of an economic . . . character"); id. ch. IX ("International Economic and Social Co-
operation"); id. ch. X (establishing "The Economic and Social Council").
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Recent developments in the law of international institutions suggests
why this might be so. The ICJ has now invoked the principle of specialty, or
specialization, of international organizations to decide that the World Health
Organization (WHO) was not competent to request an advisory opinion from
the Court concerning the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. The ICJ
concluded that the United Nations's special competence in international
peace and security removed such issues from the WHO's domain.28 The
ICJ's reasoning thus confirms that the special competence of the Security
Council in matters affecting international peace and security cannot be
disregarded by the WTO, even when the precise provisions of the U.N.
Charter and the WTO do not specify a particular result.
Moreover, in the context of discussing the law of the United Nations,
its organs, and its specialized agencies, former ICJ president Mohammed
Bedjaoui has argued that a counterpart principle of coordination between
international institutions may also be derived from the principle of specialty
and its related principles of nonsubordination (i.e., that international
organizations retain autonomy) and competence (i.e., that as part of this
autonomy they retain the right to interpret the Charter as necessary to
perform their functions)." 9 In the context of the law of U.N. organs,
Bedjaoui supposes that overall authority resides in the General Assembly,
"even though it has itself to respect the three principles" under which it must
"perform a work of co-ordination which, being bound to generate some
form of control, has at least the potential for testing the validity of the acts
of other organs."290 With the caveat that in international peace and security
the U.N. Charter makes the General Assembly subordinate to the Security
Council,291 extension of this reasoning to the relationship between the United
Nations and the WTO supposes "co-ordination" of U.N. law with WTO
law.
2. Mediating Between the Conflicting Interests of the WTO and
United Nations
Giving effect to the indirect relationships between the WTO and United
Nations will be a delicate task. It should not be oversimplified. One might,
for example, trivialize the problem by unnecessarily invoking the supremacy
of the United Nations-thereby obfuscating the need for choice because the
decision seems preordained. This error would perversely have the same
effect of obviating choice that flows from the application of governmental
interests methodology in conflict of laws to defer to the law of another
288. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J.
No. 93, para. 25-26 (July 8).
289. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, On Efficacy of International Organizations: Some Variations
on an Inexhaustible Theme.. ., in TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION, supra note 144, at 7, 20-
21.
290. See id. at 22.
291. See U.N. CHARTER art. 12.
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jurisdiction in cases of so-called "false conflicts"; that is to say, where only
one state has an interest in applying its law and the mere fact that the tort,
for example, occurred in the territory of the forum state does not truly
implicate that state's interests.2" Under this oversimplified approach, one
might describe the national security exception in trade as part of a species of
cases involving international security that is outside the competence of the
WTO and that therefore should be addressed by the Security Council.
Although it has been intimated by one scholar that the GATT national
security exception should be addressed in this fashion, it is doubtful that
GATT practice would support such an approach." 3 Indeed, the 1982
Decision on the Falklands/Malvinas case and the 1989 Montreal
Improvements to GATT dispute settlement seem to undercut any such
suggestion.2 94 Moreover, the "false conflicts" solution, entailing absolute
deference in all security-related cases, ignores the strategic trade dimension
of some protectionist policies. Such policies are explicitly recognized in the
article XX(b)(i) and (ii) exceptions and may well be relevant to some cases
under article XX(b)(iii) 5
There is, on the contrary, precedent for a more nuanced comity
approach in the law of international organizations related to the GATT.
Much as GATT law on development evolved to authorize the Generalized
System of Preferences in derogation of the core GATT Most Favored Nation
Principle in response to U.N. policymaking input,296 some International
Monetary Fund (IMF) lawmaking in the national security area has evaluated
the relevance of GATT law in a way consistent with the comity approach. 297
The IMF faced the prospect of restrictions on payments and transfers on
current international transactions that were inconsistent with the IMF's
Articles of Agreement9" but were undertaken, ostensibly, for national
security reasons by the United States and other countries against the Soviet
292. Cf. Cavers, supra note 242, at 180-81 (arguing against oversimplified analysis ignoring
consideration of justice).
293. Richard Lauwaars employed a version of this method in citing a 1965 statement by the
Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties in 1965 to the effect that it had been GATT policy "to
avoid passing judgment in any way on essentially political matters and to follow decisions of the
United Nations on such questions." Lauwaars, supra note 281, at 1612 (quoting JAcKsoN, supra note
130, at 125). What Lauwaars did not say, however, was that this statement was not made in the
context of considering the national security exception but rather in response to the question of China's
membership in the GATT. See JACKSON, supra note 130, at 125.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 129-130 (discussing 1982 Decision); supra note 170
(discussing 1989 Montreal Improvements).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 177-212 (presenting possible interpretive approaches
for non-self-judging theories of national security exception such as would permit defensive policies but
not offensive policies).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 283-284.
297. See JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 451-81
(1996).
298. Article VIII, section 2(a) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement provides, in pertinent part,
that "no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions." IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note
285, art. VIII(2)(a). It was the practice of the IMF to treat a "no objection" as the equivalent of
.approval" pursuant to article 8(2)(a). See GOLD, supra note 297, at 455.
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Union and North Korea. The U.S. Executive Director at the IMF defended
the U.S. action by reference to article XXI of the GATT. 299 After some
debate, the IMF Executive Board ultimately decided that, although "[the
prohibition] applies to all restrictions on payments and transfers for current
international transactions, whatever may be the motive for the restrictions
and the circumstances in which they are imposed. . . '[t]he Fund does not,
however, provide a suitable forum for discussion of the political and military
considerations leading to actions of this kind. "300 In adding that "the Fund
must exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Fund Agreement in
order to perform its functions and protect the legitimate interests of its
members," 30' however, the Executive Board made clear that the IMF had
jurisdiction in the case, notwithstanding the GATT national security
exception, but simply was not exercising it.302 Thus, the U.S. argument that
the IMF should defer to the policy stated in the GATT, -which in turn
deferred to national security interests, in effect prevailed on comity grounds,
even though the text of the IMF Articles of Agreement itself contained no
such clause. 03
The central point is that the IMF retained jurisdiction but implicitly
made a prudential judgment that countervailing U.N. policy counseled in
favor of deference to national action that was consistent with U.N. policy on
Korea in the early 1950s. Thus, the choice of law approach outlined here for
interpreting the WTO national security exceptions conforms to an important
early precedent in interpreting the GATT national security exception.
Neither is the institutional comity approach inconsistent with the early
jurisprudence of the WTO/DSU Appellate Body, which suggests it too is
"concerned to make it very clear that the WTO is not a unique international
organization that only needs look at its own terminology and practices for
guiding principles. "'0
299. See GOLD, supra note 297, at 452.
300. Id. at 453-54 (quoting IMF Decision No. 144, Selected Decisions, at 345).
301. Id. at 454 (quoting IMF Decision No. 144, Selected Decisions, at 345).
302. See id. (questioning distinction drawn in IMF's decision between restrictions imposed
for security reasons and restrictions imposed for economic reasons, since very purpose of restrictions
imposed ostensibly for security reasons are intended to have economic effects).
303. The IMF's deference to national decisionmaking in the context of security-related
justifications for deviation from substantive rules of the IMF, such as article 8(2)(a)'s prohibition
against restrictions on current transfers, is contrasted by its rejection of Czechoslovakia's attempt to
assert a security justification for its refusal to comply with IMF reporting requirements. See id. at
458-62. The IMF even rejected Czechoslovakia's theory that it was entitled to withhold information
from the IMF under article XXI of the GATT because information submitted to the IMF would make
its way to the GATT. See id. at 461.
304. Jeffrey Waincymer, Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora out of a Chapeau?, 18 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 141, 165 (1996)
(discussing extensive citation of decisions of International Court of Justice by Appellate Body in
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 208).
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3. The Choice of Law, Bargain, and Constitutional Approaches
Compared
The choice of law approach described here is arguably superior to the
bargain or constitutional conceptions of WTO law. Unlike the bargain
conception, which leaves the national security exception to be judged
according to subjective good faith, 35 comity eliminates the self-judging
character of the exception, thereby furthering the pro-legalist policies of the
WTO's revised DSU. Unlike the constitutionalist approach, under which an
argument for a non-self-judging security interests exception might be
constructed out of the ashes of the Nicaragua Trade Measures case, albeit
with little other precedent, the much greater and more detailed practice of
the Security Council could establish objective measures of the good faith
required in the exercise of the national security exception. This, in turn,
might allow members of the WTO to develop expectations about the
operation of the national security exception that could make misuse of the
exception a basis for compensation in a nullification and impairment of
benefits claim even if the DSB could not order withdrawal of the measure. 6
The objective good faith standard made possible by the comity approach thus
accords with the larger purposes of the new WTO.
Comity in this context is supported by the same rationales, both
technical and democratic, that in the administrative law context support
deference to a national regulatory agency. 0 7 Comity among international
organizations fosters decisionmaking by the organizations with special
expertise in the issue area. It thereby encourages uniformity and avoids
institutional forum shopping. But, most important, it maximizes political
accountability to the whole community that created an international
institution by channeling the community's focused attention on the full legal
implications of the development of rules and policies governing an issue area
at a particular institutional forum. This channeling of attention may well
broaden and deepen the international political process by creating
opportunities for tradeoffs between different interests, such as the conflicts
between trade and traditional national security policies, at the lawmaking
forum with special competence over the issue. In the case of international
peace and security, this forum is primarily the Security Council of the
United Nations but also to some degree the General Assembly as well.3 08
Finally, structural considerations further support the comity approach.
Unlike the bargain conception, which ignores the overall community interest
in compliance with WTO/GATT rules, the comity approach gives due
305. See supra text accompanying notes 89-118.
306. See generally Kuyper, supra note 129 (rejecting possibility of compensation, except in
case of breach of GATT through misuse of exception); see also Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at
195-98 (discussing DSU's refusal to require withdrawal in pure nullification and impairment cases).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
308. Article 12 of the Charter excludes the Assembly from this area only when the Council
"is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it." U.N. CHARTER art.
12.
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respect to the ways in which states have ceded portions of their sovereignty
in attempting to create a new and more stable framework for global trade.
Unlike the constitutional conception, the comity approach relates the effort
to establish a global regime for trade with the other, related cessions of
sovereignty by states. Without resorting to absolute state sovereignty as a
limiting principle, the logic of which Jackson and Croley recognized might
destroy the WTO,3 °9 comity among international institutions checks, on
behalf of sovereign state interests, the lawmaking power of each
international institution.
A possible analogy is the role of process-based limits in federal
decisionmaking in the United States in preserving state autonomy.1 Under
the political process account for the preservation of state sovereignty,
lawmaking-including the checking function performed by the U.S.
Congress on lawmaking by administrative agencies-is constrained by state
sovereignty through, among other things, the necessary involvement of the
U.S. Senate.3 ' Similar protection for state sovereignty is secured in the
international system through the principle of sovereign equality, which
expresses itself through one-state, one-vote rules at the WTO31 2 and the
United Nations. 3 This voting rule partially counteracts the influence of
power and population in the WTO through the leverage that larger
economies have in negotiating tariff concessions, thereby tilting the balance
of advantages in their favor, and in the United Nations through the veto the
U.N. Charter accords to five states, which happen to be the nuclear powers
and are among the largest, most populous, and wealthiest countries. 4
309. See supra text accompanying note 77. Arguably, "subsidiarity," Jackson and Croley's
other suggestion, is inadequate because it lacks any cultural or historical justification for treating
territorial units as worthy of respect. See Perez, supra note 175, at 394-96.
310. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) ("State
sovereign interests... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure
of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."). But cf. Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (invalidating as unconstitutional conscription of state resources
under federalism principles in Constitution, federally-imposed requirement that state officers perform
background checks on handgun purchasers); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 TEx. L. Rav. 795, 819-25 (1996) (discussing implications of "necessary and proper
clause"); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 22-36 (1988) (drawing limits on federal intrusion on state autonomy
from federal guarantee of "Republican" form of government); Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth
Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1658-67
(1987) (discussing Garcia's process-based theory); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. RV. 341, 365 (describing
process-based jurisprudence as "an elaboration of judicial standards, the justification of which does
not rely on the desirability of specific substantive results but rests instead on the identification of some
defects in the political process that prevent it from operating in accordance with the function assigned
to it").
311. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 for proposition that States
receive equal representation in Senate).
312. Article IX(l) of the WTO Agreement provides that "where a decision cannot be arrived
at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be settled by voting" and "each Member of the [WTO] shall
have one vote." WTO AGREEMENT art. IX(l).
313. Article 27, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter provides: "Each member of the Security
Council shall have one vote." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 1.
314. See Perez, supra note 92, at 754-55 (discussing distinction between de jure nuclear-
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Reliance on the product of Security Council process thus redresses the
WTO's failure, as some have called it, to provide for the weighted voting
procedures employed at other major international economic institutions.3"5
In the particular case of the national security exception, however, the
most important factor in checking wealth, power, and population is the way
by which structure of the Council facilitates principled decisionmaking. 16
When, for example, states, particularly the smaller states that rotate through
the Council, 1 7 agree and find a situation to be a threat to international peace
and security, they are not unaware that they establish a precedent.3" 8 This is
not to say that chapter VII findings by the Security Council are necessarily
legal determinations subject to judicial review.319 Nonetheless, the patterns
and practices of the Security Council even as a political organ generate
expectations of likely future behavior, or at least of the kinds of arguments
of a prudential character that might be given weight in particular factual
contexts. In making or rejecting factual arguments about what might
constitute a threat to international peace and security, the Council's members
establish objective criteria that they know may well come back to haunt them
in future cases. Therefore, the practice of the Security Council should reflect
sovereignty concerns of Council members, particularly the nonpermanent
weapon states, which owing to France and PRC's adherence to NPT are same group as permanent
members of Security Council, see U.N. CHARTER art. 23(1), and de facto nuclear weapons states, that
are thought to possess nuclear weapons capability not legitimized by NPT).
315. See JACKSON, supra note 217, at 49 (describing failed efforts at GATT to develop
consultative mechanism including only largest economic powers).
316. Cf. Bukovansky, supra note 265, at 217 (arguing that diverse interests shape state
system); Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law From
an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 109, 149-79 (1995) (identifying principles that,
operating as shared understandings, limit expression of power in international lawmaking process);
Wendt, supra note 265, at 406 (advancing, from political science perspective, related approach
focusing on relationship between construction of legal norms and construction of community self-
identity which in turn generates interests that are advanced through exercise of power).
317. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23(2) ("The non-permanent members of the Security Council
shall be elected for a term of two years."). Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, moreover, assures that
the nonpermanent and permanent members each have significant voting power, since "decisions of the
Security Council," except on procedural matters, "shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." Id. art. 27(3). Thus, at least
four nonpermanent members must join the permanent members in potentially reducing national
sovereignty by determining that a situation is a threat to international peace and security that, in
theory, could warrant collective measures. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (determination requirement as
predicate recommended measures under article 41 or mandatory non-military and military measures
under articles 41 and 42, respectively).
318. See Perez, supra note 175, at 421-36 (discussing deliberative democracy at Security
Council, including concern of members of Security Council over precedent-setting implications of
chapter VII findings).
319. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations, 87 Am.
J. INT'L L. 83, 90-91 (1993) (rejecting World Court supervision); Oscar Schachter, United Nations
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1994) (rejecting possibility that chapter VII standard employed by
Security Council is legal standard); cf. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J.
(Feb. 27), at *13-14 (visited Mar. 23, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.orgidocketilukjudgment
/ilukjudgementcontent.html> (holding that chapter VII resolution does not retroactively defeat
jurisdiction or admissibility that existed as of date application is submitted, but leaving open question
whether ICJ is free to ignore substantive effect of such resolution in the merits phase of dispute).
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members who will not in the future be able to protect their sovereignty
through the exercise of the veto. Thus, the political process rationale
through which state sovereignty is protected at the U.S. national level may
well also suffice to address any federalism concerns against subjecting the
WTO national security exceptions to the supervision and control of the DSB.
4. Limits to the Usefulness of Security Decisionmaking as a Source
of WTO Law
The particular approach outlined here for incorporating the activity of
the Security Council in the work of the DSB is not, however, without
potential objections. At least one possible criticism is that the Security
Council's decision not to impose sanctions in a particular case should
foreclose reliance on the national security exception in that case. However,
the decision to impose or authorize collective sanctions is a prudential
judgment about the likely effect of economic sanctions in resolving the
situation that caused the threat to international peace and security. Thus, the
Council's failure to authorize collective sanctions in a particular case need
not be read as evidence that the Council believes it would not be within its
power to do so. Similarly, an individual state might nonetheless have an
objectively well-founded basis for considering its security threatened and
thereby be entitled to invoke the WTO national security exception.
A broader, and perhaps more compelling objection, is that the WTO
members may have expressed a different intention by not tying the WTO to
the United Nations. This suggests that their commitment to an independent
trade order supersedes their understanding that the transnational political
process, even in the security area, needs to be governed through the
institutions and principles embodied in the United Nations. It will be recalled
that because of the ambiguous legal statutes of the GATT, given the stillbirth
of the ITO, the GATT never entered into a relationship agreement with the
United Nations.32 There is, moreover, evidence that the current WTO
Secretariat even now is reticent to enter into such an agreement32-perhaps
on the premise that the WTO is a preferred nexus for supranational
constitutional development and should be free from U.N. influence until
U.N. reform modeled on the achievements of the Uruguay Round is
achieved.322 It is suggested that the WTO institutional structure, which
320. See Zamora, supra note 217, at 509 n. 16.
321. See Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 232, 237 n.13 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (noting that despite
WTO's status as formal organization, WTO has yet to conclude agency agreement with United
Nations and remains allied only informally). Conversely, the WTO concluded in April 1997 an
agreement for cooperation and collaboration with the World Bank, providing for, inter alia, reciprocal
observer status in decisionmaking bodies, and established a similar agreement with the IMF in
December 1996. See WTO and World Bank Sign Cooperation Agreement, Apr. 28, 1997 (World
Trade Organization news release) (visited May 5, 1998) <http:/www.wto.orglwto/press/
press72.htm>.
322. For a discussion of this issue by a former GATT legal advisor, see Petersmann, supra
note 30, at 457-68, which argues that liberal democratic values can be "constitutionalized" through
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facilitates multiple negotiations on several issues simultaneously-permitting
"global package deals" between, for example, services and intellectual
property-and thereby facilitates bargained tradeoffs, "may enable results
that were never possible ... in UN bodies like the UN Conference on Trade
and Development." 23 But it is doubtful whether the WTO is by itself an
adequate vehicle for continued global constitutional development, given the
limits imposed by its underlying philosophy, institutional structure, and
textual commitment to join the family of international institutions.
First, law and economics modes of reasoning-even in explicating
federalist values as subsidiarity, thereby justifying decentralization solely on
efficiency grounds-pervade the WTO epistemic community.324 Thus, the
WTO's bias toward trade values ignores other human values that are
ordinarily a central part of the political processes of most communities32 and
calls into question its viability for serving as the exclusive vehicle, or even
model, for developing supranational institutions that facilitate strengthening
of the transnational political process.326  Rather, supranational
constitutionalism could be grounded on premises that, unlike the utilitarian
premises of subsidiarity, are more sensitive to the need to develop a true
supranational community through a supranational political process involving
deliberative democracy over values instead of involving merely economic
well-being.3 7
Second, even WTO advocates recognize that its current amendment
process is structured to channel constitutional change toward negotiation of
supplementary agreements that will not be binding on all the parties, which
"could again lead to a 'WTO A la carte' system. This might later prompt
WTO countries to repeat the Uruguay Round approach and replace the WTO
Agreement by a new agreement." 328 Accordingly, it would seem preferable
radical institutional reform of the United Nations, following the WTO model.
323. Id. at 442; see also id. at 454 (arguing that WTO facilitates "package deal
negotiations").
324. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration
and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 468-71 (describing various interpretations of principle of
subsidiarity); see also Croley & Jackson, supra note 67, at 211 (suggesting, in article's conclusion,
that issues of "local" governance within international system be addressed "perhaps using theories of
'subsidiarity'" but making no reference to federalism).
325. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-17 (1996)
(rejecting comprehensive theories of legal reasoning, such as law and economics school); see also
Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an Institution, 85 CAL. L.
REv. 265, 280 (1997) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra) (arguing for extension of institutional analysis of
decisionmaking that, unlike law and economics, "employs a complex model of individual behavior
based on self-interest, altruism, opportunism, ideology, and meaning" to the behavior of courts as
well).
326. See Nichols, supra note 52, at 709-18 (questioning whether WTO, as currently
configured, suffers legitimacy deficit because it fails to account for nontrade values).
327. See Perez, supra note 175, at 393-94 (articulating justification of federalism based on
role of reasoned debate in forming community committed to ideals of human perfection as organizing
principle for U.N. constitutional development).
328. Petersmann, supra note 30, at 454. Similarly, just as states might defect from the WTO
if they dissented from new WTO agreements that focused excessively on WTO values, they might
defect from the WTO if WTO interpretation by the DSB made the same mistake. Accordingly, even
Petersmann, one of the foremost advocates of WTO-centered global policymaking, acknowledges that
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to develop analytic approaches for relating existing supranational institutions
rather than waiting for each to be perfected. Under the comity principle
suggested in this Article, for example, the lawmaking organs of the United
Nations and the WTO's multiple councils could function as "laboratories of
democracy. 329 In implementing a pluralist version of federalism calculated
to stimulate reasoned debate leading to a supranational community, they
would give "full faith and credit" 330 to each other's exclusive judgments and,
where their interests conflict, accord appropriate deference based on the
comity principle.
Finally, the WTO Agreement's text specifically provides that the WTO
"shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other
intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those of
the [WTO]." 331 It is hard to see how, consistent with this provision, the
WTO can avoid the implications of U.N. law on its activities and its legal
development. In short, the WTO Agreement itself recognizes that no
international organization is "an island," but rather that each must be "a part
of the maine.
332
That said, one might not necessarily conclude that international
agreements have established institutions fully responsible for management of
areas other than international trade and international security. It might not be
appropriate for the WTO to accord institutional comity to the decisions of
ever6 other existing institution. For example, as much as one might be
desirable, there exists now no equivalent of the United Nations or WTO for
environmental law.333 Accordingly, the institutional comity approach would
not appear to undercut the conclusion of the 1994 GATT Panel on the
Restriction on Imports of Tuna that environmental agreements "that were
not concluded among the contracting parties to the General Agreement, and
. ..did not apply to the interpretation of the General Agreement or the
application of its provisions," or "practice under" that agreement, did not
affect interpretation of the GATT.33 4 This conclusion, asserting the
'worldwide trade agreements, like GATT and the WTO Agreement, are an integral part of the
international legal system and not 'self-contained regimes' isolated from other areas of international
law." ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at xvi (1997); cf.
supra text accompanying notes 223-231 (explicating concept of self-contained regime).
329. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single state may . . .serve as a
laboratory.").
330. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect thereof.").
331. WTO AGREEMENT art. V(1).
332. John Donne, For Whom the Bell Tolls, in SELECTED PROSE 100-01 (Helen Gardner &
Timothy Healy eds., 1941).
333. For a proposal for the creation of a "new international environmental regime," see
Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 103,
111 (1996).
334. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 173, para. 5.19, at *167-68.
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superiority of WTO law within the WTO legal system, was expressed in the
ordinary language of article 31 of the Vienna Convention.33 Yet, for
different reasons, it remains valid under the choice of law theory as well.
Nonetheless, institutional comity suggests a means by which states could
circumvent the Vienna Convention's requirement that all the parties to the
WTO accept new environmental obligations as modifications, either directly
through amendment of WTO law or indirectly as a separate agreement
intended to relate to WTO law. Instead, something less than all the members
of the WTO could create a new institution with coordinate responsibilities in
management of the world's environment which would, accordingly, be
entitled to deference in matters within its area of responsibility.
C. The Comity Approach Applied to the Helms-Burton Dispute
However rich the recent practice of the Security Council may be, one
must candidly admit that, even if the practice of the United Nations offers a
set of precedents that reduces uncertainty in the application of the national
security exception, a close study of Security Council behavior might not
yield determinate solutions in every case.
In the case of Helms-Burton, for example, one might question the
legality of continued U.S. sanctions against Cuba, measures that previously
had been justified on the basis of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.336 Yet
post-Cold War Security Council rationales for authorizing enforcement
action might still justify the United States's determining that Cuba's conduct
or probable conduct threatens its essential security interests.3 ' Thus,
massive state-sponsored emigration along the lines of the earlier 1980 Mariel
episode might have justified the imposition of sanctions. Yet the United
States had come to an agreement with Cuba resolving this issue,338 leaving
335. See id.
336. See Jerry W. Cain, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the United States' Trade Embargo
Against Cuba: The United Nations General Assembly's Call for an End to the U.S. Trade Embargo,
24 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 379, 394 (1994) ("As a result of the end of the Cold War, the United
States is no longer justified in claiming such an exemption from GATT provisions under Article
XXI.").
337. See Porotsky, supra note 138, at 929 n.145 (arguing that United States could plausibly
argue that maintenance of repressive dictatorship near its borders, leading to refugee crisis, would
implicate U.S. security interests). Porotsky's argument would be buttressed by the Security Council's
recent decision under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to authorize use of force by the United States,
among others, to restore democracy in Haiti, at least in part because of the threat created by Haitian
refugee flows. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 51, U.N. Doe. S/INF/50
(1994).
338. See U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration (Sept. 9, 1994), in 5 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 603, 603 (1994) (agreeing to ensure "safe, legal and orderly" migration); U.S.-Cuba Joint
Statement on Migration (May 8, 1995), in 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 397, 397 (1995) (agreeing to
continue policy of humanitarian parole for those currently residing at Guantanamo Bay's "safe
haven," but crediting them towards annual immigration goals as they are transferred); Peter Turnoff,
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, Address Before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (May 22, 1995), in 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 446, 450-51 (1995)
(explaining drawdown of Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Bay and expressing concern that earlier
disclosure of agreement could have incited mass migration).
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only the February 1996 shootdown incident apparently as the sole security-
related justification. An unnamed senior U.S. official was reported to have
said: "Our position is that matters related to national security and foreign
policy should simply not be considered at the WTO, but rather at the U.N.
or NATO or whatever. " 9 Yet, when the United States took the matter of
the shootdown to the Security Council, only a mild condemnation of Cuba's
action followed.340 The United States has been unable to persuade the
Security Council-much less the General Assembly, which has consistently
criticized U.S. sanctions against Cuba34 -that Cuba represents a threat to
U.S. security interests.
Nonetheless, the United States objectively was the victim of the use of
force against its nationals. Moreover, the Cuban government's decision to
embark on this provocative course might reasonably have signaled to the
United States the possibility of escalation, including the threat of state-
sponsored mass migration. Arguably, a foreign policy crisis was precisely
what the Cuban government needed to divert attention from its concomitant
crackdown on the internal Cuban dissident movement.342 Given the Cuban
government's history, it is not entirely unreasonable for the United States to
have concluded that some coercive measures, short of the use of force,
might deter further escalation of Cuba's provocative strategy-or so, at
least, the United States should be prepared to argue before the WTO, if this
is indeed its rationale.
In brief, in engaging in this debate, the comity approach would provide
the United States and European Union with more than enough precedent for
one side to cite, and the other to distinguish, thereby giving more settled
meaning to WTO law in national security cases, such as Helms-Burton
sanctions, that fall outside the strategic trade component of the WTO
national security exceptions.
339. Paul Blustein, WTO Powers Are Put to the Test; Dispute over Cuba Sanctions Has U.S.
Crying Foul Early in the Game, WASH. PoST, Feb. 22, 1997, at D1 (quoting unnamed U.S. official).
340. See Statement of Acting Security Council President, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 57th plen.
mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. SIPRSTI199619 (1996) (stating that Security Council "strongly deplore[d]"
incident).
341. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 17, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 27, at 1, U.N. Doc.
AIRESI51117 (1996) (calling for United States to end trade sanctions and expressing "concern" over
continued "promulgation" of laws such as "Helms-Burton").
342. Cf. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its
Interests Abroad: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 104th
Cong. 49 (1996) (Prepared Statement of Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research) (stating that Cuba's "desperate economic straits" created "potential" of "yet another
mass migration"); Max J. Castro, Editorial, "Another Mariel" an Unlikely Threat, SUN SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 25, 1996, at 15A (discussing fear in United States that sanctions against Cuba
for shootdown would result in mass migration).
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the suspension of the case before the WTO, implicitly in return
for, among other things, U.S. relaxation of Helms-Burton sanctions,343 the
United States may never need to explain its legal reasoning before the
WTO/DSB. But the settlement, if it holds, is about more than U.S. and EU
neuralgias over Cuba. The United States may have been justifiably
motivated by the economic-but nonprotectionist-concern that foreign
investors in Cuba benefit from formerly U.S.-owned properties in Cuba,
probably the only truly new development in American interests. The sale of
such properties triggered broader U.S. interests in the stability of its
overseas investments and thereby motivated in part the congressional effort
to enact Helms-Burton." Accordingly, the United States may have used its
threat to invoke the national security exception in the Helms-Burton dispute
for the related purpose, not covered by the security interest exception, of
inducing Europe to accept restrictions on profiting from unlawful
expropriation in negotiations for a new WTO multilateral investment
regime-although arguably only with prospective effect, thus removing
preexisting investments in Cuba from the scope of negotiations. 5 The
United States also obtained European agreement to negotiations "to address
and resolve through agreed principles the issue of conflicting jurisdictions,
including issues affecting investors of another party because of their
investments in third countries,"346 an issue that has historically bedeviled
transatlantic relationships. 7
Through bargaining "in the shadow of" the WTQ, 345 it appears that the
United States and the European Union may have avoided the costs of
litigation. Moreover, if the EU threat of WTO adjudication and the U.S.
retaliatory threat of asserting the national security exception encourage
343. See U.S.-EU MOU, supra note 6, at 529.
344. See Therese Raphael, U.S. and Europe Clash over Cuba, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1997,
at A14 ("Mr. Castro's wholesale expropriation of American property without compensation happened
nearly four decades ago, but only recently has the hard-pressed dictator started actively peddling it to
foreigners. For example, the Italian state-owned phone company Stet is now a large investor in the
Cuban phone system, expropriated from an ITT subsidiary.").
345. See U.S.-EU MOU, supra note 6, at 529 ("[D]isciplines should inhibit and deter future
acquisitions of investments . . . expropriated . . . in contravention of international law, and
subsequent dealings in covered investments"); see also Paul Blustein & Thomas Lippman, Trade
Clash on Cuba Is Averted; U.S.-Europe Pact Seeks to Ease Helms-Burton, WAsH. POST, Apr. 12,
1997, at Al (describing agreement to "try to negotiate common 'disciplines and principles' for
protecting the rights of companies and individuals whose property is seized in violation of
international law. Such measures might, for example, impose penalties on a future purchaser of
property that had been expropriated . . . ."); Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton, EU Ease Tension on
Cuba Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A3 (reporting statement of Marc Thiessen, spokesman
for Senator Jesse Helms, that preexisting investments must also be covered in new investment
agreement).
346. US-EU MOU, supra note 6, at 529-30.
347. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 967-72 (discussing EC objections to U.S. efforts
to impose sanctions extraterritorially).
348. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing how law aids negotiation outside of
courtroom).
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harmonization of policy on the extraterritorial application of law and the
protection of foreign investment, it is hard to quibble with the result.
Bargaining in the shadow of the WTO will continue to be fruitful, however,
only if the WTO continues to serve as a Sword of Damocles for both sides
in disputes implicating national security issues. The comity approach to
interpreting the WTO as a member of the family of "sovereign"
supranational institutions properly balances the constitutional purposes of the
WTO against the need for a measure of state sovereignty in the national
security area, at the same time ensuring that the shadow cast by the United
Nations marks the shape of a law otherwise left invisible by the WTO.
In conclusion, by most accounts we live now in an era characterized by
the declining power of the state and the increasing authority of supranational
institutions. We need, therefore, to reconceive the relationships between
individual states, between states and supranational organizations, and-as
argued here-between supranational organizations. Together, these
relationships will generate a large and now only dimly-perceived set of
interpretative tasks for philosophers, economists, political scientists, and
even for international lawyers. The Bello-Jackson debate over the remedial
powers of the WTO and states' duties of compliance thus foreshadows the
larger debates that lie ahead concerning the effect of the changing structure
of international society on the doctrinal tools we lawyers use to make sense
of our world. Institutional comity may at the end of the day turn out not to
provide the best possible theoretical foundation for these tasks. But, for
now, unlike the contract or constitutional conceptions of WTO law,
institutional comity will provide an agenda for research and analysis that
does not blind itself to the new world before us.
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